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This study examines the descriptive utility of a meta-theoretical approach over the
traditionally applied general theory approach to African International Relations. It argues
in favor of the meta-theoretical approach commonly employed in US foreign policy
studies as yielding greater explanatory capacity to describing the behavior and relations
of the African state than traditional approaches based on a single primary determinant. It
suggests that a multiple primary determinant approach to assessing African state behavior
and relations grants greater theoretical and empirical parallels to state and system
structure and behavior than analysis based on a single determinant.
This study builds a meta-theory of International Relations (metafunctionalism) by
which to assess African state behavior and relations utilizing the most commonly applied
and descriptive conventional and non-conventional theories within the discipline.
Metafunctionalism combines multiple theoretical approaches while negating the
contradictions between them that would limit their relative explanatory capacity. It
employs the theories of functionalism, evolution, realism, liberalism, neomarxism
(international class theory). The presentation of a metafunctional model of African
International Relations will provide an alternative lens by which to view African state
behavior and relations and address the fundamental problems of “description” and
“consensus” within African political discourse.
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The objective of this study is to categorize the African state based on the
dominant behavioral, relational, and structural characteristics that define its behavior and
relations in the first decade of the 21st century. Twenty-first century analysis of the
African state warrants recognition of the complex balance that has evolved between the
structure of the international system and the degree of agency exercised by the African
state over the past fifty years. Previous approaches rooted in realist, liberal, and
international class schools of thought have traditionally attributed African state behavior
and relations primarily to structural forces emerging out of the international system.’
Statist approaches based on sociocultural, psychoanalytic, and structural and functional
frameworks have largely attributed African state behavior and relations mainly to the
degree of internal agency exercised by the state in the decision-making process. Neither
approach by itself is sufficient to describe the evolution of the African state and its
relations into the 2l~~ century.
In the unipolar and now the emerging post-unipolar world of the post-Cold War
‘Feminism is not included here, as the feminist approach does not constitute one of the major
theoretical frameworks used to assess LR, JR theory, or African politics within the most significant
literature within those fields. Feminism does not provide a mechanism for structuring the international
environment and describing the characteristics and behavior of its units.
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period, neither the security concerns of the Cold War nor the postcolonial ambitions of
Western Europe are the primary drivers of African state behavior and relations. In the
fifty years following African independence, the state in Africa state has evolved a unique
pattern of relations between itself and other actors in the international system differing
from the previously dominant bipolar relations of the Cold War and post-independence
neocolonialism. These relationships are both directly and indirectly collaborative in
nature, where existing patterns of domestic political behavior and choice in the African
state are enabled and reinforced by the structure of the international system and actions of
its most influential actors. The central determinants in the state’s behavior and relations
have necessarily become an outgrowth of dual state and non-state factors not
hierarchically ranked in terms of importance and impact. The theoretical frameworks
used to describe and categorize the African state in the 2l~~ century must be capable of
identifying and explaining the evolution of this particular pattern of behavior.
The theoretical tools previously employed to assess the 20th century African state
individually present a significant challenge to describing this defining characteristic of
the 21 St_century African state and correctly categorizing it relative to other states. In the
post-Cold War period, liberal economics and the environment have emerged alongside
security and military power as major factors in system process and organization. As a
result, assessing state behavior and relations can no longer be limited to realist, liberal, or
international class theories in isolation. Assuming the primacy of any one approach
undermines the validity of the other viable approaches, providing only a very limited and
one-sided description of the state and its relations. This study seeks to present a broader
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and more inclusive framework through building a metatheory that will not invalidate
viable theories but utilize their most efficient aspects in providing a more detailed
explanation of African state behavior and relations.
The research focus ofAfrican international relations (IR) was proposed for a host
of reasons growing out of a survey of the available literature. First, the existing literature
did not provide a data-based consensus on the causal factors in African state behavior.
The positions for the determinants of the state’s behavior are at extremes with little to no
moderated middle positions within conventional or unconventional theory. The African
state is granted either too little or too much agency in its own actions relative to systemic
factors. Theoretically, there is no conventional theory presently available that moderates
between the impacts of system structure and state agency.
Second, within the literature, there is little evidence or justification for numerous
assumptions and positions contemporarily applied to the African state within
conventional theory. Numerous assumptions within realism and liberalism cannot be
justifiably sustained while studying the African state, which accounts for almost 25% of
all states in the international system. Particularly problematic are the assertion of the
“nation state” as the base unit of the international system, the “unitary actor” conception
of state rationality, and the predominating liberal ideas regarding new and classical trade
theory. Continued acceptance of those assumptions creates and propagates a crisis of
“general description” and “categorization” within African politics and IR, creating great
difficulty in explaining the behavioral outputs and structure of the African state.
Third, there exists an urgent need to explain how there has been a general
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behavioral change in the African state while its behavioral outputs and outcomes have
remained similar or the same over an extended period of time. The consistency of
outputs and outcomes over the fifty years of African independence easily leads to the
assumption and conclusion that the determinants and processes in the state’s behavior
have remained relatively unchanged. Across the period of African independence,
however, distinct changes have occurred and continue to occur in the behavior and
relations of the African state. These changes must be identified to account for the manner
in which they continue to propagate the state’s behavior, resulting in consistent
behavioral outputs such as underdevelopment and chronic debt.
Fourth, at this juncture of history, it is necessary to present a rational general
study of African IR that provides a clear distinction between rational decision-making
processes within the available means of the state and the deviating decisions chosen by
African leaders. The African state has sufficiently aged and settled into distinct patterns
ofbehavior within the international system to be discussed as a mature but largely
dysfunctional participant in the global system. The decisions and actions of the African
state must necessarily be presented as a reflection of the actual level of agency and
autonomy available to the state within the constraints of the international system. The
practice of exempting the African state from being discussed as an accountable rational
actor has exhausted its academic utility and must now be abandoned. The African state
must now be held to a new standard of accountability in the disciplines of African
Politics and IR.
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Statement of the Problem
The dominant behavioral and relational characteristic of the 21 St century African
state is a unique pattern of collaboration and interaction between the governing elements
of the state and other international actors that may be characteristically described as
“matrimonial” in structure and execution. In patterns of matrimonial collaboration,
indigenous domestic political behavior and choice within the state are enabled and
reinforced by the structure of the international system and actions of its most influential
actors. The state’s behavior and relations are the dual product of large degrees of state
agency exercised by its governing elements in their interests and the position of the
African state in the political and economic structure of the international system.2 This
view is divergent from those of neorealism and international class theory suggesting that
system structure rooted in power or class determinants is the independent variable in
African state behavior and relations. It is also divergent from modernization theory’s or
neoliberalism’s assertion that statist factors are the independent variable in African state
behavior and relations. The central determinants in the state’s behavior and relations
have evolved into a complex nonhierarchical combination of interlinked system and state
factors that cannot necessarily be separated in terms ofprimary and secondary roles. As
a result, descriptions of the 21~ African state as primarily neocolonial or
neopatrimonial are no longer categorically descriptive of its behavior. Those descriptions
are representative of the dominant behavioral patterns of the pre-millennium period.
The fundamental problem presented in this research focuses on the inadequacy of
2 Ian Taylor, “Blind Spots in Analyzing Africa’s Place in World Politics” Global Governance, no. 10
004) :411-412,414-415.
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JR theory and analyses of African politics in presenting a categorization and descriptive
system for the African state reflective of its dominant 21 ~-century structural, behavioral,
and relational characteristics. More specifically, the two disciplines (African politics and
IR) face the challenges of adequate description and categorization and an absence of
theoretical “consensus and consolidation” within the topic area. The problem of
description and categorization for the African state exists both generally within JR theory
and specifically within the study of African politics. The occurrence of this first problem
is compounded by the occurrence of the second parallel problem. The absence of
“theoretical consensus and consolidation” comes about as a result of the broad theoretical
divisions in assessments of the African state, which have largely no moderated positions
or theoretical consolidations. As a result, broad readings of the literature do not easily
allow for a clear identification of the causal factors in the behavior and relations of the
African state.
General IR theory does not present a categorization for the behavioral, relational,
and structural characteristics overwhelmingly shared by the states of sub-Saharan Africa.
Conventional theories such as realism, liberalism, and class analysis do not generally
acknowledge or recognize the existence of a grouping of state characteristics unique to
the African state.3 As general theories of IR, they do not present region-specific
categorizations based on regionally shared characteristics. Rather, they focus primarily
on the structure of the system and the general behavioral, relational, and structural state
characteristics displayed by its base units. General theory grants characteristic
Realist and liberal theorists have not presented a region- or state-specific categorization for the
African state within their major literature pieces. Only within international class theory has the African
state been specifically branded neocolonial by authors such as Kwame Nkrumah.
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descriptions identifiable and applicable among all states without regional limits in
application. States are categorized relative to other states displaying similar
characteristics and are described by the same conceptual terminology reflective of those
traits.4
As a result, within realism, states described as “powerful” display a distinct list of
characteristics while states described as “weak” display a different set of common
attributes. Within liberalism, “most developed states” house a distinct set of traits while
“least developed states” display another set of traits. Within the world systems school of
international class theory, all “center” states display distinct characteristics while all
“peripheral” states share another set of common characteristics. As such, they have no
classification or designation for the shared characteristics general to the states of sub
Saharan Africa.
The problem of categorization and description is paralleled by the problem posed
by an absence of theoretical consensus and consolidation in African politics and IR. The
general theoretical divide between statist and system approaches to description,
explanation, and categorization has not granted conclusive answers to the causal factors
in African state behavior within any single theoretical tradition. Each theoretical
framework has granted its own answers based on differing assumptions and theoretical
traditions, providing a limited degree of causal truth. The problem is rooted in the
classical behavioral question of “structure versus agency,” which is the active variable in
state behavior and relations? Within African politics and IR, there has not been
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theori ofinternational Politics (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979) 79-81.
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developed a consolidation process to seanilessly integrate the select pieces of truth
revealed in each approach and theory. General acknowledgement and consensus on the
existence of multiple causal factors in African state behavior necessarily warrant a
nonhierarchical consolidation of theoretical approaches to explain its behavior and
relations. Out of a consolidation process, a description and categorization system may be
developed to more accurately describe and categorize the empirical realities of the
African state.
Within the field of African politics, there have been efforts to grant region- and
state-specific characteristics to the African state. However, the two most common
descriptive categories utilized in the field to describe the specific characteristics of the
African state and region do not adequately describe its behavioral, relational, and
structural characteristics in the 21St century. Neocolonialism and neopatrimonialism
individually do not parallel the changes that have occurred in the general behavior of the
African state in the twenty years preceding the Cold War. Neocolonialism attributes the
state’s behavior and relations primarily to systemic factors, while neopatrimonialism
focuses primarily on state-based factors5; both are reflective of the problems previously
described in the field of African politics and IR. Any theoretical framework used to
categorize the general, regional, or state-specific characteristics of the African state must
be reflective of its hybrid contemporary pattern of political behavior. The theory must be
derived from an approach simultaneously inclusive of both system and state factors as
primary determinants in state behavior and inclusive of the partial truths revealed in the
~ Zein Kebonang, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Promoting Foreign Direct




This study poses and attempts to answer the following question: “Will the
application of a metatheoretical framework to the study of the African state provide a
more accurate description and categorization ofAfrican state behavior and relations in
the 2l~ century than the previous general theory approaches applied to its analysis?”
Hypothesis
The application of a metatheoretical approach to African IR and politics provides
the necessary framework by which to describe the changes that have occurred in African
state behavior and relations over the past twenty years The metatheoretical approach
provides a feasible framework by which to simultaneously include both system and state
variables as nonhierarchical primary determinants in state behavior and relations. The
assumption of dual primary variables will logically result in conceptual terminology
reflective of those multiple primary variables in the description of the African state. This
will allow for the description of the African state beyond the traditional 2Oth~century
assumptions of African state behavior and relations, which are the product of primary
variable primary determinant approaches.
The application of a metatheory to the study of African state behavior and
relations expands the behavioral and structural assumptions given to the international
environment and its primary variables beyond the linear assumptions of any one theory.
This expansion of base assumptions allows for the consideration of multiple state
behavioral detenninants that are more representative of the multilayered structures of the
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state and characteristics of the system than is a single determinant. Consideration of
multiple behavioral determinants in turn provides a larger basis by which to analyze and
describe the behavior and relations of the state. A metatheoretical approach allows for
the consolidation of theory based on the limited truths revealed in each tradition and the
building of a moderated position between system and state factors.
Definition of Terms and Concepts
-African state or postcolonial African state refers to any one of the 48 states of the African
continent south ofNorth Africa and the Sahara desert.
-Aggregated state power refers to the state’s sum of combined economic, military, and
political influence and capabilities.
-Agonistic relations refer to a system of relations in which states primarily compete
politically, economically, and militarily without imposed limits on the conflicts.
Agonistic systems of relations discourage increased broad cooperation and rules among
states across the system and encourage power balancing, military arms buildups, and
containment as the primary means by which to settle or deter conflicts.
-Artificial multinational state refers to a state in which multiple national groups or
nations inhabit the boundaries of the state, embracing and maintaining loyalties to social
identifications of ethnicity, race, religion, and culture over an overarching state. The
designation of this type of state as artificial is derived from its historical creation through
European colonialism and imperialism (or other national colonialism or imperialism)
culminating in its emergence as a theoretically independent entity in the 1 9th and 20th
centuries.
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-Art~ficial sovereignty refers to a circumstance in which the state’s territorial composition
and borders have essentially been determined by or in relationship to the former colonial
powers of Europe, and are maintained through external relationships with international
institutions and powerful state actors. Due to the inability of the state by itself to exercise
and maintain all aspects of its own sovereignty, it relies on external forces. As such, the
state’s sovereignty and very existence are largely derived and legitimized by external
elements rather than the state population.
-Civigenesis refers to the process by which states and the international system evolve as a
product of the forces of natural selection, coevolution, and group multilevel selection.
Within these evolutionary processes states simultaneously compete, cooperate, and
specialize in the international environment to increase the survival prospects of their
populations.6
-Commensural relations describe any relationship between two or more actors where at
least one of the actors largely benefits while the others are not significantly harmed or
helped. Commensural relationships are either necessary for at least one actor and
nonessential for the others or nonessential for all.
-Consolidatedpower refers to the most constant active elements of aggregate power upon
which system structures and processes may be built and maintained. These elements
include a constant economic and fmancial revenue stream, territorial availability, an
active modem communications network, modem naval and air forces, and multiregional
or global diplomatic offices.
6 Civigenesis is developed as an original concept within this study.
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-Domestic group security dilemma refers to a circumstance in which the sociopolitical,
economic, and military gains of one national group are perceived as a decrease in the
sociopolitical and economic security of other competing groups in the state. This
circumstance of perception arises as an outgrowth of the demographic and sociopolitical
structuring of the artificial state rooted in its past colonial state’s historical policy of
forced population inclusion, integration, and group disempowerment.
-Ecostasis refers to the constant environmental conditions necessary for the global
ecosystem to sustain biological life and regenerate itself. Ecostasis represents the
equilibrium point between the demands living organism’s place on the ecosystem for
their survival, and the ecosystem’s ability to supply those demands without
compromising its ability to self-regenerate. An ideal ecostatic relationship is one that
grants the greatest possible social benefit to individuals, the state, and the system at the
least physical cost to the environment.
-Equ~functional states are those states exhibiting a general level of institutional
organization and a normalized degree of structural complexity that allow for the basic
functioning of their political and economic institutions towards meeting the resource and
security needs of the state. Equifunctional states generally evolve from hypofunctional
states or come about as the result of the developmental stagnation and regression of a
hyperfunctional state. The equifunctional state’s level of economic productivity and
political organization has reached an acceptable point of equilibrium between the basic
wants and needs of the population and the state’s capacity to adequately provide them.
This level of equilibrial functionality grants the state an above-average capacity to
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compete, cooperate, and specialize within the international environment relative to other
states. Individually, equifunctional states continue to specialize within the global
resource production process, internally maintaining high levels of repetitive innovation in
the production and distribution of goods and services. An equifunctional state’s primary
international relationships are mutualistic with secondary parasitic and commensural
relationships. Along with hyperfunctional states, equifunctional states become the
primary cultural and technological developers and providers within the system. They
evolve production, organizational, and cultural practices and processes adopted by the
other states of the system. Together with hyperfunctional states, equifunctional states
account for the largest percentage of the global production of consumer and capital goods
and services. Based on the chronic diminishing returns and increasing cost inherent to
military expenditure, limited developmental space, and the relative costs of military
conflict versus cooperation, equifunctional states opt for cooperation and integration with
other equifunctional states as the most effective means by which to provide for the
essential wants and needs of the state. Equifunctional states include countries such as
England, France, Russia, Italy, Spain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan, among others.
-Funct~ona1 composition refers to the state’s structure being comprised of interlocking
units within a formally organized political and economic system. The state is formally
organized into a system of institutions, infrastructure, and territory that converts societal
inputs into behavioral outputs towards meeting the wants and needs of its population and
aggregately addressing the challenges of the international environment. Its institutions
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are organized in an equilibrial relationship in which changes in one institution will
necessarily be reflected in changes in adjoining institutions or society as a whole.
-Functionality cost refers to the long- and short-term costs states must incur to
functionalize to the hypofunctional stage and above. The most common costs to achieve
greater societal complexity include environmental destruction and degradation, political
repression, social and economic inequality, humanitarian disaster and underdevelopment,
and large-scale debt.
-Functional governance refers to governance facilitating long-term increases in state
functionality to the hypofunctional level and above.7 The elements of functional
governance historically displayed across the international system to date have been
responsible government, strategic vision, long-term planning, and the desire to increase
human security and quality of life within the state.8 Functional governance may be
observed across every region of the world across all forms of government from
democracy to authoritarianism. The development of functional governance is inherently
linked to political values, history, culture, and geography.
-Functional transition refers to a principle of state development suggesting that all states
must go through phases of transition until they reach an evolutionary ceiling or floor in
their development. State developmental transitions are an inherent part of the
evolutionary pattern of states as they leave one phase of development and enter another
phase above or below it. Once a state transitions into a different category, its behavior
This term ~ as developed and introduced by the researcher.
~ These traits are based on the observations of the researcher.
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and relations become reflective of the transition.
-Hierarchical anarchy describes the systemic imposition of varying levels of anarchy on
states in which relatively weak states are subject to greater levels of structural or
institutional regulation and subordination bordering on governance while the most
powerful and influential states experience the greatest degree of anarchy as they structure
and maintain global order in an environment of ongoing self-help.
-Hyperfunctional states are those states housing an enhanced degree of structural
organization and institutional complexity that effectively hyperaccelerates the normal
functioning of institutions and societal productivity. This level of hyperfunctionality
super-enhances the state’s capacity to compete, cooperate, and specialize relative to other
states in the international environment through repetitive innovation and security.
Hyperfunctional states evolve from either hypoflmctional states or equifunctional states.
Hyperfunctional states presently have the greatest capacity for long-term rapid growth
and development and become central hegemonic pillars within the international order.
They are central to the maintenance of the system as they contain the greatest capacity to
contribute to international public good. They encourage systemic and institutional
participation among other states by creating conditions for those states to free ride and
enjoy the benefits of the system without paying the bulk of the cost to maintain it.
Hyperfunctional states’ primary relationships are largely mutualistic or parasitic in
nature. In their mutualistic relationships, hyperfunctional states accrue massive benefits
along with the other participating parties in the relationship. In their parasitic
relationships, they accrue massive benefits at the expense of the other participating
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parties in the relationship. Their secondary relationships are commensural, adding to
international public good and system stability. Based on the principle of diminishing
returns on military expenditure and the limits of developmental space and resources,
hyperfunctional states in the long term will settle into an equifunctional condition, more
closely cooperating and integrating with other equifunctional states. Hyperfunctional
states include states such as China, the United States, Japan, and Germany.
-Hypofunctional states are those states in which the basic level of institutional
organization and structural complexity functions just below the equilibrium point
between the demands of the state in terms ofbasic wants and needs and the state’s ability
to supply and provide for those wants and needs. The state’s needs outweigh its
productive capacity, where its institutions are complex enough in their organization and
development to allow for rapid economic growth and development but are too limited to
extend those processes and their benefits to the entire state. Their level of subequilibrial
functionality grants the state an above-average capacity to compete, cooperate, and
specialize within the international environment relative to other states. Hypofunctional
states generally evolve from protofunctional and pathofunctional states or emerge as the
result of the developmental stagnation or regression of an equiflrnctional state.
Hypoflmctional states presently include countries such as India, Brazil, Indonesia,
Turkey, Iran, Poland, Czech Republic, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, South
Africa, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Bangladesh, Panama, Costa Rica,
Belize, Ghana, and Senegal.
-Institutional inertia refers to the occurrence or development of unusually high levels of
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organizational rigidity and complacency within national institutions that limit or constrain
these institutions’ ability to evolve to reflect the changing needs of society and the state.
Institutional inertia occurs when the national sociopolitical and economic institutions
systematically reproduce specific sociopolitical and economic outputs regardless of the
type of inputs into the state. The institutions become rigid and dogmatic in their
approach to addressing societal needs and wants.
-Metafunctionalism is a metatheory of IR developed to assess state behavior and relations
through a multiple-primary-determinant approach built on modified functionalist
assumptions and the collective processes of evolution.9 It simultaneously utilizes the
most common theories of IR and a host of unconventional frameworks to explain and
categorize state behavior and relations. Metafunctionalism’s modified functionalist
assumption maintains an analogy between the individual organism and the state or
society. The state is held to be analogous to a living organism, in that both society and
organisms are made up of interdependent working parts and systems that must function
together in order for the greater body to function. The state is dually composed of a
physical territory and infrastructure and its multiple institutions including the family,
educational system, religious system, judicial system, political system, econoimc system,
military, and other institutions. These institutions are connected in an equilibrial
relationship in which significant changes in one institution will ultimately be paralleled
by changes in other institutions. As a result, state behavior must be assessed in terms of
its multiple societal sources working in concert to produce policy or action. Just as
~ Metafunctionalism is a metatheory of state behavior and JR developed within this study by the
researcher based on functionalism, evolution, realism, liberalism, international class theory, structural
functionalism, and a select number of unconventional theories.
18
individual behavior is afforded to a host of factors working in unison that are studied
within separate fields and different theoretical traditions, likewise the state requires
multiple levels of analysis to assess its behavior and relations. The state’s behavior and
relations therefore require consideration of multiple primary determinants to describe and
categorize its behavior.
-Metafunctionalist model ofstate behavior and relations refers to the behavioral model
designed to operationalize and illustrate metafunctionalism. The metafunctionalist model
of state behavior and relations illustrates how the structure of the international
environment and the characteristics of the international system and its state units drive
state behavior and relations. Its format streamlines a circular system of political inputs
and outputs from the anarchical structure of the international environment to the
institutional processes and outputs of the state.
-Multiunit system composition refers to the base units of the international system that
include both the nation-state and artificial multinational state. These state units are
rational actors seeking their own interest. Most states in the Global South
characteristically fall within the description of the artificial multinational state as opposed
to a functional nation-state. The functioning of their institutions and their behavioral
outputs differ greatly from those of the functional nation-states primarily found in the
Global North.
-Mutualistic relations describe any relationship between two or more actors where all
actors derive major benefits. Mutualistic relationships may be either necessary for all
actors, necessary for some actors but nonessential for the others, or nonessential for all.
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-Neutrofunctional states are structurally collapsed states in which the official formally
organized political, economic, and social institutions of the state have ceased to function
or no longer exist in their capacity as the organs by which to organize and order the state.
The state has no formal governing authorities or standing military. A state becomes
neutrofunctional through civil, national, or international conflict, economic sanctions,
natural disasters, or political collapse. Somalia is a present example of a neutrofunctional
state. With no functional institutions and no active political or economic system, the
state is unable to serve as a mechanism to deliver scarce resources to its population. With
no effective governing or societal institutions by which to effectively organize the state,
the state’s struc al collapse culminates in the erosion of its political social and
territorial integrity. In essence, there is not an actual state, but a shadow of a state
maintained by the juridical recognition of international institutions and other states. It
has primitive forms of decentralized leadership revolving around religion, clan, tribe, and
warlordism. It has no significant international relationships other than those of aid
regimes. Neutrofunctional states may be resuscitated through external aid to a
protofunctional or pathofunctional stage of development. Previously collapsed and failed
states include Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo. Somalia is the African continent’s
existing neutrofunctional state.
-Parasitic relations describe any relationship between two or more actors in which one or
more of the actors involved largely benefits while the others are significantly harmed.
Parasitic relationships are either necessary for at least one actor but nonessential for the
others or nonessential for all actors in the relationship.
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-Pathofunctional states are those states in which lower levels of institutional organization
and structural underdevelopment drastically impair and retard the normal functioning of
the state’s institutions. The state does not house enough productive capacity to
independently maintain its own survival or ensure the survival of its population without
external assistance. Its extreme degree of subequilibrial functionality impedes the state’s
ability to compete, cooperate, or specialize in any effective manner within the
international environment. Pathofunctional states presently include most of the states of
sub-Saharan Africa, Guyana, Paraguay, Uruguay, Guatemala, Bolivia, Columbia, Laos,
Myanmar, Nepal, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria, among a host
of others.
-Polar mobility refers to the ability of states to accumulate vast amounts of aggregate
power within the international system structure.
-Protofunctional states are states that in practical reality have essentially no active
centralized national institutions beyond their center that house governing officials, the
military, and the police forces. National institutions in these states not only have failed,
but also are neglected or simply not used as tools to serve the wants and needs of the
population. The state government primarily acts as the prime intermediary between the
state and other international actors, maintaining a military and police force to guarantee
its own security, protect private and public investments, and maintain control over the
population. Protofunctional states presently include states such as Afghanistan, Niger,
Myanmar, Congo, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, Tajikistan, East
Timor, and Haiti.
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-Reciprocally altruistic relations refer to a system of relations that enable and encourage
broad cooperation among states. States generally cooperate based on the condition that
the relative cost they incur to cooperate is less than the relative benefits their cooperation
grants to other participating states. Each state follows the rules and participates because
the other states of the system have agreed to do the same.
Reciprocally altruistic relations discourage balancing behaviors and military arms races
but fail to deter conflict with states that do not wish to cooperate.
-Soft sovereignty refers to the marginal or limited application of state sovereignty, where
even with the external maintenance of the state’s sovereignty, its structural and
institutional weakness restricts its capacity to fully employ internal or external resources
towards meeting its sovereign responsibilities in a hard application similar to fully
sovereign states.
-Structural andfunctional independence refers to the practical condition of states
primarily found in the first and upper second tiers of states whose institutions are
organized in such a manner as to allow for the efficient use of resources towards the
provision of the needs of the state and its inhabitants without external structural support.
Their political systems serve as effective societal organizing tools by which to meet the
collective interests within the state and ensure accountability and transparency in the
extraction, allocation, and distribution of resources. Examples of states of this type are
the United States, Russia, China, France, and Japan.
-Structural dependence and dysfunctionality refers to the practical condition of states
primarily found in the lower second and third tiers of states whose institutions are
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organized in a manner that hinders or negates the efficient employment of state resources
towards the provision of the needs of the state and its inhabitants. Rather than serving as
an effective societal organizing tool, the political system enables and facilitates
institutional inefficiency and corruption without organizational or institutional
accountability. The process of resource extraction, allocation, and distribution in these
states is adversely affected, and each state’s ability to internally provide for itself is
severely compromised. The cumulative result of the institutional disorganization is a
reliance on external political and economic structural support. Without external support,
many states in the third tier would regress into structural collapse and institutional failure.
These states’ complete reliance on external structural support may also be referred to as
dependency. Examples of states of this type are Togo and Benin.
-Structural dependence andfunctionaliiy refers to the practical condition of states
primarily found in the lower second tier and upper third tier of states whose political
systems are organized to a sufficient operational degree to work in concert with external
support systems in mobilizing state resources to meet basic societal wants and needs.
However, the institutions of these states are organized in a manner that allows significant
institutional inefficiency and corruption to necessitate external supports to mitigate the
adverse affects of institutional and organizational weakness. The political process and
governing institutions ensure enough transparency and accountability to secure external
assistance for a functional system of extraction, allocation, and distribution of basic and
essential state resources, goods, and services. Even though existing in a state of
dependency, these states engender an acceptable degree of functionality and theoretically
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are on a transitional path to structural independence. Examples of states of this type are
Ghana, Dominican Republic, and the Philippines.
-Structural elasticity refers to the capacity of the system’s structure to expand and
accommodate increasing numbers of state and non-state units
-Structural independence and dysfunctionality refers to the practical condition of states
primarily found in the lower first and second tiers of states whose institutions are
organized in such a manner as to ensure the basic employment of resources towards the
provision primarily of the essential needs of the state and its inhabitants without external
structural support. Their political systems are organized to an operational degree that
allows resources to be mobilized to meet the most basic needs of the state but not the
collective interests of its population. These state institutions are organized in a manner
that facilitates institutional inefficiency and corruption that adversely affect the state’s
ability to provide for itself as a flilly functional entity. The political process and
governments ensure only enough transparency and accountability to enable the inefficient
and limited extraction, allocation, and distribution of state resources. The cumulative
result of the institutional organization of the state is its partial and limited functionality.
However, such states have the option of seeking external assistance in areas beyond
essential goods and services. Examples of such states are India, Iran, and South Africa.
-Structural penetration describes the condition of a state whose internal structure and
institutions are compromised by the presence of external actors whose actions undermine
or supersede aspects of the state’s sovereignty to a degree that impedes its ability to act
within its own interest. A structurally penetrated state’s sovereignty may be so greatly
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encumbered by the presence and actions of external actors that several of its domestic and
foreign policy decisions and behaviors cannot be discussed in isolation from those
external actors. Examples of structurally penetrated states are Zambia and Mozambique.
-Structuralpolarity refers to the point or position of the greatest diffusion of consolidated
power within the system.
-Structural underdevelopment describes a national condition in which both internal and
external factors systematically weaken state institutions and retard the state’s ability to
function effectively or expand. A state’s institutional organization and the nature of
international relationships impede its ability to sufficiently expand its material
capabilities towards providing basic necessities. In this condition of structural
underdevelopment, the state’s sociopolitical and economic institutions are unable to
efficiently process societal and international inputs and convert them into functional
outputs in a manner that allows that process to be cyclically reproduced and expanded.
State structural and institutional expansion is contingent on socioeconomic growth and
development in which the aggregate generation of revenue and increasing complexity of
social networks and values enhance the ability of the state to satisfy an increasing number
of societal wants and needs. The majority of states in sub-Saharan Africa are
experiencing prolonged periods of structural underdevelopment that are plunging them
further into poverty, debt, and civil instability.
-Tangible and intangible system characteristics refer to the dual characteristics afforded
to the international system through the collective processes of evolution or civigenesis.’
° The classification of the characteristics of the international system into tangible and intangible
aracteristics was developed in this study by the researcher.
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Tangible characteristics describe those traits readily measurable in the international
environment and physically represented. They include realist, liberal, and international
class characteristics. Intangible characteristics describe those traits that cannot be
readily measured and may not be physically represented in the international environment.
They include relative degrees of polar mobility, structural elasticity, competitive
tendencies, cooperative tendencies, and isolationist tendencies. The system’s tangible
characteristics determine its intangible characteristics.
Assumptions
This study contains five central assumptions in seeking to answer its stated
research question. It first assumes that African state behavior and relations regionally
and internationally can be generalized across a region as vast and diverse as sub-Saharan
Africa. This assumption is common in the literature and founded on similarities in
geographic region, history of colonial rule, state structure, and behavioral outputs. While
a few notable exceptions exist, scholars apply general political and economic theories to
the region. Within general IR studies, both normative and scientific categorizations such
as the west, western civilization, industrialized, nonindusirialized, most developed, least
developed,first-second-third world, Arab world, and Muslim world are commonly used.
sub-Saharan Africa is not exempt from the theoretical necessity to group and categorize.
Second, this study assumes that the African state must be categorized based on the
collection of behavioral, relational, and structural characteristics shared by a majority of
African states. Within this study, a majority of states is based minimally on a two-thirds-
plus ratio (66-67%), or 32+ of the 48 states of sub-Saharan Africa. Secondary and
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tertiary categorizations must be granted for the exceptions to the majority comprising the
remaining one-third of sub-Saharan states. Likewise, they must be categorized based on
their dominant shared characteristics and behaviors.
Third, this study assumes that there is no generally accepted theory of Affican IR
capable of comprehensively describing African state behavior and relations in an
empirically verifiable fashion by itself. The seminal texts in the field have not agreed on
a comprehensive general theory of African IR, and in its place exists a plethora of
theories that have attempted comprehensive descriptions but have achieved only limited
and partial explanations. Fourth, this study assumes the validity of existing IR theories as
partial explanations of state behavior and relations. Each theory represents only a limited
and partial truth, granting an incomplete representation of the empirical realities of the
state.
Fifth, this study assumes that African state behavior and relations have developed
in transitional phases that can be tracked, separated, and described from independence to
the present. The first phase of sub-Saharan African statehood was from 1957 to 1974, the
second phase was from 1975 to 1993, the third phase was from 1994 to 2000, and the
fourth phase was from 2001 to the present.” This study seeks to expound on the fourth
phase presently underway.
Peter J. Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transfoz7nation ,nd ed. (London:
WadsworthtThomson Learning, 2004), 83-84. The first three phases of sub-Saharan African independence
are general to African politics, coinciding with events such as the close of the Cold War. However, there is
no general consensus on a fourth phase underway in the post-9/1 1 era. The first decade of the 2’~
millennium is still under observation within African politics and has not yet been identified as a fourth
transitional phase within the literature. The researcher regards 2001 as the beginning of a fourth phase in
the development of the independent African state even though theoretical consensus is lacking.
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Methodology
This work is a review of IR theory as applied to sub-Saharan Africa. Its primary
focus is the development of a new categorization and descriptive system by which to
assess contemporary African state behavior. This new categorization and descriptive
system will deviate from traditional approaches and be built upon a metatheoretical
approach to IR theory. The metatheoretical approach is most immediately borrowed
from foreign policy models and studies of state behavior and decision making of
countries within the international arena. It represents a nontraditional method of
theorizing the African state within African politics and IR.
The metatheoreticallmultideterminant approach to analysis will be contrasted with
the general theory/primary-determinant approach commonly applied in JR. The
metatheory developed in this study is built upon the theories of evolution, functionalism,
realism, liberalism, class, structural functionalism, psychoanalytical and perception
theories, and leadership type/styles analysis. These theories were chosen based first on
their descriptive utility and second on their positions as the most highly utilized theories
across the spectrum of literature dedicated to the African state and its relations.
Significance of the Study
This study addresses the theoretical problems of description and categorization in
the fields of African domestic and international politics that are a product of the
transitional nature of the African state. It is intended to present a rational general study
of the African state based on empirically verifiable assumptions within distinct
behavioral phases and time periods. The fields of African politics and African JR stand
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to benefit from this contemporary effort to theorize the African state and describe it in a
manner reflective of the changes that have evolved in its behavior and relations in the 21st
century.
The most common approaches to describing and explaining African state behavior
and relations are reflective of 2O~-century assumptions, and the development of a new
description and categorization system is necessary to reflect the changes that have
occurred in the African state from the close of the Cold War through the first decade of
the 2l~ century. Categories and concepts popularized in African politics such as
neocolonialism and neopatrimonialism by themselves are no longer sufficient as
descriptive tools of African politics. They must be reassessed according to their ability to
parallel the empirical realities of the African state. A re-categorization of the African
state propels the study of African politics beyond the period of extended theoretical
stagnation begirming in the l980s.
This study hopes to begin a trend within African politics and IR in standardizing
the application of the metatheoretical method to the study of the African state and its
relations. Within the field, there is a need for more moderated positions between
systemic and statist approaches and a consolidation of theory. Previous general theory
approaches housed very narrow assumptions regarding state behavior and relations,
essentially attributing state behavior to a central primary determinant represented in a
single theory. Within the context of 21 Sl~~~fl~j_y JR discourse, the assumption that the
behavior and relations of a multilayered state entity could be limited to a single
behavioral determinant faces great challenges in being substantiated by empirical data.
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The assumptions contained in this study are made to reflect the empirical realities
of the international environment and its primary variables as opposed to propagating
assumptions that cannot be substantiated by data and are the product of theoretical
tradition. In this study great effort was made to separate from the ongoing practice of
building on the strict assumptions of existing theory which are no longer empirically
accurate. Many of the accepted assumptions common to the African state do not reflect
the fundamental changes that have occurred in the continent and international system
The metatheoretical approach is intended to simplify the identification of the role
of the state and system as either the dependent variable, independent variable, or a
combination of the two in African state behavior and relations. Under the present
theoretical discourse, this distinction has been very difficult to determine, given the
differences in theoretical approaches and philosophy as expressed in the rhetorical and
literary positions of academia, international institutions, organizations, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and African leadership and governments.
Limitations of the Study
This study is limited to the development of a new category and system by which
to describe the contemporary behavioral trends of the African state within the
international environment. The states of sub-Saharan Africa are the primary regional
focus, and there will be no attempt to evaluate states in other regions of the world. The
metatheory employed in this study is built on a host of theories: the most conventional
theories of ER and their variants (realism, liberalism, international class analysis) and
alternative theories and their variants (evolution, culture, perception, psychoanalysis,
30
leadership type style analysis). A metatheoretical framework is seen as ideal because of
the historical limitations of the pursuit of comprehensive general theories of behavior in
the social sciences that to date have yielded only limited and partial explanatory
capability.’2 Existing theories chosen for inclusion in the metatheory are in their present
form sufficient for the building of a metatheory of African IR. They require no
modification to be included in the metatheory.
Deficiencies of this Study
The first and most apparent deficiency of this study is its assumption that the
theories upon which the metatheory is based are collectively sufficient to explain African
state behavior and relations. All JR theories are continually being developed and
expounded on by their proponents to be more efficient as well as to accommodate state
and systemic changes. Metatheories do not automatically include an internal mechanism
allowing for the expansion of the metatheory as the theories it is built on grow and are
further developed. All theory is based on a host of assumptions relative to the current
structure and functioning of the international system and African state. Those
assumptions are subject to change as the international environment fundamentally
changes, requiring the restructuring of any metatheory. The restructuring of the
metatheory, in turn, may require altering the categorization and descriptive system.
Second, metatheories are finite or infinite based largely on the subjectivity of the
theorist. The selection of appropriate theories is a subjective activity, and arguments may
be made for more or fewer theories being included. The ideal number today may not be
12 Eugene J. Meehan, Explanation in Social Science: A System Paradigm (Homewood: The Dorsey
ess, 1968), 12.
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the ideal number tomorrow to achieve the level of description desirable.
Organization of the Study
Chapter 1 of this study was dedicated to the introduction of the research question
and topic area, giving justifications for its pursuit and stating the fundamental problem it
seeks to address. The research parameters were defmed along with the basic assumptions
and limitations of the study. A definition of terms was presented to explain all
uncommon terms utilized in proceeding chapters. Chapter 2 of this study includes an
extensive literature review of the theoretical frameworks applied to the study of African
politics and IR by both contemporary and classical authors. Chapter 3 goes on to outline
the theoretical framework employed in this study to assess the behavior and relations of
the African state. The most commonly applied general theories are first evaluated and
critiqued, including realism, liberalism, and class analysis. The metatheoretical method
is introduced as an alternative to the general theory approach. Chapter 3 also highlights
the limitations of single theory primary determinant approaches relative to the benefits of
a multiple theory multideterminant approach. It goes on to introduce metafunctionalism
as a metatheory for explaining state behavior and relations. The concepts of civigenesis
and its variants of competition, symbiosis, and multilevel selection are explained in their
relation to system and state development.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to a detailed explanation of the metafunctional model of
state behavior and relations. The model is developed as a means of operationalizing
metafunctional theory and illustrating how it is played out in the international
environment. Section 1 of the chapter describes the major global variables of system and
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state, introducing alternative concepts such as hierarchical anarchy, multiple unit system
composition, the artificial multinational state, artificial sovereignty, and soft sovereignty.
Sections 2 through 6 are dedicated to the behavioral determinants of state behavior and
relations and their variants.
Section 2 describes the realist characteristics of state behavior and relations,
explaining those influences centering on conflict and its amelioration in the absence of a
global government to order the international environment and regulate state behavior.
The realist characteristics’ corresponding variants include power, national interest,
material capability, and balance. Section 3 describes the liberal characteristics of state
behavior and relations, explaining those influences centering on cooperation and global
governance in the absence of a global government to order the international environment
and relations between state actors. The liberal characteristics’ corresponding variants
include international institutionalism, complex interdependence, globalization, and
international aid regimes. Section 4 describes the international class characteristics of
state behavior and relations, explaining those influences centering on the establishment of
an international political hierarchy and economic stratification of states within the
international system and global economy. The international class characteristics’
corresponding behavioral variants include class conflict, political hierarchy, economic
stratification, institutional regulation, and systemic subordination.
Section 5 describes the structure and function characteristics of state behavior and
relations, explaining those influences emanating out of the institutional and territorial
organization of the state as a national and domestic conduit for sociopolitical inputs and
33
processor ofpolicy outputs. Structure and functions’ corresponding variants include
structural and functional independence and dependence, structural institutionalism and
institutional inertia, structural penetration, structural underdevelopment, institutional
failure, and structural collapse. Section 6 describes the leadership type style factors in
state behavior and relations, explaining those influences on state relations derived from
the type/style of leadership exercised within the state’s governing structure. Its
corresponding variants include national leadership, democratic leadership, kleptocratic
leadership, neopatrimonialism, and clientelism. Section 6 describes the
perception/worldview characteristics in state behavior and relations, explaining the
influences on state behavior and relations derived from an amalgamation of elite, mass,
and leadership understandings of the international environment and their preferences for
both domestic and international order. The world view’s corresponding variants include
globalist-regional-national views, centrist-peripheral views, polar-satellite views, racial-
ethnic-religious views, and civilizational views.
Section 7 is dedicated to policy institutions and state behavioral outputs. It
describes the consolidation process in state decision making as policy through both its
domestic and foreign policy institutions. It presents domestic and foreign policy as being
intermestic in nature, where each policy contains both domestic and foreign policy
elements. It concludes with an analysis of what happens when intermestic policy exits
state institutions into the international environment as behavioral outputs.
Chapter 5 categorizes and describes the dominant characteristics of a majority of
African states. Additionally, the minority exceptions are outlined with detailed
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justifications for their placement in select categories. Chapter 6 is dedicated to an
analysis of the findings of the study, while chapter 7 summarizes its conclusions.
Conclusions are drawn regarding the descriptive utility of the metatheoretical approach
and metafunctionalism in particular. The metatheoretical approach as applied in
metafunctionalism will be assessed first based on its utility and accuracy as an ordering
system for the international environment, the interactions within it, and its units; second
based on its capacity for describing and categorizing African state behavior and relations;
and third regarding the method and viability of the analytical procedure by which the
integration and consolidation of theories were achieved.
Metafunctionalism will be practically evaluated based on how closely it models
and parallels existing official and unofficial systemic structures, institutions and
institutional policy, and structural outputs. It will be evaluated based on its creation of a
logical chronology of structure and process in the form of an operational model by which
it illustrates international activity and state behavior. It will be judged by the degree of
effectiveness by which it negates the intertheory contradictions that may necessarily arise
in theoretical combines. The metatheory developed in this study (metafunctionalism)
must grant, at minimum, the same degree of accuracy in describing and categorizing the
African state as existing theory. The chapter concludes with possible future questions
and prescriptions for future applications of the metatheoretical method and
metafunctionalism in African politics and ER.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The primary literature reviewed discusses the behavior and relations of the
African state. The pieces vary in their theoretical frameworks and are set across a time
period of 60 years The texts specifically dedicated to the area of African International
Relations are limited in number both classically and contemporarily, superseded by more
general studies of the African state’s sociopolitical and economic development. The
literature set may be divided into classical and contemporary pieces including classic
authors such as Basil Davidson, Kwame Nkrumah, Franz Fanon, Walter Rodney, and
Samuel Huntington and more recent authors such as Christopher Clapham, Edmond
Keller, Donald Rothchild, Ian Taylor, Paul Williams, and Daniel Offiong.
The backdrop to the study of Afncan International Relations is the Cold War that
ensued prior to the African independence period. Realism, as the conventional
theoretical framework of the Cold War both classically and in the post-Cold War period
was employed to describe the international relations of the African state as well as many
other areas of the world. In the first 40 years of African independence, realists placed the
bi-polar politics of the Cold War and neocolonial interests of the former European
colonial powers as the defining element in African state relations. Its international
relations merely being an extension of the geopolitical and geostrategic considerations of
the United States and Soviet Union in their global competition for preeminence over the
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globe.1 Realism was fundamentally rejected by African-centered scholars as an effective
means to describe the behavior and relations of the African state because of their
fundamentally different assumptions regarding the international environment and the
post-colonial state.2 However, socialist/Marxist thought prior to and during the
independence period pervaded the major literature dedicated to the relations and behavior
of the African state as the nonindustrialized world harnessed it to explain its condition
within the context of a Western colonialism, imperialism, and global capitalism. Marxist
and Leninist concepts were used to describe the system of international order and the
relationships between the actors within the system as the product of class conflict.
Several of the most important African-centered pieces of forty-sixty years ago are rooted
in a Marxistlsocialist framework to provide the foundations for the development of their
alternative theories and approaches to describing the behavior and relations of the African
state.3 However, in-between these two dominant traditions a number of nonsystemic
approaches in the form of statist and civilization frameworks were also applied as a
means of theorizing the African state and its behavior and relations.
In the literature, the first notable theoretical framework arising to explain the
behavior and relations of the African state was neocolonialism. Kwame Nlcrumah, the
theory’s most famous African proponent, conceived the behavior and relations of the
African state to be largely the product of its relationship with the former Western
Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International Srstern: The Politics ofSlate Survi~ a? (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2 Ojo, Orwa, and Utete, 11-12.
Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1987), 1-3.
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European colonizing states, their allies, international fmancial institutions, and
international organizations.4 The African state even though theoretically independent is
essentially a satellite or client of a former colonial state and is structured institutionally to
reproduce domestic and international outputs consistent with colonial type relationships.
Leadership in the African state is either manufactured internally or externally to
reproduce individuals willing and able to facilitate such a relationship. The international
relations and domestic politics of the state are dictated by its neocolonial relationships as
opposed to concerns of national interest, security, power maximization, international
institutionalism, or class.5
Within the context of anti-colonial struggle and post-colonial independence,
socio-psychological analytical frameworks and perception studies were introduced to
explain the condition of the African state and its behavior and relations. Frantz Fanon
popularized this approach as he presented the behavior and relations of the African state
as the outgrowth of an ongoing internal and external battle to forge a cohesive African
identity. The colonial African identity was forged through intense violence and an
independent African identity must also necessarily be forged through violence within an
insecure international environment.6 The African and African state are continually
bombarded by international, state, and non-state actors with prescriptions for identities
apart from that of independence. Former colonial powers reinforce an identity and
~ Kwame Nlcrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage ofIniperialism (International Publishers Co.,
c., 1966).
Ibid.
6 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Paris: HarperCollins Publishers & Grove Atlantic,
Inc., 1967).
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position of subservience for the African state in spite of the independent identity
struggled for through violence by the African state. The African state is itself internally
torn between the identities of those individuals historically circumscribed and relegated
to a menial and difficult African life, and those living a more privileged existence
predicated on Western education, norms, behavior, and relationships. As a result, the
relations and behaviors of the state revolve around a conflict between these two groups in
economic, political, and social spheres for control over a national identity. ~ This conflict
and question of identity itself must be settled through violence and force, as these
identities were established and maintained by violence and force enacted by the
colonizer. The behavior and relations of the African state will be continually riddled with
conflict and security issues until the internal and external question of its identity is
settled.
By the mid 1 970s, a host of statist approaches differing from the neocolonial and
psychosocial frameworks became popularized as a means of theorizing the African state
and its relations. Basil Davidson, the most famous proponent of this approach to the
African state, framed its behavior and relations as an outgrowth of the historical
dysfunctionality of the nation-state in sub-Saharan Africa.8 The nation-state that emerged
in the region, initially hoped to be a means by which to introduce and integrate Africa
and its peoples into the modem world, functions to reinforce domestic insecurity civil
instability, and widespread poverty. The nation-state models imposed and adopted by
Ibid.
Basil Davidson, The Black Man ‘s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (New York:
Three Rivers Press, 1992).
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sub-Saharan Africa engendered a certain sociocultural and political incompatibility with
the local populations. Particularly inasmuch as they have not been effective mechanisms
by which to address the political and developmental needs of the state. Instead, these
state and political models largely allowed for the manipulation of the political system in a
manner that retarded the political and economic growth and development of the state.
The international relations of the state likewise are reflective of this incompatibility
between the African state’s governing structures and institutions and the sociocultural
makeup of African society. Its international relationships serve to expose the state to
mass exploitation and international insecurity as opposed to minimizing or mediating the
insecurities and dangers the international environment imposes on the state.
In an expansion of applied systematic thinldng and approaches, development and
dependency theories were developed to explain Africa’s specific circumstances in the
global system. The premier proponent of this approach, Walter Rodney, essentially
described the relations and behavior of the African state as an outgrowth of its historical
underdevelopment by Western European powers.1° The African state’s historical and
contemporary relationship with Europe, its allies, and international institutions and
organizations, restricted its capacity to grow and develop into a functionally independent
actor capable of internal self development. Through the international system, African
state’s primary resources are systematically extracted from the state in a manner that
deprives the state of the breadth of the wealth those resources generate. As a result, the
Ibid.
JO Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications,
1972).
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state is unable to generate enough revenues to purchase or produce essential capital and
consumer goods and services towards the building of its own extractive and economic
capacity. The state is then relegated to dependency on goods, services, and credit from
those actors who generate the most wealth from the extraction of African primary
resources.1’ As a result, the relations and behavior of the state either become an
outgrowth of international efforts to reinforce the system ofunderdevelopment, or
internal efforts to halt the system of underdevelopment and achieve development and
growth. The state and its leadership will be structured to achieve either of these two
goals in the conduct of both its international relations and domestic politics.
Among classic authors on the subject of development Samuel Huntington is the
chief proponent of the civilizational approach to state relations, describing state behavior
and relations as the product of a global competition between the world’s most prominent
civilizations. 12 Among states, this civilizational competition manifests itself along
cultural, religious, language, regional, traditional alliances, economic, and military lines.
States cooperate or engage in conflict based on these varying civilizations factors in
efforts to achieve influence or dominance over competing civilizations, and within their
own civilizational grouping. Conflict is most likely to manifest in those geographic areas
where civilizations meet or border each other, particularly where civilizational lines
overlap within a state or geographic region. 13
ibid.
12 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations” Foreign Affairs, vol. 23, no. 1 (July/August 1993).
13 ibid.
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Within the context of this civilizational framework, the African state since the 7th
century Muslim invasions may be described as being caught in the middle of a
civilizational conflict seeking to draw it into multiple civilizational groups. The state’s
behavior and relations consequently reflect this tug of war, both internally and
externally.’4 On the African continent and in the African Diaspora, there are those
groups and individuals seeking to establish the African region as its own civilization pole.
African independence, African unity, and economic integration and regionalism, all
represent efforts to establish an African centered civilization. However, the former
Western European colonizers of Africa, even after the era of African independence,
continually seek to reintegrate the African region into the sphere of Western civilization.
Simultaneously, the broad adherence to Islam in every subregion of the continent serves
to draw large portions of it into the Turko-Islamic civilization. Furthermore, the large
scale entry of the Chinese and Indians into the continent further complicate the
civilizational loyalties of the continent as India and China seek to extend their influence
across the continent. The African state possibly suffers from a condition of civilizational
schizophrenia where its relations and behavior are dictated by the civilizational forces
most strongly pulling the state into its sphere of influence.’5 The overwhelming
dominance of France in Central and West Africa, the Arab domination of the sub-Saharan
governments of Sudan and Mauritania, the practice of Islamic law and government in
Senegal and Nigeria, the dual membership of Somalia, the Comoros, and Djibouti in the
‘~ This assessment is the position of the researcher in applying a civilizational framework to Africa.
This assessment is the position of the researcher in applying a civilizational framework to the African
ontinent.
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African Union and Arab league, and the large multiracial compositions of Mauritania,
Namibia, South Africa, Sudan, and Zimbabwe are all symptomatic of the civilizational
competition existing on the African continent.
The close of the Cold War essentially ended the classic period of scholarship
within African International Relations as the world transitioned to a unipolar international
order based on liberal and neoliberal regimes. Existing theory was reassessed and
reapplied and new theory developed to describe the behavior and relations of the African
state in the face of new systemic changes. African International Relations became
dominated by literature centered on African state and regional transitions from the realist
frameworks of the Cold War to the neoliberal international economic order of the
unipolar world. Africa’s place and position within the new international order was
closely examined particularly with regards to the capacity of the African state to
modernize, grow, and develop within the new order.
Among neorealists, Christopher Clapham presents a security-based framework on
what he describes as the post-Cold War international relations of the African state as the
product of ongoing efforts to maintain and achieve state survival from a position of
relatively limited power within the international system.’6 He develops an alternate
realist framework that views international relations from the bottom up perspective from
those states with extremely limited power and influence, as opposed to the traditional top
down view, from the system’s most powerful states. Within this view, African state
behavior and relations revolve around ongoing efforts to ensure that the state does not
16 Christopher Clapham, Africa ana’ the International System: The Politics ofSlate Survival (New
ork: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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dissolve under the pressures exerted upon it by the international system and state actors.
Due to its power deficit and fragile state structure, the African state has employed a host
of conventional and unconventional means by which to ensure its continued existence in
the international system. African states took sides and played sides during the Cold War,
joined or built international and regional institutions and organizations, established one
party states, maintained neocolonial relationships, and instituted authoritarian and
military rule ultimately as mechanisms to ensure the ongoing survival of the state. These
survival strategies and techniques determine the relations and behavior of the state with
very real consequences for the lives and security of the individuals living within the
state.’7
Edmond Keller and Donald Rothcbild adopting a combined neorealist and
neoliberal framework describe the behavior and relations of the African state in the post-
Cold War as a reaction to the breakdown of the 30 year realist security frameworks of
that period.’8 The breakdown of the global security regimes organized and maintained by
the superpowers immediately manifested itself in terms of regional and subregional
balances of power, civil stability, and domestic order. Where strong stabilizing agents
did not exist, interstate conflict, civil conflict, economic collapse, or chronic instability
ensued regionally or subregionally. African state behavior and relations are part of a
transitional global process of redefining and reconstructing regional security frameworks
through which to ultimately achieve state security and a stable international order. Due
17 Ibid.
18 Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State
overeignty and Region Securitj (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).
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to the sub-Saharan African region lacking stabilizing agents, the reestablishment of
regional and subregional security frameworks and regimes has been a turbulent process.
The region has required the aid of external agents such as the United Nations (UN),
European Union (EU), and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to help manage the
transition from the realist security frame frameworks of the Cold War, to new security
frameworks facilitating African participation in the post-Cold War neoliberal economic
order. As such, the African state’s behavior and relations are based on efforts to achieve
security through the reestablishment of national, subregional, and regional security
frameworks. 19
Mulugeta Agonafer goes on to utilize a political economy framework in
evaluating the behavior and relations of the African state. He expresses African state
behavior and relations as an outgrowth of efforts to transition from military security
paradigms of the Cold War to the neoliberal economic security paradigms governing the
new economic international order. This new economic order emphasizes global
economic security over military security, necessitating state national participation and
integration into the global economy.20 Daniel Offiong using a neoliberal framework goes
on to further examine the fundamental dynamics of the new international order in which
state security is increasingly defmed in terms of economic participation and production
value chains. In the new order, economic participation is valued over realist Cold War
value system founded on geostrategic and military concerns. Each state is required to be
20 Mulugeta Agonafer, Africa in the Conremporaiy International Disorder: Crises and Possibilities
anham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1996).
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a global economic competitor in order to ensure its survival relative to the competitive
efforts of other states. In the 2l~’ century era of globalization and interdependency, the
fundamental determinants in state behavior and relations revolve around healthy
participation and integration into the global economy.21 Those states best able to
participate and effectively integrate themselves into the global economy at the highest
levels, gain the greatest economic and political benefits. Those states unable to
effectively integrate, participating only at the lowest levels of the production value chain
are relegated to a position of marginality within the global economic system. However,
in sub-Saharan Africa, the civil-political-economic deterioration of the 1990s that
accompanied the breakdown of Cold War security regimes, teamed with the failures of
the structural adjustment policies of the 1 980s, significantly retarded the capacity of the
African state to compete in the new neoliberal economic order. Political and civil
instability, limited infrastructure, large scale debt, wide spread disease, and a lack of
fmancial transparency severely curtailed the ability of the state to meaningfully
participate in the global economy.22
Offiong goes on to explain that most African states have encountered significant
challenges in achieving the necessary paradigm shifts to transition from security
paradigms to economic paradigms. Every subregion of the continent has required
external forces to maintain peace and security accompanied by large economic packages
comprising humanitarian assistance and financial aid. The short term result has been that
21 Daniel A. Offiong, Globalization: Post-Neodependency and Poverty in Africa (Enugu, Nigeria:
Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. LTD, 2001).
22 Ibid.
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in the era of economic globalization and political interdependence, African states have
the means to participate marginally on the periphery of the global economy. 23 The
politics of the state in turn revolve around the movement of the state from a position of
economic and political marginalization to a position ofmeaningful inclusion and
participation. This process of transition from one security paradigm to another becomes
the central determinant and influence on African state behavior and relations.
Taylor and Williams fundamentally reject as a starting point for African
International Relations, arguments based on Africa’s international economic
marginalization and internal political decay in the neoliberal economic order. Rather,
they assert that the ongoing behavioral and relational challenges of the African state are
reflective of its ongoing interaction with the imposing forces of the outside world that
adversely affect the ability of the state to manage both its domestic and international
political affairs.24 They describe the relations and behavior of the African state in the
post-Cold War period as the outgrowth of ongoing attempts to manage state interaction
with a host of international actors seeking to enter into relationships with the African
state beyond the realist security politics of the Cold War. These actors seek to occupy the
economic and political space left by the superpowers in their retraction from the
continent. The ongoing globalization of the world since 1989 has forced all regions of
the world to evolve and transition their behavior and conduct their relationships to reflect
this global scale economic interaction between state and non-state actors.
23 Ibid.
24 lan Taylor & Paul V~1i1liarns, Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the continent
ew York: Routledge, 2004).
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As a result, the average African has become an ongoing participant in the
contemporary globalization process and is affected both directly and indirectly by the
daily requirements and adjustments those global processes impose on the state.25 The
relations and behavior of the state are then understood to be dictated by: ongoing efforts
to effectively manage its neoliberal economic relationships with state and non-state
actors; the effective meeting of the basic structural requirements of globalization, and the
mitigation of the adverse effects of globalization’s processes on the state and its
population.
Among the literature on African international relations in both the classical and
contemporary period, very few pieces presented a general study of the field collectively
detailing the major approaches to African international relations. Most were either
ideologically slanted or were largely critiques of other approaches. The pieces dedicated
to African politics were sociopolitical and economic commentaries largely not in the
form of academic text books. In the mid period between the major classical and
contemporary pieces, Olatunde Ojo, D. Orwa, and C. Utete introduced the first major
general study Africa international relations academic text in 1985. The text was titled
“African International Relations,” and represented a significant break with the traditional
style of classical texts. 26
For the first time the general study approach common to academic international
25 Ibid.
26 Olatunde Ojo, D. Orwa, and C. Utete, African International Relations, (Essex: Longman Group
Limited 1985).
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relations texts was applied to AIR. The text outlined the most common general theories
of international relations and approaches to African Politics. The authors explained how
African states have addressed the most important IR questions within their own
experiences. They address questions of power, international institutionalism, coaffict,
foreign policy decision making, and integration. Ojo, Orwa, and Utete’s work stands out
among studies in African politics as a non-ideologically aligned piece unbiased towards a
specific theoretical tradition or framework.
This short review of both the classical and contemporary literature reveals two
notable shortcomings endemic to the available literature set in explaining the
international relations of the sub-Saharan African state in general behavioral terms.27
First, even though each author employs a theoretical framework that is clearly
informative in its subfield, representing a limited truth, each assessment represents a
largely linear approach to the study of the African International relations. They center
largely on singular aspects of state behavior and relations as the central determinants in
the ongoing management of the state’s international relationships. Regardless of
considerations of perception, global security regimes, transition, development, class,
global economy, or global economic and cultural imperialism; none of the theoretical
approaches presented in the classical and contemporary literature represents a
27 This study is in the topic area of African international relations. It primarily addresses African state
behavior and relations in the international system. The literature on African international relations (AIR)
primarily discusses agency versus structural factors within the parameters of the international system. The
seminal text in AIR largely do not have a primary focus on the domestic politics of the African state. This
study is concerned primarily with adequate description and categorization of the African state as a unit
within the system and how its unit characteristics interact with the structure of the international system.
Further, general international relations texts and the most conventional JR theories do not focus primarily
on domestic state behavior. Based on these collective factors I followed the pattern of the literature set on
AIR, and did not pursue literature dedicated specifically to the state in Africa.
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comprehensive theoretical framework inclusive of multiple behavioral determinants
paralleling the multilayered structure of the state. Each author in employing a presumed
general theory assumes that the determinants of the state’s behavior and relations can be
isolated and narrowed to one central determinant to explain all of the state’s decisions
and actions. Given the validity of the limited truth presented in each theory, this study
fundamentally assumes that the behavior and relations of the state cannot be
comprehensively explained utilizing a single theory presenting a single determinant.
As a multilayered entity, different aspects of the state are inherently linked to
distinct behavioral determinants, those determinants to a specific set of behaviors, and
those behaviors in turn impacting the other aspects of the state which are inherently
linked to other behavioral determinants. No single determinant in the state’s behavior
can necessarily be divorced from the impact of other behavioral determinants in a truly
behavioral assessment.28 The state’s actions and decisions are founded on consideration
ofmultiple factors, even if only in varying degrees, as the outcomes of those actions
affect the state in a multiplicity of ways. The objective of theory ultimately is not to
identify a single or central determinant in the ‘states’ behavior, but to describe as fully as
possible the behavior and relations of the state.29
28 This study assumes that it is possible to have a hierarchy of determinants in terms of “primary” and
“secondary” roles. This assumption is common to conventional JR theory. Mainstream theories such as
realism, liberalism, and international class analysis subordinate all other factors to their specific primary
determinant. This is done in order to not isolate against the existence of those other determinants, and
classify them as secondary determinants. Power may be subordinated to class, institutionalism may be
class based and rely on a military element, and the diffusion of power among select states may place them
in a specific class category. During the cold war all other determinants were subordinated to power.
However, this study also assumes that these determinants do not have to compete in terms of primary and
secondary roles, but can exist simultaneously outside of any form of hierarchy.
29 Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, 6Ih ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 6-9.
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Examples of such theoretical shortcomings may be seen in Christopher Clapham’s
realist framework in citing state survival as the African state’s central behavioral
determinant. Within his assessment, there arises the distinct challenge of assessing the
prevalence of state failure and collapse in every subregion of the African continent in the
1 990s given that they were not inevitable events. The patterns of state failure and
collapse in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Democratic Republic of Congo,
Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Central African Republic, Angola, and Mozambique do not
suggest that the general objective of those states was survival. Other determinants need
to be identified particularly given the continuing necessity for international institutions
and actors to provide international economic aid, peacekeepers, and humanitarian
missions to ensure the survival of several states. Keller and Rothchild also encounter
significant challenges in citing the “realist to liberal” transitions of the post-Cold War as
the central determinant in African state behavior and relations. The instances of civil war
during and afier the Cold War continue in consistent percentages and the region’s
international debt continues to climb within the neoliberal order. State expenditures m
both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods have continued to be disproportionately
matched in favor ofmilitary spending over infrastructure, education, and the production
of essential primary agricultural goods. The argument of “transition” as the primary
behavioral determinant does not account for those behaviors and actions continuing from
one period into another with great consistency. The assumption of a single primary
determinant to explain this phenomenon ultimately provides an incomplete understanding
of the state, as its specific behaviors continue beyond the prescriptions of that single
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determinant. Consideration of multiple determinants is necessary to explain the
consistencies and changes in state behavior and relations that go across many periods.
The second theoretical shortcoming present in the literature set is its general
founding on theoretical assumptions that do not necessarily parallel the contemporary
realities of the international system and its units. Numerous realist and liberal
assumptions that held true in the 1950s or 1990s simply cannot be substantiated in the
post-September 11th world because the data do not uphold them. The African state
largely does not meet the general state structural characteristics of realism or liberalism,
nor do their system-unit descriptions wholly reflect the structure of the international
system in any manner that can be empirically verified. In particular, realism assumes the
unitary nature of state units in structure and behavior, and that systemic factors have a
general impact on all state units. The African state is theoretically subject to the same
assessments, requirements, and rules of a system it is not functionally structured to
operate within. As a result, realist and liberal frameworks have been utilized to structure
the international environment for the African state based on assumed general unit
constants of structure, rationality, and interest that did not parallel the dominant
characteristics of the African state. Within the contemporary literature, Taylor and
William’s efforts at theoretical discourse through such a partial lens leads them to
conclusions patterned on unconventional theory within a conventional theoretical
framework.
Likewise, unconventional theory has continued to hold the general assumptions
that cannot necessarily be substantiated by empirical evidence. Unconventional theory
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continues to hold the assumption that the African state has only a minor degree of
autonomy in its domestic and foreign policy decisions. Neocolonialism, development
and dependency, and marginalization studies all support this type of position. However,
the regional decision making patterns and actions of the states of sub-Saharan Africa
suggest that this assumption is presently unfounded. Rather, it suggests that African state
leadership may be exercising larger degrees of autonomy and agency in decision making
than was previously experienced during the Cold War.3° Regional percentages of
expenditures as a percentage of GDP on the staples of development such as education,
infrastructure, and health care remain the lowest of any region in the world in the post
Cold War era. Without the ongoing support of the Cold War powers to insulate it from
the outco~nes ofpoor decision making and corruption on the part of government, the
failings of the leadership of the African state have become plainly obvious in its
increasing post cold war underdevelopment, marginalization, and civil instability.
This study seeks to address the weaknesses of the literature through the building of a
meta-theory of African International Relations utilizing a multiple theory
multideterminant approach with assumptions reflecting the actual realities of the African
state and international environment. It does not merely seek to build on the assumptions
ofprevious theoretical traditions without scrutinizing those assumptions against an
empirical evaluation. Such an approach to African International Relations will provide
the basis for more comprehensively descriptive studies of African state behavior and
relations rooted in empiricism and not merely theoretical tradition.





The three primary conventional theoretical frameworks discussed and critiqued in
this study are realism, liberalism, and international class theory. These theories were
chosen as the most widely utilized theoretical frameworks in African international
relations (AIR). Thereafter, the general theory approach to analysis is critiqued in lieu of
the functionalist and evolution-based assumptions of this study followed by arguments in
favor of a metatheoretical approach based on multiple primary determinants. The chapter
goes on to outline the challenges ofbuilding a metatheory as well as how those
challenges will be addressed within this study. The remainder of the chapter introduces
metafunctionalism as a primary framework, detailing its foundational concepts of
polygenesis and modified functionalism as the skeleton of the metatheory.
Theoretical Critique: Realism, Liberalism, International Class Theory
Realism, liberalism, and class analysis are the three leading paradigms utilized in
JR theory. In particular, realism and liberalism are the two primary theoretical influences
on international behavior and norms in the contemporary international system.1 Realism
presupposes the centrality of state sovereignty as the principal value of the members of
the international system and is state-centric, holding individual countries as the most
important units of the system. Realism holds that the realization of national interests is
‘Kegley and Raymond, 28.
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the primary motivator of state behavior and interaction and that power, primarily in its
military form, is the ultimate means by which the state’s interests are achieved in an
anarchic system. Liberalism, however, seeks to foster peace through political and
economic institutionalism as a means of fostering cooperation and mitigating conflict
among states. Liberalism advocates the utilization of institutions and organizations to
formally establish behavioral norms among states, utilizing the same institutions and
organizations to discipline or punish states not adhering to the rules of international
order.2 Today’s rapidly evolving international system is a complex interplay between the
two with global governance and institutional balances of power in the absence of a global
government.
Both realist and liberal forms of international order represent imperfect
constructed realities that are brought into being and maintained via the exercise ofpower
by the leading actors in the international system. They do not represent a perfect, natural,
or permanent order that irrefutably must be maintained to ensure an acceptable level of
international organization. Continual systemic changes and present and ongoing
challenges in the international system sufficiently dispel any notions of permanence or
perfection. By themselves, they are insufficient to fully describe the motivations behind
state behavior and IR beyond the aversion of conflict and war through military security
and the maintenance of peace through institutional cooperation.3
Power is ultimately the means by which realist and liberal orders are constructed
and maintained, and power or its loss are the means by which those constructed realities
2Kegley and Raymond, 29-32.
~ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”
International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 391-425.
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may be changed.4 These power-based forms of order result in building theory on
idealized forms of order that do not necessarily reflect the empirical realities of th
international environment. They have a particular challenge in generalizing the
behavioral motivations behind the actions of the state. Realist and liberalist scholars
essentially construct their theories on the world as they think and hope it is, assuming that
the exercise of power in military, economic, and institutional forms will ultimately bring
that ideal into being.5 As a result, their foundational assumptions are rooted in an ideal
environment (system) and object (nation states) constants that do not and will not
necessarily hold true in all circumstances but are justified as necessary for the
formulation of a rational general theory of JR. Liberalism and realism’s theoretically
descriptive and analytical shortcomings are maintained through the use of power to make
international order and state behavior conform to theory, even if only in a partial aesthetic
form.6
Proponents of realism and liberalism justify this method of structuring general
theory on the idea that system-wide behavioral theories must be dependent on the actors
in the system exercising the most power and influence in both the military and economic
spheres, posing the most tangible threats or benefits to the functioning of the system.7
Weak states such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, based on their level of influence, power,
and international political and economic participation in the system, are not held to be
“Ibid.
This is the position of the researcher after having reviewed both the contemporary and classical
literature in the topic area.
6 Hughes, 48-50, 79-80.
~ Ibid.
significant enough international actors upon which to base a rational and general
behavioral theory of system and states. These states have little impact on the structure
and behavior of the system and its most influential actors and do not militarily or
economically threaten the existence or functioning of the system. As such, they need not
warrant full consideration in the formation of general behavioral theories of IR because
their impact is minimal.
This approach poses significant challenges to an empiricist-based analysis of the
state and system, as several of these generalizations do not take into consideration at
minimum 25% of the states participating in the system.8 An example of this form of
theoretical structuring may be seen in the basic ordering of IR into a system of
corresponding units. Realism’s assumption of unitary consistency among states across
the system as expressed in the unitary rational actor principle is intended to allow for
broad generalizations regarding unit behavior. The base unit of the international system
is held to be the state in its nation-state format, generally assumed to be a rational actor
with similar basic responses to systemic factors.9 However, even the most remote
empirical observation of the international system suggests that a significant percentage of
states, mainly among nonindustrialized states comprising the majority of states in the
international system, are structured differently and express great variation in behavior
relative to industrialized and industrializing nation-states.~°
In spite of the structural and behavioral deviation among states in the system,
8 The states of Africa alone comprise 54 of the world’s almost 200 states.
~ Barry Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives, 3rd ed. (New
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997), 46-47.
‘° Anderson, “Antiquated Before They Can Ossi1~’: States That Fail Before They Form” Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 58, no. 1 (Fall 2004) : 9-11.
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realism assumes not only the structural similarity of state units (nation-states), but also
similar levels of functionality between states. Participating states are assumed to be
functional or on a path to becoming functional nation-states with like behaviors. Instead,
realism makes distinctions between the power, capabilities, and interests of different
states within the system as a means of explaining their differences.”
However, a significant percentage of states, including those of sub-Saharan
Africa, do not structurally resemble or behave in the fashion of a nation-state, and it has
become highly questionable as to whether they will ever transition to functional nation-
states. Global developmental projections suggest that it is likely that most of these states
will either remain cyclically dependent and weak with great possibilities for future failure
and collapse or evolve into another social organizational form altogether. 12 Of the
world’s nearly 200 states, the majority of the 48 Sub-Sahara African states arguably do
not fit the description of the nation-state or general rational unitary actor relative to the
functional nation-states in the international system. General assumptions of this type
based “ideally” on the nation-state significantly distort the formal structure, functioning,
and basic system-unit agreement of the international system for most of the states on the
African continent.
The proponents of realist theory have sought to maintain theoretical consistency
in structural makeup and outcomes through the use ofpolitical, economic, and
institutional power. The system’s most powerful actors maintain unitary consistency in




on states that not only fail to resemble the nation-state in any way, but also do not display
the characteristics of a sovereign state to any recognizable degree. Both state power and
institutional power are used to maintain a system of states through territorial, diplomatic,
and institutional recognition and economic support where, according to conventional
definitions, states technically would not exist. 13
Likewise, liberalism’s preferences for international institutionalism and economic
interdependence assume that participation in the first instance and cooperation in the
second instance are generally desirable, rational, and in the interest of all the system
units.’4 Liberalism does not assume that conflict and noncooperation may rationally be in
the interest of state actors, leading to greater benefits than those gained from
cooperating.’5 Furthermore, liberalism overlooks the possibility of preferences for class,
civilization, religion, ethnicity, or race over the socioeconomic and political benefits of
institutional cooperation. All of these factors may serve to obstruct the process of
cooperation, which, in reality, is conditional for both applicants and participants. Due to
liberal assumptions being a reflection of the preferences of the system’s most powerful
and influential actors as opposed to general attitudes substantiated by data, power is
exercised to bring about environmental conditions where the cost of nonparticipation is
significantly higher than the cost of cooperation. Regimes of international isolation,
sanctions, and force are tools in the present international order to encourage participation
t3Ibid.




and discourage noncooperation.16 However, if liberalist assumptions were generally true
for all state units, no such measures would be necessary to assure participation and
cooperation. Furthermore, liberalism assumes that economic and political
interdependency and interconnectedness are the best method by which to reduce conflict,
foster cooperation, and achieve international order.’7 However, the structure of
international institutions and their distribution of benefits may serve to reduce
cooperation as opposed to encouraging it.’8 The hierarchical nature of international
financial and political institutions dictates that those states ranking highest in the
international status quo of states accrue the greatest institutional benefits while those in
the lowest positions accrue the least. As a result, the majority of states in the system
receive the smallest tangible benefits from it and have the greatest incentive to dissociate.
International class theory in its multivariant forms has been the most consistent
and common means of theorizing the African state and its relations. The variant forms of
class analysis (Leninism, neocolonialism, system theory, dependency, and
underdevelopment) were believed to better address the conditions of the African
continent and the third world by African and other third-world scholars. Class theory
suggests that production relations both domestically and internationally are the driving
factors in state behavior and relations. Just as in the state where social classes have
formed and are in a conflict over ownership and control of the means of production,
within the international environment a hierarchy has developed among states in which




they are engaged in a conflict over control of scarce resources, ownership of capital and
consumer intensive production processes, and the distribution of goods and services.
International class theory assumes the existence of a dialectical relationship between
social and state classes in which select groups benefit at the expense of others. Further,
the international system is hierarchically structured and economically stratified between a
number of metropole states in the center and a host of satellite states in the periphery and
semi-periphery. The outcomes of the class-based structure of the international system for
peripheral states are neocolonial- and dependency-based relationships resulting in their
cyclical underdevelopment.
However, international class analysis poses several problems in theorizing African
state behavior and relations. First, like other general theoretical approaches, it assumes
that the state’s behavior and relations can be reduced to a single behavioral determinant
of class. As stated previously, such an assumption does not parallel a functionalist
assumption of the multilayered structure of the state, which implies multiple primary
determinants in the state’s behavior. Second, regional development indicators and
national budgetary expenditures do not indicate that African states continue to be
underdeveloped primarily due to dialectical relationships with developed center states.
African states are not necessarily poor because other states are rich. In the sub-Saharan
region, national budgetary expenditures indicate a general diversion of resources from the
foundational development areas of education, infrastructure, and essential staple
agricultural products to military expenditure, personal aggrandizement, and corruption.’9
Further, the global economy (GWP) has expanded significantly in size from 20.5 trillion
‘9Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Sizing up the African State” The Journal ofModern African Studies, 38, 1
(2000): 1-20.
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dollars in 1989 to 69.7 dollars in 2009 (over 200%). The African region economically
accounted for only one thirtieth of the global economy over this 20-year 200% growth
period. Sub-Saharan Africa did not achieve significant economic growth and
development in the post-Cold War period while dramatic growth occurred in other
peripheral and developing areas in Southeast Asia, Southern Asia, and Latin America. 20
International class theory also assumes the position of center states to be created
and maintained through exploitation of the periphery. However, the expansion of
European power that allowed for the exploitation of other regions of the world was
founded dually on domestic consolidation of the state through nationalism and the
advancement of naval technology and prowess. These factors allowed those states to
assume a position in the center from which to exploit other areas and states and were not
based on a dialectical relationship with the periphery in the first instance. Without the
assumption of exploitation as the fundamental means by which to enter the center,
international class theory does not have prescriptions by which peripheral states may
achieve a center quality of life outside of delinking. The prescriptions of socialist
revolution have as yet to achieve this desired goal.
The General Theory Approach vs. Functionalist Assumptions
This study proposes a metatheoretical approach over a general theory approach to
theorizing the behavior and relations of the African state. Such an approach is meant to
address the multiple problems of previous general approaches by utilizing multiple
theories and multiple behavioral determinants rather than a single theory and primary
determinant. It is believed that such an approach provides greater theoretical parallels to
20 Economic Outlook Database 2009,
www.imforgfexternalipubs/filweo/2009/02!weodata/download.aSpx [accessed May 1, 2010].
the structure of the state, yielding greater descriptive capacity and explanatory power
than previous approaches. A broader descriptive framework is necessary to describe and
re-categorize the behavior and relations of the African state in order to reflect its current
dominant characteristics.
This approach is inspired and borrowed from classic and contemporary U.S.
foreign policy studies utilizing multilevel analysis to assess foreign policy decision
making and implementation. Kegley and Witpkof, and Kegley and Raymond, in both
US. Foreign Policy and International Relations, developed a metatheoretical framework
referred to as the “funnel of causality” to illustrate the workings of both areas.21 The less
elaborate version is presented in the study of IR detailing the three levels of analysis
including global, regional, and state sources. The causal factors in the state’s behavior
are attributed to a combination of factors present in the structure of the international
environment and its units. The more elaborate version of the funnel of causality is
utilized in U.S. foreign policy detailing the multiple sources of foreign policy decision
making within a structured chronological order of inputs and outputs.22 These sources
are nonhierarchical and include external sources, societal sources, governmental sources,
role sources, and individual sources, all of which require differing methods of analysis.
Though such an approach is uncommon within IR theory, the method housed in the
funnel of causality provides a sound foundation for the analysis of the collection of state
foreign policies that largely comprise IR. This metatheoretical approach provides an
alternative to the traditionally applied general theory approaches being founded on
21 Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, 5th ed.
(Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2003). Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, The Global





The general theory approach of description and categorization has been the most
common contemporary methodological approach to scientific social theory and the social
sciences generally.23 This approach to theory has been adapted from the hard sciences
approach to theorizing where singular theories are comprehensive within environmental
constants in explaining select phenomena.24 The most conventional theories of JR
employ the general theory approach to explaining causation, commonly entailing a single
theory revolving around a primary behavioral and relational determinant (Figure l).25
Within IR, they begin with the assumption that state behavior and relations can be
isolated and narrowed to a central or primary determinant that will explain most of the
state’s politics, policies, decisions, actions, and relationships. 26 This central determinant
emerges primarily out of either a state or system environmental variable. The most
common general theories of JR include realism, liberalism, and international class theory.
General JR theories describe the general characteristics of state units, their interactions,
and the structure and functioning of the system within which they exist.27 State
characteristics are based on the aggregate behavioral and relational outputs of the states
within the system. They are identified and described relative to other states displaying or
23 Steven Siedman, Contested Knowledge: Social Theory Today 4” ed. (Massachusetts: Blackwell
Publishing Ltd. 2008), xii-xv.
24 Meehan, 9-12.
25 Joshua S. Goldstein. International Relations, 6” ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 6-9.
26Poid
27 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics. (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 79-81.
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Figure 1. General Theory Approach: Single Theory Primary Determinant Model of International Relations
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not displaying those characteristics. System characteristics are based on the system’s
structure and functioning in relation to the base units comprising it. Changes in the
system’s characteristics are identified by changes in its base units and the relations
between them. These general systems of characteristic description are presented as
applicable to the entire international environment across all regions and states. 28
As such, within IR, both the state and the system have been afforded a host of
characteristics within the varying theories. Within realism, state characteristic
descriptions include “powerful” and “weak,” and system descriptions include “anarchic”
and “unitarily rational.” Within liberalism, states are described as “interdependent” and
“marginal,” with system characteristics including “institutional” and “interdependent.”
Within internal class theory, states are characteristically described as “central,” “semi-
peripheral,” “peripheral,” “dependent,” and “underdeveloped.” Likewise, the system’s
characteristics are described as “hierarchical” and “stratified.”29
The general theory approach is fundamentally limited by its assumption that the
general behavior and relations of the state can be fundamentally isolated and narrowed to
a single determinant.30 Even though such an approach has feasibility within the physical
sciences, it has not resulted in academic consensus regarding human behavior and social
systems within the social sciences. The integrated nature and multilayered structure of
human social interaction does not allow human behavior and relations on multiple levels
to be studied within a single discipline or assumed to be driven by a central determinant.
29 Goldstein, 78-81, 314-3 15, 462,468-470,474-478.
~° Meehan, 12.
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Within psychology Freudian theory assumes all human behavior to be the outgrowth of
sexuality or the human sex drive.3’ Within sociology, Social Darwinism suggests that
human behavior and relations are driven by evolutionary forces in which competition
among individuals, groups, nations, or ideas drives human and societal advancement.32
Within political science, Marxists believe class factors emerging out of production
relations to be the central determinant in human behavior and relations. As a result,
between and within social science disciplines, there has not developed a general
consensus on the central determinant in human behavior and relations.33 In the 19th and
20th centuries, the broadest consensus across disciplines was achieved within class theory
and among social evolutionary theorists in explaining human and societal behavior. ~
Functionalism
Functionalism is founded on a dual emphasis on the application of an analogy or
metaphor between the individual organism and society, and the application of the
scientific method to the study of the social world.35 Society is held to be analogous to a
living organism in that both society and organisms are made up of interdependent
working parts and systems that must function together in order for the greater body to
function. This ‘organic analogy’ views society’s various parts as working together to
31 Doris Bergen, Human Development: Tradition and Contemporary Theories (Upper Saddle River,
New Jersey 2008), 37-41.
32 Bruce Bridgeman, Psychology and Evolution: Origins ofthe Mind (London: Sage Publications 2003),
16.
33Bergen, 2-4.
34Bridgeman, 12-22. Both evolution and class theory has been employed extensively in anthropology,
sociology, and economics.
35N. J. Deinerath ifi and Richard A. Peterson ed., System, Change, and Conflict: A Reader on
Contemporary Sociological Theory and the Debate Over Functionalism (New York: The Free Press,
1967), 2.
form a social system in the same way that the different parts of an organism form a
cohesive functioning entity.36 Society is composed of multiple institutions such as the
family, educational system, religious system, judicial system, political system, economic
system, military, and other institutions that are connected in an equilibrial system.
Significant changes in one institution will ultimately be paralleled by changes in other
institutions. As a result, each institution must be assessed in terms of its role in the
functioning of the whole of society, and societal behavior must be understood as the
product of all of these interlinked parts working in concert.37 Structural functionalism
further emphasizes the structures or specific institutions and the manner in which they
operate individually towards the functioning of the entire system. The functionality of
each of society’s political structures must be studied in isolation as well as in concert to
determine the causal factors in political and state behavior.38 These functionalist
assumptions are germane to the study ofpolitical science with its focus on the systematic
organization of society, the state, and the international system.
The multiple aspects of both the individual and society must be studied within an
interdisciplinary framework inclusive of different theoretical traditions and approaches in
order to explain and describe their behavior. Human beings are at the same time
biological, psychological, social, and economic creatures, while societies are
simultaneously ecological, political, economic, cultural, and religious entities. In order to
understand society or the state as a product of its interlocking parts, states must also be
36 A. R. Radcliffe Brown, “On the Concept of Function in Social Science,” American Anthropologist,
No. 37 (1935) : 395-6.
37Ibid.
38N J. Demerath ifi, “Synecdoche and Structural-Functionalism,” Social Forces, No. 44 (March, 1996)
01.
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assessed within their various areas. The theoretical approach to assessing the African
state must parallel these basic functionalist assumptions, which are indicative of the
existence of multiple primary determinants in the state’s behavior and relations.
Contradictions
Within the social sciences, however, there exists a foundational contradiction
between commonly held functionalist assumptions and the general theory approaches
commonly applied to the study of human behavior and social systems. Functionalism
ultimately views behavior to be the product of multiple determinant factors, while the
general theory approach narrows the causal factors in human social behavior to a primary
or central determinant.39 Functionalism implies the necessity for an interdisciplinary or a
metatheoretical approach, while the general theory approach hinges on a single theory
and primary determinant.
The general theory approach faces the challenge of substantiating its position
relative to social theory and the social science’s foundational functionalist assumption of
the multilayered structure of society and the individual. Each individual is a multifaceted
being composed of a biological being, psychological being, emotional being, and sexual
being, among other divisions. Each layer is dynamically linked to the others, and each
has an impact on the behavior of the individual. Likewise, the state’s structure is
composed of multiple institutions and its bounded territory. The state itself is at a
minimum comprised of a geographic territory, population, political system, economic
system, religious system, social system, ethnic and national identities, and culture.4°
~ Meehan, 12.
~° Gabriel A. Almond, Russell J. Dalton, G. Bingham Powell Jr., Kaare Sirom. Comparative Politics
day: A World View 9th ed. (New York: Longman 2010), 9-25. This state description and its composition
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These different aspects of the state are inherently linked to multiple behavioral
determinants that produce specific character traits in the state. Due to the state’s structure
being composed of interlocking parts, no single determinant can necessarily be divorced
from the impact of other determinants in the state’s behavior.
General theory approaches within IR face the challenge of substantiating the
pursuit of a primary behavioral determinant relative to the state existiflg as a multilayered
functionally composed entity. The assumption that the general behavior and relations of
a multilayered state entity can be limited to a single behavioral determinant is an
assumption imported from the hard sciences that has in recent history only proved
successful in explaining the multipolar origins of WWI/II and the bipolar politics of the
Cold War.4’ In the post-Cold War era, however, state relations in general have moved
beyond the primary security concerns of the superpowers and neocolonial interests to a
host of interlinked factors also including security, economics, culture, civilization,
religion, and human rights.42
Within African IR, what is contemporarily necessary is an approach paralleling
functionalist assumptions of society, considering multiple primary determinants in the
state’s behavior based on its multilayered structure. This approach will provide greater
parallels between theory and empirical reality, granting a more accurate means of
examination and analysis than approaches housing only a single or primary determinant.
are taken from the chapter’s comprehensive description of the state and its challenges.
41 Realism and power as the central determinant adequately explain the behavior of those periods.
However, the combination of behaviors demonstrated by the United States and China in the post-Cold War
era requires multiple theories to explain the complexity of their behavior towards each other and the rest of
the world as the system’s two most powerful states.
42 Goldstein, 102-105.
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Analysis based on a single determinant does not generally parallel the structure of the
state and hence is not likely to be capable of granting a comprehensive general
explanation of the causal factors in its behavior.
Challenges to African State Description and Categorization in General Theory
Approaches
Within conventional IR theory, the African state has generally faced the problem
of region-specific categorization. Historically, realism and liberalism have not generally
acknowledged or recognized the existence of a grouping of state characteristics unique to
the states of the sub-Saharan African region.43 They do not present a categorization for
the behavioral, relational, and structural characteristics shared by the states of sub
Saharan Africa. African states are merely described as weak, underdeveloped, pre
modern, traditional, and economically and institutionally backwards, as are many states
in other regions. Even so, African states have collectively displayed a drastically
different set of behavioral outputs than those of other regions. Those behaviors are
observed most markedly in the political instability, economic underdevelopment, and
large-scale debt of African states.44
The individual characteristics displayed by African states by themselves are not
unique; they are observed in numerous other states and do not require a regional
categorization just because they are experienced. Such a justification would serve to
create a false premise in which the deduction would be made that if a state is
43No such categorization or acknowledgment is present in classical realism, neorealism, liberalism,
neoliberalism, or constructivism.
~ Carol Lancaster, “Development in Africa: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly,” Current Histoiy: A
Journal ofContemporary World Affairs, vol. 104, No. 682 (May 2005) : 223-227.
71
characteristically weak, it is also then located in sub-Saharan Africa. Such a conclusion
would prove false, as many weak states exist outside the African continent. The factor
warranting a region-specific or alternative categorization is the unique combination of
select behavioral, relational, and structural characteristics shared by a majority of states in
a particular region or globally.45
Within Affican political literature, there has been historical acknowledgement that
African states exhibit a combination of shared characteristics that account for their long-
term behavior and the aggregate condition of the region. Due to realism’s and
liberalism’s failure to address the realities of those collective characteristics and their
implications, theorists of African politics turned to international class theory and statist
approaches as a means to describe and categorize African state behavior and relations.
International class theory, as IR theory’s most popular alternative to realism and
liberalism, was widely adopted and embraced among scholars of the African continent as
the ideal framework by which to theorize the newly independent states of sub-Saharan
Africa.46 Neocolonialism, systems theory, dependency, and underdevelopment theory’s
emphasis on equality and an equitable distribution of income and resources loaned
greater explanation and causality for the conditions of poor states relative to conventional
theory. Neomarxist theory explained the conditions of sub-Saharan African states
relative to the conditions of other states within a dialectical relationship. This
explanation more closely approximated the historical experience of the African state with
‘~ This is the position of the researcher based on his own observations and understandings of IR and
mparative politics.
46 Ojo Olatunde and D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete. African International Relations (Essex: Longnian
oup Limited 1985), 10-15.
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colonialism. Such explanations were presented in contrast to realism, which was absent
of moral considerations and justified the conditions of the African state based on its lack
of power, and in contrast to the modernization ideas of Neoliberals.47
However, most of international class theory’s variants ultimately adopted a
general theory approach to description and categorization with all its inherent limitations.
Leninism, world systems theory, dependency, and underdevelopment were all developed
with largely general application throughout the international system, describing the
structure of the system as the basis of the relations between its units. The categories of
peripheral, dependent, and underdeveloped described the dominant general characteristics
of nonindustrialized states. The international class framework emphasized the role of the
system and its structure in the behavior and relations of not only the African state, but
also all states in the periphery. Only neocolonialism within the context described by
Kwame Nkrumah was used to specifically describe the condition and behavior of African
states within international class theory. Even so, neocolonialism as a regional category
faces the challenge of limiting the contemporary behavior and relations of the African
state to primarily systemic forces where state-based factors are just as pervasive.
An Alternative Approach: The Metatheoretical Method
This study favors a metatheoretical approach over a general theory approach to
theorizing the African state (Figure 2). The metatheoretical approach to description and
categorization has been most commonly used in general-study academic texts of IR and
as a primary method of study in the area of foreign policy. The metatheoretical approach
is consistent with the functionalist assumptions pervading the study of the social sciences,
47Thid.
mt Env. (a) Global Variables (b) I Characteristk~icL I Behavioral Determinants (d) I Variants (e) I lnstitutions(F) Behavio~~Pu~~j
(Consoildaton
Characteristic I DetermInant 1 National Interest, Process)
ReaIist Power,~Stmcture Material Capability Balance~.
Security ForeigWPollcy
Scarcity System: International Institutionalism, Institutions
CharacterIstic 2 DetermInant~2 Complex Interdependence
Assumptions Liberal mnstiutIa~iaIlsmi&~iiit~rdependeñce Globalization mt. Aid
_j Characteristic 3 Detemmnar!~ - ______________
InternatIonal Class nt. C ass ConIITc i- ~ Hierarchy StratifIcatIons (Consolidation
‘•‘ ‘~t~ “~ ..‘ Process)
EnvIronmental _________________________ mntermesti Policy
Inputs
CharacterIstic 4 (ConsolIdation
______________ DetermInant 4 Process)
Resource CharacteristIcS
Scarcity AssumptIon~~ Determinant 5 Domestic Policy
Institutions
Characteristic 6 - .:.‘ - -
- Determ nan 6 •-. (Consolidation
5 ~i Process)
_ I _____ I
Figore 2. Metatheoretical Approach: Multiple Theory Multiple Determinant Model of International Relations
warranting the consideration of multiple primary determinants to explain the behavior
and relations of an individual, society, or state.
Metatheoretical approaches must hold the possibility of inclusion of multiple
theories or theoretical traditions, an acceptance of multiple primary behavioral and
relational determinants, and an acknowledgement that those determinants may emerge
simultaneously out of multiple variables. Metatheoretical approaches (multiple theory -
multiple determinant approaches) begin with the assumption that general theories
represent partial explanations revealing only limited causal truths in explaining state
behavior and relations. Such an approach immediately addresses the limitations of the
general theory approach by acknowledging its shortcomings and recognizing the
necessity ofutilizing multiple theories as tools to achieve greater accuracy and
explanatory power. It allows for the consideration of a nonhierarchical set of behavioral
determinants largely unavailable in most conventional IR theory.
Building a Metatheoretical Framework
The metatheory built in this study will be constructed through a nonhierarchical
consolidation of theoretical approaches. Given the assumption of the validity of existing
IR theories as partial behavioral truths, within the metatheory must be developed a means
of employing existing theory cooperatively while eliminating intertheory contradictions.
Consolidating preexisting theory presents a foundational problem, as there are
fundamental differences between the philosophical approaches and assumptions of each
of the theories. First, each theory approaches ER from a unique philosophical base that
differentiates it from other approaches.48 Second, each theory assumes the primacy of a
central determinant in the state’s behavior and assumes that its particular determinant is
48 Goldstein, 6-9. The assumptions of IR theories are different based on philosophy
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the most prominent factor in state relations. Third, the base assumptions and system-unit
descriptions regarding the international environment are fundamentally different based on
the theoretical tradition.
Of the three foundational problems, the philosophical bases upon which the
theories are formed cannot be changed, as those are the factors that grant theoretical
diversity, allowing each theory to describe different aspects of state behavior and
relations. The absence of philosophical diversity in IR theory would destroy any basis
upon which to pursue a metatheory of IR. The second and third factors, however, may be
changed in such a manner as to allow for a theoretical consolidation without destroying
the fundamental utility and uniqueness of the theory in its present form.
Regarding the second operational challenge to building a metatheory, this study,
as stated earlier, fundamentally rejects the position that in the post-Cold War era a single
central or primary determinant can generally explain state behavior and relations. The
verifiability or parallels of the assumptions of each theory to empirical reality suggest
there is inherent credibility in each of the theories from different points of view regarding
the same events. Though base assumptions vary across theories, they are inherently
rooted in examining the same international environmental variables of state and system.
Each philosophical position simply views the same events through different eyes and
expresses some explanatory power in JR. The contradictions occur between the theories
as each framework regards the determinant unique to its philosophical view as primary
and general across the entire international environment.
However, the occurrence of one explanatory truth does not necessarily negate the
existence of other explanatory truths, nor does it necessarily warrant the branding of such
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a position as universal or primary.49 Due to all the primary theories holding elements of
empirical truth, they all may be considered general or primary. Likewise, if they all
dually house true and false elements, then all may be considered partially general or not
general at all.50 Under such circumstances, a metatheory may only be conceived of as
possible if the empirically verifiable fmdings of each theory can harmoniously coexist.
For in the event that the verifiable findings of each theory can harmoniously coexist
without contradiction, then likewise the empirically verifiable assumptions of each theory
may also coexist harmoniously without contradiction. The elimination of contradictions
in assumptions would then allow the third operational challenge to be immediately
overcome. Even so, the empirically false statements or aspects of any of the theories
need not be considered at all, as they are not the elements upon which an empirically
based metatheory would be formed.
In addressing the challenge of diverging theoretical assumptions and linking the
theories, a general set of verifiable assumptions regarding the international environment
and its variables must be formed to provide a basis for each theory’s individual execution
without destroying its philosophical roots. The simplest scenario by which to achieve
this assumption consolidation involves maintaining all of the empirically verifiable
assumptions of each theory (for without them there would be no theory), disregarding
those assumptions that cannot be substantiated by data, and merely adding where
empirical data further necessitate. Even so, the question remains as to whether these
verifiable assumptions can coexist without negating the explanatory capacity of each




not internally contradictory, where empirically verifiable environmental assumptions do
not falsif~,’ each other.5’ There is empirical consistency between systems and their units,
structures and their functions, and institutions and their outputs.
As such, realism’s propositions of power, interest, material capability, and
balance are not nullified by international class theory’s assumption of a center and
periphery, or liberalism’s international institutionalism and complex interdependence.
Likewise, realism’s premise ofunit rationality is not destroyed based on liberalism’s
assumption of rationality based on institutional rules and norms of participation and
cooperation, as rationality is an outgrowth of state interests and germane to institutional
participation as well as to state security. The concept of unit rationality remains without
the concept of the unitary rational actor as rationality is not preponder t on like units
but on the base interests of units that are collectively constrained by the structure of the
international system. Those rational interests may lead states to voluntarily cooperate or
engagc in conflict to provide for the basic needs that are general to all states.
International class theory’s assertion of the existence of multiple divisions within
the structure of the international system leaves adequate room for the existence of
institutional and interest-based actor rationality. Liberalism’s assumption of international
institutionalism and interdependence is not made less relevant because of class theory’s
assertion that they are dominated by hierarchy and stratification factors. International
institutions are hierarchical, based primarily on economic and military power and to a
lesser extent on other normative factors.52 The global economy is itself stratified based
51 Meehan, 57-58.
52 G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the future of the West,” Foreign Affairs vol. 87, no. 1
(January/February 2008) : 33.
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on the international division of production and labor, and each state’s position in the
global economic value chain in the center or periphery.53 Regimes of dependency exist
within international institutionalism and complex interdependence and are maintained
based on power considerations and national interests.
From the position that these verifiable general assumptions germane to each
theory do not nullify the explanatory capacity of the other relevant theories, those same
assumptions will form the base general assumptions of the metatheory. The assumptions
imported from each theory ultimately allow for the identification of each of the primary
determinants in the state’s behavior and relations without eliminating the validity or role
played by each of those determinants.
The process of expanding the structural assumptions given to the international
environment beyond the linear assumptions of any one theory effectively expands the
number of behavioral determinants under consideration in a state action. Under common
assumptions, each general theory merely becomes an identification tool for a specific
behavioral determinant, differentiated from the others only by its philosophical approach
to describing behavior. This process mitigates the conilict between the theories, allowing
for a seamless integration of theory. Contradictions that arise within the metatheory
would likely be reflective of internal structural contradictions arising within the system
and states themselves as opposed the structure of the metatheory.
~ Hughes, 352, 354.
Biological Evolution
The metatheory developed in this study assumes the philosophical position
Social Darwinists and evolutionary psychologists holding biological processes of
evolution to have distinct and direct parallels in human social and societal development.54
In maintaining the state as analogous to the individual, evolution is considered the driving
factor not only in human development, but also in societal-state-system development. It
is the assumption of this study that these biological processes and forces are also present
in the human social world, giving ultimate direction to its highest form of development in
the form of state and system relations. The primary evolutionary processes of natural
selection, coevolution, and group/multilevel selection all may be identified in the social
world of human beings. These processes developed as a means of ensuring the long-term
survival of life on Planet Earth, which is cyclically riddled with the challenge of scarcity
and security relative the needs of all life on it. The evolutionary processes proceed
through stages and continue simultaneously in a cyclical fashion in which they are all
present.55
Natural selection is the starting process of biological evolution in nature, where
organisms possessing certain genotypic characteristics are better adjusted to an
environment and are thus better able to survive, reproduce, and increase in number or
frequency relative to other organisms.56 Natural selection acts on the phenotype, or the
observable characteristics, of an organism, but the genetic (heritable) basis of any
~ Bridgeman, 12-2 1.




phenotype that gives a reproductive advantage will increase in frequency over the
following generations. Organisms are then able to transmit and perpetuate their essential
genotypic qualities to succeeding generations, enhancing their prospects for survival. In
this process, heritable traits that increase an organism’s chances of survival and
reproduction are favored over less beneficial traits. As a result of the natural genetic
variation within a population of organisms, some organisms will survive and reproduce
more successfully than others in their current environment. Over time, the process of
natural selection can result in adaptations that specialize organisms for particular
ecological niches and may eventually result in the emergence of a new species.57
Coevolution, the second major process of evolution, describes cases where two
(or more) species reciprocally affect each other’s evolution. It is the biological process in
which the change of a biological object is triggered by the change of a related biological
object.58 Each party in a coevolutionary relationship exerts selective pressures on the
other, thereby affecting the other’s evolution. Species-level coevolution includes the
evolution of a host species and its parasites, as well as mutualism evolving over time.
One-on-one interactions such as predator-prey, host-symbiot, or host-parasitic pair are all
coevolutionary relationships. Within diffuse coevolution, a species may evolve in
response to a number of other species, each of which is also evolving in response to a set
of species. Coevolution is likely to happen when different species have close ecological
interactions with one another. Plants and insects represent a classic case of coevolution
57Jbid.
58 George Cox, Alien Species and Evolution: The Evolutionary Ecology ofExotic Plants, Animals,
Microbes, and Interacting Native Species (Washington, DC: Island Press 2004), 246-247.
that is often mutualistic in nature.59
Group-level selectionlmultilevel selection occurs when the traits that allow a
specific group within a species to systematically out-reproduce other competing groups
eventually come to characterize the species itself.6° Group selection is a possible natural
explanation for apparently altruistic traits in humans such as group defensive behaviors
that advance the group’s interests over those of the individual bearing the trait. To
succeed, group multilevel selection requires that local groups differ substantially in the
proportion of the selected trait, that local groups be ephemeral, and that the productivity
of each local group be a positive function of the proportion of its individuals that bear the
selected trait. When these conditions are met, group selection of the type called “trait
group” selection can occur. Within group selection, multilevel selection suggests that
groups can have functional organization in the same way individuals do and consequently
can also be “vehicles” for selection. Therefore, if group cooperation is a trait ensuring
greater survival and reproduction, the groups better at achieving cooperation may out-
reproduce those that are not prone to cooperation.6’
Sociopolitical Evolution
-Natural Selection (Political Application)
The selective pressures of resource and security scarcity within the international
environment prompted human beings over an extended period of time to develop states as
the highest level of social organization by which to ensure their greater survival. Natural





characteristics allow a state to effectively compete with other states or forms of social
organization in order to ensure the more efficient survival of its population. Those
characteristics that successfully increase the likeithood of societal or state survival are
eventually adopted by other states or forms of social organization and multiply across the
international environment to become more numerically common. These social and
structural characteristics grant distinct developmental advantages to those states and other
forms of social organization able to achieve them. However, due to the diversity among
different social networks and social organizations within the international environment,
not all societies and states will develop or adapt those attributes. Consequently, many
will not survive, develop, or reproduce as successfully as those that have due to their
inability to provide scarce resources and security to their populations.
The long-term reproduction of social and structural characteristics that grant
reproductive developmental advantages results in cultural adaptations that specialize a
society or state towards specific developmental niches. These developmental niches
allow that state or society to continually transform and reinvent both itself and the key
processes necessary to survive and progress. The structural adaptations are physical
features of society or the state such as political and economic institutions, infrastructure,
the military, and territorial borders. Behavioral adaptations are composed of inherited
behavior chains and the aggregate ability to learn. They may be inherited through
institutional structures such as the political system, educational system, and family, or
they may be facilitated by inherited attitudes towards learning and adaptation present in
the dominant culture, philosophy, and religion. Both long- and short-term adaptations
allow societies and states to adequately compete for scarce resources by innovating and
successfully engaging in conflicts with other actors. The most competitive states survive
and have the highest rates of long-term development.62
-Coevolution (Political Application)
Coevolution is the process by which states develop and reproduce the
characteristics necessary to allow them to cooperate in and through interdependent
relationships as a means of ensuring the more efficient survival of their populations.
Each party in a coevolutionary relationship exerts selective pressures on the other,
forcing that party to evolve beyond the process of pure competition to a pattern of
behavior facilitating mutual survival. State relationships become founded on a pattern of
symbiotic relationships ultimately laying the basis for the organization of the
international environment into a complex set of political, economic, and ecological
systems (the international system). The international system simultaneously sets
parameters and limits for competition while housing institutional structures facilitating
formal and informal means for cooperation. This systematization of the international
environment provides rules and order to the interactions and relationships of the actors
within the system. This grants a great degree of predictability and repetition to the
relationships and interactions of the international environment.
Coevolution is largely founded on variations of symbiotic relationships.
Symbiosis refers to the long- and short-term cooperative or interdependent relationships
between actors in the international environment. Symbiotic relationships are either
necessary for the survival of at least one actor in the relationship (obligate), beneficial but
not essential to the survival of one or more of the actors in the relationship (facultative),
62The political applications of the biological evolutionary processes are the interpretation of the
searcher.
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or some combination of the two. These symbiotic relationships within the international
environment take on three basic forms: mutualistic, commensural, or parasitic.
A mutualistic relationship is any relationship between two or more actors where
all actors derive major benefits. Mutualistic relationships may be either necessary for all
actors, necessary for some actors but nonessential for the others, or nonessential for all.
A commensural relationship is any relationship between two or more actors where at
least one of the actors largely benefits while the others are not significantly harmed or
helped. Commensural relationships are either necessary for at least one actor and
nonessential for the others or nonessential for all. A parasitic relationship is any
relationship between two or more actors in which one or more of the actors involved
largely benefits while the others are significantly harmed. Parasitic relationships may
result in varying degrees of maldevelopment or underdevelopment in the harmed state but
may also be key to the short- or long-term survival of the harmed state. They are played
out either within the state being hanned or in a space outside the harming state. Parasitic
relationships are either necessary for at least one actor but nonessential for the others or
nonessential for all actors in the relationship.
Mutualistic, commensural, and parasitic relationships generally involve security,
economics, trade, and travel agreements. The economic trade agreements between the
USA and Canada are largely mutualistic, while the diplomatic and political relations of
the USA with the former Soviet Bloc of Eastern European states is commensural. French
trade agreements with most Francophone African states are generally parasitic in nature.
The French derive the greater benefit while the African states become dependent and
underdeveloped. Even so, the parasitic relationship between the French and Francophone
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West Africa allows those states a degree of survival that keeps them from structur
collapse and failure.63
Contemporarily, parasitic relations take on four basic forms: colonial,
neocolonial, matrimonial, coercive and compellant, and neoliberal.64 Colonial parasitic
relationships occur when the actor primarily benefiting maintains the relationship by
force through directly controlling the physical territory and institutions of the harmed
state. Neocolonial parasitic relationships occur when the actor primarily benefiting
maintains the relationship with its former colony by indirectly controlling its leadership
and influencing its institutions. This is done through regimes of dependency, threats of
economic sanction, or threats of force towards the state being harmed. Matrimonial
parasitic relationships occur when the relationship is maintained by the consent of the
leadership elements of the actors benefiting and being harmed. The relationship is
maintained in the interest of the leadership elements of both actors. Coercive and
compellant parasitic relationships occur where the parasitic relationship is isolated from
the overall external control of the harmed state and centered only on a specific area of
interest to the benefiting state. The harmed actor is forced into that isolated relationship
by the threat of economic and political coercion or military force. In this relationship, the
benefiting actor does not control the overall behavior and actions of the harmed state.
Neoliberal parasitic relationships occur when the structure of the global economy and the
politics of its relations (international political economy) force the state into harmful
63 The political applications of the biological evolutionary processes are the interpretation of the
researcher.
~ The concept of “parasitic relations” existing in the form of colonial, neocolonial, matrimonial,
coercive and compellant, and neoliberal relations was developed and applied within this study by the
researcher.
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relationships as the only economic alternative for revenue and development towards its
survival. International aid and foreign direct investment from international organizations,
multinational companies, and developed states become the primary alternatives for
undertaking modernization and technological transfer. The most harmful effects of this
type of parasitic relationship are large-scale debt and the mass exploitation of state
resources.
-Group/Multilevel Selection (Political Application)
Multilevel selection is the process by which groups of states begin collectively
developing and reproducing the select characteristics that enhance their capacity for dual
competition, cooperation, and resource production specialization within the international
environment. In order to further improve their development and survival prospects,
select groups of states are prompted to develop structural and behavioral adaptations and
resource production specializations that further integrate them into the regional or global
system. Greater integration provides for greater gains to those groups of states, by which
they achieve the greatest developmental and survival prospects relative to other states.
The benefits of enhanced cooperation and integration allow those benefiting state groups
to cyclically reproduce those traits amongst themselves and enhance them in order to
make them more efficient at cooperating and specializing. As a result, the groups of
states best able to dually compete, cooperate, integrate, and specialize maintain higher
rates of development and survival prospects relative to those states not as adept at those
practices.65 The states of the European Union have achieved the highest levels of
regional integration, specialization, and group production in the international system.
65 The political applications of the biological evolutionary processes are the interpretation of the
researcher.
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This enhanced degree of cooperation and specialization has broadened and increased the
scope of those states’ long-term development relative to existing and emerging powerful
states.
Metafunctionalism
Metafunctionalism is the metatheory of JR developed within in this study to
assess state behavior and relations through a multiple primary determinant approach built
on modified functionalist assumptions and the collective processes of evolution.66 It
simultaneously utilizes the most common theories of IR and a host of unconventional
frameworks to explain and categorize state behavior and relations. Metafunctionalism’s
modified functionalist assumption maintains an analogy or metaphor between the
individual organism and the state or society. The state is held to be analogous to a living
organism in that both society and organisms are made up of interdependent working parts
and systems that must work together in order for the greater body to function. The state
is dually composed of a physical territory and infrastructure and its multiple institutions
including the family, educational system, religious system, judicial system, political
system, economic system, military, and other institutions. These institutions are
connected in an equilibrial relationship in which significant changes in one institution
will ultimately be paralleled by changes in other institutions. As a result, state behavior
must be assessed in terms of its multiple societal sources working in concert to produce
policy or action. Just as individual behavior is attributed to a host of factors working in
unison that are studied within separate fields and different theoretical traditions, likewise
the state requires multiple levels of analysis to assess its behavior and relations. The
66 Metafunctionalism is a metatheory of state behavior and IR developed within this study by the
researcher based on functionalism, evolution, realism, liberalism, international class theory, structural
functionalism, and a select number of unconventional theories.
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state’s behavior and relations consequently require consideration of multiple primary
determinants to describe and categorize its behavior.
In maintaining society or the state as analogous to the individual,
metafunctionalism considers evolution to be the driving factor in not only biological
development, but also societal, state, and system development. Behavior and relations
from the level of the individual to the international system are rooted in the evolutionary
processes of natural selection, coevolution, and group selection. By necessity, all
complex human biological systems have evolved as a function of human survival and
development. Likewise, complex state and international systems have evolved as a
function of the state existing as a means of ensuring more efficient human survival and
development. The dominant characteristics of the international system and its state base
units are the product of evolutionary forces at work in response to scarcity and security
concerns in the international environment. The primary systemic determinants of power,
institutionalism, interdependency, and class are all products of the processes of evolution.
They have come into being as the international environment has evolved from simple
power-based competition between units to a highly stratified and hierarchical system of
institutions and interdependent units.
Basic Assumptions
Metafunctionalism holds six basic assumptions regarding the structure and
functioning of the international environment and its primary system and state variables.
First, the state and international system and their relations are the product of the
combined processes of evolution collectively referred to as civigenesis.67 The
67 This term was adapted from evolutionary biology’s concepts of biogenesis and symbiogenesis.
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evolutionary forces of natural selection, coevolution, and multilevel selection are the
simultaneous driving forces in the development of human social organization. Changes
in international order do not occur at random, based solely on a principle of chaos, but are
the product of general evolving social systems of order that are subject to occasional
random changes.
Second, metafunctionalism begins with a metatheoretical assumption holding that
elements of realism, liberalism, and neomarxism are all active factors in the international
environment identifiable in the structure and relations of the international system.
Determinant factors of power, interdependence, institutionalism, and class are all present
and active realities in the behavior and relations of modern states. By extension, it
further assumes that as the active factors of JR today, they are also the central factors to
be considered in an analysis of system change, state behavior, and ER. Taking these
factors collectively, metafunctionalism assumes that power, interdependence,
institutionalism, and class (the sum of realist, liberal, and class factors of behavior) are
reflective of the degree of functional complexity ofboth the state and the system.
Collectively, these factors may be aggregated to reflect the state’s capacity to engage in
security competitions based on military power, to cooperate institutionally and
interdependently in the realm of politics and economics, and to specialize by economic
stratification.
The aggregation of these collective factors, or the degree of functional complexity
displayed across states of the system, is in turn reflected in its structure and relations.
The state’s degree of functional complexity is dynamically linked to its capacity to
accumulate aggregated political, economic, and military power. The greater the
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complexity, the greater the capacity for the accumulation of aggregate power. The state’s
degree of functional complexity, and by extension its amount of accumulated aggregate
power, informs its relations with other states. As its degree of functional complexity and
aggregate power changes, its interactions with other states likewise change. The behavior
that the state’s degree of functional complexity facilitates most efficiently (competition,
cooperation, specialization) forms its general relational paradigm. The international
system is then structured to accommodate the dominant behavioral trend among the most
influential states in the international environment. When the structure of the system can
no longer accommodate the dominant behavioral trend among the most influential and
powerful states, the system structure necessarily transitions to a structure better able to
accommodate the behavioral changes.
Third, the international environment is characteristically anarchical, where states
are their own highest governing authority in the absence of a global government or
supranational governing authority over states. Anarchy is the product of the processes of
evolution in which the international environment is evolving from a state of simple
decentralized competition between actors to increasingly complex levels of systemic
organization based on institutionalism and unit interdependence. The ongoing
systemization of the international environment into a system of institutions and
interdependent units serves to mitigate the effects of anarchy by achieving global
governance and order in the absence of a global government. The mitigation of the
effects of the anarchical structure of international order through international
institutionalism and complex interdependence in turn cause the effects of anarchy to be
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experienced in varying degrees among states.68 These variations are hierarchical in
nature, where the degree of anarchy experienced is based on the relative power, material
capabilities, military strength, economic strength, and degree of dependence or
interdependence of the state. Relatively weak states subject to greater levels of
institutional subordination and dependence experience lower degrees of anarchy within
the system relative to the most powerful states. The most powerful and influential states
experience the greatest degree of anarchy, as they are responsible for maintaining the
global system of order and pose the greatest threats to each other.69
Fourth, based on the processes of civigenesis, the relations of the international
environment are governed by competitive and cooperative behaviors.70 As a result, states
simultaneously engage in relationships that are either coriflictual, mutualistic,
commensural, or parasitic in an effort to ensure their efficient and long-term survival.
Fifth, the contemporary international environment is understood to be an
ecosocial and political space composed of interlocking social and ecological systems.
The international environment is minimally composed of the global ecological system or
the environment, the international political system, the global economic system, and an
emerging global material culture. These social and biological systems essentially cannot
be separated, as they are dynamically linked and changes or actions in any one affect the
functioning of the others with global reverberations.7’
68 The concept of hierarchical anarchy is defined and explained in chapter 4.
69 The concept of anarchy is a philosophical position on the question of system structure. The
searcher holds a differing philosophical position on the degrees of anarchy experienced with the system.
70 Competitive and cooperative behaviors are explained and defined in sections of chapter 3.
~‘ Josef Riegler, Eco-social Market Economy AGRIC. ECON. — CZECH, 49, 2003 (3): 101-105.
Sixth, the international system’s base units are states of different compositions
and structure (multiunit system composition) accompanied by a host of non-state actors
including IGOs, NGOs, IFIs, MNCs, international terrorist organizations, national
liberation movements, political parties, and transnational crime syndicates. The state
units forming the base of the system include both the nation-state and artificial
multinational state.72 The states within the international system are assumed to comprise
three broad tiers of states that are further subdivided into six specific categories. The first
and smallest numerical tier is composed of the system’s strongest states; the second tier is
composed of mid-range-strength states; and the third and largest numerical tier is
composed of the system’s weakest states.73 The six state categories within the three
general tiers are hyperftinctional, equifunctional, hypofunctional, pathofunctional,
protoflinctional, and neutrofunctional states. ~
Seventh, these multiple state units are generally held to be rational actors based on
the pursuit of their own self-interest.75
Civigenesis
Civigenesis holds system and state behavior, relations, and structure to be largely
the product of the evolutionary processes of natural selection, coevolution, and
group/multilevel selection.76 Through these processes, states and the system advance
72The concepts of the multiunit composition of the state and the multinational state are defined and
explained in chapter 4.
~ Goldstein, 78-8 1.
~ 6 categorical subdivisions have been developed as original concepts within this study.
~ Goldstein, 102-103, 126-127. Neoliberal and constructivist thought has expanded conceptions of
rationality that go beyond the realist concept of rationality based the unitary actor principle.
76 Civigenesis is developed as an original concept within this study.
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through simultaneously occurring phases of competition, cooperation, and specialization.
Changes in international order do not occur at random based solely on a principle of
chaos, but are the product of general evolving social systems of order that are subject to
occasional random changes. These evolutionary processes are practically played out
within the international environment as economic and military power competitions, state
cooperation and interdependence, and economic specialization and stratification.
Civigenesis occurs in response to the scarcity and anarchy characterizing the international
environment in which states as instruments of human security seek to ensure the more
efficient survival of their populations. The selective pressures within the international
environment constantly force states to compete, cooperate, engage in conflict, innovate,
adapt, and specialize in order to ensure the efficient survival of their populations. This
evolutionary process has ultimately resulted in the organization of the international
environment into a complex system of actors interacting under a formal set of rules and
guidelines both institutionally and noninstitutionally. This complex level of social
organization has led to the rapid expansion of the human population while systematically
destroying the ecological system in which humans live.
The evolution of the state and state system through civigenesis proceeds
sequentially yet simultaneously in reoccurring stages of development beginning with
natural selection, continuing through coevolution, and climaxing in group/multilevel
selection. Within natural selection, scarcity throughout the international environment
prompted human beings over an extended period of time to develop states as the highest
level of social organization by which to ensure their greater survival. In order to provide
scarce resources and security to their populations, states compete with each other
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economically, militarily, and politically, engaging in physical conflict as the ultimate
arbiter of disputes between themselves. Unbridled competition, however, faces
significant challenges and limitations as an efficient means to secure scarce resources and
security due to the physical costs of military conflict and limitations of economic autarky.
In order to increase prospects for human survival, states began a process of
coevolution in which weak and strong states utilize cooperation, mutual engagement,
institutionalism, and interdependence as more secure means by which to ensure their
survival than pure competition and conflict. Cooperation results in significant net
increases in the production and extraction of resources and physical security at a
significantly lower cost than military conflict or autarky to participating states. As a
result of the greater short-term effectiveness and net benefits of cooperation and
interdependence, states begin to specialize in different areas of the resource production
process and evolve more efficient mechanisms for enhanced cooperation with each other.
More states begin to rationalize their interests towards cooperation, and the traits
necessary for it are adopted throughout the international system.
Group/multilevel selection then begins to occur within the international
environment as the states and groups of states that develop the greatest capacity for both
competition and cooperation reap the greatest benefits in terms of resource provision and
physical security for their populations. They achieve the greatest rates of long-term
development among states and are able to survive, providing a higher quality of life than
states not as adept at simultaneously competing, cooperating, and specializing.
Simultaneous power competition and cooperation through resource production
specialization result in the economic stratification of the international environment and
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development of a political hierarchy among states. This hierarchy among states is based
primarily on each state’s relative aggregated power and economic position in the global
production process. The states most central to the functioning and maintenance of the
evolved global system determine the structure and rules of competition, conflict, resource
production specialization, and institutionalism. The states least central to the evolved
global system must evolve the characteristic adaptations necessary to make them more
proficient at simultaneously competing, cooperating, and specializing relative to the
states most proficient at those activities.
Ecostasis
Civigenesis necessarily occurs within the context of the ongoing environmental
conditions necessary to sustain life on earth. However, this evolutionary process has
come into conflict with the evolution of human beings’ capacity to increase their survival
prospects by changing the earth’s environmental conditions. Ecostasis, or the constant
environmental conditions necessary for the global ecosystem to sustain biological life and
regenerate itself, is under the present threat of destructive human production processes.
Within the international environment, the relationship among individuals, the state, the
system, and the environment should ultimately be ideally structured in an equiibrial
fashion that grants the greatest possible social benefit to individuals, the state, and the
system at the least physical cost to the environment. Presently, the relationship is
structured in a manner that diffuses the greatest cost to the environment and the greatest
benefit to a minority of states and their populations.
In practical tenns, ecostasis represents the equilibrium point between the cost of
living organisms’ demands on the ecosystem for survival, the ecosystem’s ability to
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supply those demands without compromising its ability to self-sustain, and the effects of
external pressures posed by extra-earth forces on earth’s internal environment. The
structure of earth’s state of equilibrium necessarily dictates that the organisms within
earth’s ecosystem should not impose a greater cost or demand on the ecosystem than its
capacity to sustain life and renew itself. The means of survival for life on earth, human
or otherwise, ultimately should not detract from the earth’s ability to maintain constant
ecostasis. Changing galactic and extraterrestrial phenomena theoretically also pose a
constant possible threat of placing the earth in a state of ecostatic imbalance where it
cannot maintain life, but those factors are presently outside the control of human beings.
The earth normally regulates its internal environmental conditions through a
complex balance among biological life, atmospheric conditions, water bodies, surface
changes, and imposing spacial galactic factors in order to maintain a healthy functioning
ecological system. Paralleling the evolution of life on earth, the earth developed the
ability to maintain internal environmental equilibrium as a mechanism for dealing with
external galactic changes that would threaten the survival of biological life. However,
the evolution of human life on Planet Earth has changed the dynamic of the earth’s
equilibrial balance. Human beings are the only biological life form that has evolved the
ability to manipulate the materials and resources within the physical environment to
develop a means of production not purely dependent on natural processes. Through
mechanization, industrialization, and information technology, human beings rapidly
change and combine earth’s natural resources in a mode ofproduction, allowing the mass
production of goods and services beyond the earth’s natural ability to produce. Humans
have developed technology to overcome the transportation, environmental, and
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communication limitations naturally present on earth.
Prior to the industrial era, all life on earth was subject to naturally occurring
environmental self-correcting patterns that minimized biological organisms’ ability to
negatively impact earth’s ability to maintain internal equilibrium. As a result, animal
populations didn’t expand beyond earth’s natural ability to provide for their survival
needs. Human beings have evolved beyond earth’s ability to self-correct the costs of
human production and consumption patterns. Rather, human production and
consumption patterns have begun a process of changing the structure of the ecosystem in
a manner that detracts from earth’s ability to maintain ecostasis. The current pattern of
human life is founded on the mass consumption of renewable and nonrenewable
resources fundamental to ecosystem regeneration without parallel plans for their
replacement. Teamed with the resulting pollution of water, air, and land sources with
foreign contaminants, these dual factors do not permit the earth to effectively recreate the
conditions necessary to maintain life in the long term.
The modern state has been the tool or mechanism by which human beings have
organized and maintained this form of production and consumption. The world now
exists in a global system of states and international institutions that pollute and utilize
resources at a simultaneous national and global level. The byproduct of this evolution of
human ingenuity and mass state organization has been the mass expansion of human life
expectancy and population along with the rapid environmental destruction that has made
that expansion possible. Even so, the processes of civigenesis and ecostasis must become
mutually reinforcing to allow for the persistence of both in the future. Human ingenuity
must become a tool to ensure ongoing ecostasis as opposed to destroying it.
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State and System Characteristics
The dominant characteristics of the international system and its state base units
are also the product of the collective processes of evolution. The system’s characteristics
have developed as the international environment has evolved from simple power-based
competitions to a highly stratified and hierarchical system of institutions and
interdependent units. These structural and relational characteristics determine the
specifics of state behavior and system function, as they house the primary determinants of
state behavior and system change. State-based determinants of structure, leadership, and
woridview emerge out of the state’s functional composition, governance, and
cognition/perception characteristics. Systemic determinants ofpower, institutionalism,
interdependency, and class likewise emerge as the product of realist, liberal, and
international class characteristics.
State Characteristics
In maintaining a metaphor or analogy between the individual and the state, the
state may necessarily be regarded as housing anthropomorphic or human-type
characteristics. It reflects human development, preferences, thinking, and needs to
survive. As such, the state is representative of human interests towards ensuring more
efficient human survival and as a result has evolved a host of anthropomorphic
characteristics. Its functional composition, perception and cognitive awareness, and
decision-making capacity are ultimately the factors allowing it to compete, cooperate,
and specialize to varying degrees within the international environment.77
~ The state’s development of these biological, neurological, and psychological traits parallels the broad
developmental patterns of human development. This characterization and description of the state and its
development was adopted from human development studies within psychology and sociology by the
researcher. The descriptions and terminology were developed and applied by the researcher within this
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-Functional Composition
The state’s functional composition refers to its structure being composed of
interlocking units within a formally organized political and economic system. The state
as reflective of the individual is functionally composed like all biological organisms and
the ecosystems within which they exist.7 The state is formally organized into a system
of institutions, infrastructure, and territory that convert societal inputs into behavioral
outputs towards meeting the wants and needs of its population and aggregately
addressing the challenges of the international environment. Its political, economic, and
military institutions all serve the specific function of giving society and the state long-
term cohesion and social stability. Its institutions are organized in an equilibrial
relationship in which changes in one institution will necessarily be reflected in changes in
adjoining institutions or society as a whole. The actual day-to-day functions of society’s
institutions are the tangible factors making the state operable. The electoral system, the
party system, the system of government, the judicial system, the economic system, civil
society, interest groups, the media, and the military all serve particular functions in
mobilizing the system. The state’s behavior is ultimately a reflection of its level of
institutional organization and development and will only be as productive as its level
institutional organization will permit.79
The resulting behavioral determinant growing out of the state’s functional
composition is “structure.” Within this study, structure refers to the manner in which a
study.
78Goodson, 37-38. All complex life forms are functionally composed with every trait within their
biological systems serving a function towards their survival. Life and its differing characteristics evolve
based on the principle of functional causality.
‘~ Almond, Dalton, Powell, Strom, 31-35.
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society or state is systematically organized and the organizing principle upon which the
relationship between its parts is formed.8° The state’s abilities to compete, cooperate, and
specialize are all enabled or limited by the manner or principle upon which it is
structured. The state ultimately will only function as it is structured to, and changes in its
behavioral outputs will be the product of changes in either the state’s structure or the
structure of the international system itself. State structures are largely based on
normative ideological, religious, or philosophical preferences such as liberalism,
socialism, or Islam. The structural preference informs the type ofpolitical system or
formal type of institutional organization adopted by the state. 81 If liberalism is adopted
as the state’s structural preference, the political system will likely be based on democracy
of some type with capitalism as the dominant economic component. Likewise, if
socialism is the structural preference, the political system will likely be based on
socialism or communism, with a command or mixed-economy component. Where there
is a divergence between the structural preference and the functioning of political and
economic institutions, state dysfunction will necessarily be present.
-Perception and Cognitive Awareness
The systematic organization of national institutions within formal territorial
boundaries provides an environment within which to form and build a central national
social unit. State institutions in the service of the population create a common entity all
individuals have an interest in maintaining as a provider of their individual scarce
resources and security needs. Individuals in the population are serviced by the state in a
80 Waltz, 1-2.
81 Almond, Dalton, Powell, Sizom, 31-35
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contractual exchange of allegiance for services. Through national participation in group
servicing by state institutional bodies, a national-group level of awareness attached to the
political and economic system develops. Within this group level of awareness, the
members of the population become cognizant of not only their collective interests, but
also the interests of populations in other states competing for similar resources and
security. In the international arena, group-level awareness and interests become formally
articulated as the national interest pursued by policy institutions. The national unit acting
through national institutions in pursuit of its interest has the effect of transforming the
state into a perceptive and cognitively aware entity. On a macro level, through its formal
political and economic institutions, it is aware of its environment (the international
environment), scarcity, other actors, and its position relative to those actors. The state
develops its own identity and understanding, perceiving its own interests, needs, and
ability to act on behalf of its population. In servicing or acting on behalf of the
population, state institutions have a national reach and service base. 82
-Decision-Making Capacity (Centralized Leadership and Government)
As a cognizant and perceptively aware entity, the state characteristically has
developed the rational capacity to measure the costs versus benefits of its decisions.
Aware of its capacity to act in its own interest, the state via its population centralizes its
decision-making and policy processes, affording those tasks to a governing body. Every
governing body is headed by an individual who, based on the system of government, acts
in concert with the governing body on behalf of the state. The individuals occupying
leadership and government positions within the process are as important to the state’s
82 The concept of state-level cognitive awareness was developed in this study.
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capacity to act as the institutions and population they represent.83
The ultimate result of the state having its own decision-making capacity is that the
type and style of leadership exercised on behalf of the state dynamically affect the
manner in which it will act or behave. Leadership type and style are major detemiinants
of the state’s behavior, as the governing body or leader may ultimately enhance or stifle
the ability of the state to ensure the more efficient survival of its population.84
Leadership factors have great bearing on the state’s ability to compete, cooperate, and
specialize relative to other states.
International System Characteristics
The evolutionary processes driving the state’s development and behavior have
resulted in the transformation of the international environment into a highly complex
political and economic system of state interactions. Through the process of civigenesis,
the international system’s general characteristics have developed according to the
evolution based principles of competition, cooperation, and specialization. These general
characteristics are broadly divided into intangible and tangible characteristics.85 Tangible
characteristics are those active characteristics readily measurable in the international
environment and physically represented. They include realist, liberal, and international
class characteristics. Intangible characteristics are those active characteristics that cannot
be readily measured and may not be physically represented in the international
environment. They include relative degrees of polar mobility, structural elasticity,
~ Kegley and Wittkopf, 464-465, 503-504.
~ Ibid.
~ The classification of the characteristics of the international system into tangible and intangible
characteristics was developed in this study by the researcher.
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competitive tendencies, cooperative tendencies, and isolationist tendencies.
Tangible Characteristics
The international system is characterized by simultaneous competition,
cooperation, and specialization among its base units. These characteristics are
individually representative of realist (natural selection), liberal (coevolution), and class
(group/multilevel selection) characteristics, each of which dynamically influences the
general behavioral responses of the state and other actors to each other and their
environment.
Realist Characteristics (Natural Selection)
In response to the scarcity of resources and security (anarchy) within the
international environment, the forces of natural selection have resulted in a number of
systemic attributes paralleling those of realism. Survival-based competition and coiiflict
are the primary attributes of natural selection and likewise characterize realism politically
and mercantilism economically. The behavioral determinants emerging out of the
system’s realist attributes are both “power” and “structure,” with an emphasis on relative
gains for each state.86
Within the anarchical structure of the international environment, the pursuit of
scarce resources and security creates competition between actors seeking to ensure their
more efficient survival. This competition at its base is decided by the amount of power
amassed and exercised by each actor relative to other actors. The states amassing and
maintaining the most power become the most adept at competing for scarce resources and
maintaining their security. Physical conflict or power in the form ofbrute force becomes
86 Goldstein, 55-58.
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the ultimate arbiter of any competition between states in both its active and latent forms.
The distribution of power between actors within the structure of the international system
ultimately serves to constrain each state’s ability to act in pursuit of its own interests. All
states’ decisions must be measured against the possibility and potential costs of conflict
with other actors.87
As a result, in order to effectively compete for scarce resources and security,
states must continually seek to augment their power by enhancing their material
capabilities via structural adaptations and innovation. The building of material
capabilities enhances their ability to compete, engage in conflict, and ultimately establish
a sphere of influence for themselves in which to exercise their power. Among competing
states, conflict continues until a balance of power develops among them conducive to
their survival and security needs. Where a balance of power has not developed, conflict
continues among competing states to supply their material and security needs.88
Liberal Characteristics (Coevolution)
In response to the costs of conflict and limitations of economic autarky present in
natural selection, states within the international system have developed a coevolutionary
pattern of relations paralleling the dominant attributes of liberalism. Cooperation and
interdependence are dominant characteristics of coevolution and likewise of liberalism.
The behavioral determinants emerging out of the liberal characteristics of the
international system are institutionalism and interdependence.89
87Thjd
88Ibid.
~ Goldstein, 10 1-107.
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Within the international system, states must engage in relationships of
cooperation, interdependence, and mutual coexistence beyond pure competition and
conflict in order to ensure their more efficient long-term survival. States seek to better
meet their survival needs collectively than on their own by creating organizations and
institutions to facilitate cooperation, manage competition, and limit conflict. Such efforts
grant greater possibilities of survival for both powerful and weak actors in an
environment of scarcity. Through institutional cooperation, large degrees of
interdependence develop between actors, linking their survival to the system’s
institutions and other states. States begin specializing within resource production
processes for exchanges with other specializing states. Survival prospects and
developmental gains in terms of scarce resources become interpreted in terms of absolute
gains, and relative security gains become secondary.9°
International Class Characteristics (Group SelectionlMultilevel Selection)
The process of group/multilevel selection grants characteristics to the
international system paralleling those of international class conflict. Class division or
class conflict is the major behavioral determinant emerging from the system’s class
characteristics, which, in turn, are further factored into variants of stratification and
hierarchy. Within the process of group selection, those states most adept at
simultaneously competing, cooperating, and specializing begin to collectively accrue
benefits to themselves that reinforce their ability to repeat and improve those processes
over time.
An international division ofproduction develops in which the states that
90Thid.
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collectively reproduce high development attributes form a center and those that do not
form a periphery. Based on resource production specialization, the international
environment creates an economic stratification from which a global hierarchy among
states is derived. This hierarchy is based primarily on each state’s relative aggregate
power and position in the global production process. As a result, the states most central
to the functioning and maintenance of the evolved global system determine the structure
and rules of competition, conflict, resource production specialization, and
institutionalism. The system’s most peripheral states and the states furthest down in the
global resource production process are highly subordinated to the preferences of center
states.91
Intangible Characteristics
International systems themselves are defmed or likened to one another by their
general component parts inclusive of a system structure (the formal and mformal
organization of its base units), and unit relations (the general behavioral tendencies of the
base units towards each other). International systems are differentiated from each other
by their allowable degrees of polar mobility, or the ability of states to accumulate vast
amounts of aggregate power within the system structure; structural elasticity, or the
capacity of the system’s structure to expand and accommodate increasing numbers of
state and non-state actors; and degrees of competition or cooperation displayed among
their base units. The system’s degrees of polar mobility and structural elasticity are its
most important structural characteristics, as these two factors primarily dictate the
parameters of state behavior and relations. The system’s degrees of general behavioral
91 Goldstein, 467-470, 475-477.
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slants towards competition, cooperation, and isolationism are its most important
relational characteristics, as those three factors dictate the structures necessary to manage
the dominant relational behaviors.
Polar Mobility and Structural Elasticity
System structures impose varying degrees of limits on the state’s accumulation of
aggregate state power, serving to either restrict or enable the status mobility of the state
within the system. Aggregate state power here refers to the state’s sum of combined
economic, military, and political influence and capabilities. International system
structures have historically either been characteristically polar static, limiting the
integration or rise of new political, economic, and military powers within the system, or
polar dynamic, allowing the integration or rise of new political, economic, and military
powers within the system.92 Different structures impose varying degrees of constraints
on the expansion of the number of units in the system at different periods during the
lifespan of the system.
Exclusively defmed, a polar static structure limits the vertical mobility of states in
the system by limiting the amount of aggregate state power they can accumulate
themselves. Polar static structures discourage increased state participation in the system
by restricting the numerical multiplying of state units within it, commonly resulting in the
development of an international status quo among states. An exclusively polar dynamic
structure does not limit the vertical mobility or accumulation of aggregate power among
states but encourages increased systemic participation with few limits on the number of
states in the system. States may accumulate increasing amounts of aggregate state power
92Po1& mobility and structural elasticity are original terms and concepts created by the researcher
within this study.
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and may enter the international status quo of states as their influence increases.
Agonistic and Reciprocally Altruistic Relations
The system’s unit relations are distinguished by the general tendencies of the most
influential and powerful states to compete or cooperate with each other militarily,
economically, politically, and institutionally. The international system’s unit relations
have historically been either characteristically agonistic, facilitating unit competition
without imposed limits on conflict, or reciprocally altruistic, facilitating unit cooperation
with imposed limits on conflict.
Exclusively agonistic systems of relations encourage states to compete politically,
economically, and militarily without imposed limits on the conflicts that inevitably arise
in relation to resource and security scarcity. Agonistic systems of relations discourage
increased broad cooperation and rules among states across the system. They instead
encourage power balancing, military arms buildups, and containment as the primary
means by which to settle or deter conflicts. The systems structure may enable or
encourage conflict among agonistic states by not providing other viable means by which
to achieve material and physical security.
Exclusively altruistic reciprocal systems of relations enable and encourage broad
cooperation among states that perceive them as the most effective means of addressing
the scarcity of material and physical security. States generally opt to cooperate rather
than competing when the cost of competing is greater than the cost of cooperating and the
benefits of cooperating are greater than the gains of competing. Within a reciprocal
altruistic system of relations, states generally cooperate based on the condition that the
relative cost they incur to cooperate is less than the relative benefits their cooperation
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grants to other participating states. The process of cooperation must not undermine one
state’s material and physical security while enhancing the material and physical security
of other states. Each state follows the rules and participates because the other states of
the system have agreed to do the same.
Reciprocally altruistic systems of relations generally resolve conflict through
mediation, reward, and punishment by consensus. Reciprocal altruistic systems of
relations discourage balancing behaviors and military arms races and thus have the
shortcoming of failing to deter conflict with states that do not wish to cooperate.
Noncooperative behaviors may be may be necessary to deter aggressive competitive
states that would disrupt broad cooperative efforts.
Based on the specific characteristics of structure and unit relations, international
systems will likely be either polar static and agonistic, polar static and reciprocally
altruistic, polar dynamic and reciprocally altruistic, or polar dynamic and agonistic. Each
combination results in its own processes, functions, and outcomes, accompanied by a
specific diffusion of consolidated power within the system. For the system to be
functional, there must be congruency between its structural and relational characteristics
at any given point in the life of the system. The dominant characteristics must parallel
each other and be mutually reinforcing, as opposed to mutually exclusive, or the system
will quickly collapse and disintegrate.
Structural and Relational Change in the International System
The tangible characteristics of the system primarily dictate its intangible
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characteristics.93 The realist, liberal, and class characteristics of the system, or the
system’s base unit tendencies towards competition, cooperation, and specialization,
ultimately dictate the system’s structure.
In the establishment of a first or new system, it is the general pre-system
behavioral disposition of the most influential and powerful states in the international
environment that determine the structure and unit relations of the system. The pre-system
behavioral tendencies or general behavioral slant of the most powerful and influential
states towards competition, cooperation, or isolationism determine how states construct
the system’s structure. A general behavioral slant among states develops across the
international environment based on general perceptions of the most efficient means by
which to achieve survival relative to other states. As such, the system’s structure is
developed to formalize and regulate the general behavioral and relational tendencies
among previously interacting states. The structure is geared towards minimalizing the
most harmful effects of those behaviors by granting predictability and parameters to state
actions and interactions. The system’s structure operates as a function of the dominant
relational paradigm of its units and serves as a mechanism by which to constrain or direct
their behavior.
As a result, as general state behavior varies, polar mobility and structural
elasticity must also change over time for the system to remain functional. Static polarity
historically has been a necessary structural condition to achieve systemic stability among
~ This principle is adapted from the practice and process within genetics or evolutionary biology of
mapping a set of genotypes to a set of phenotypes (genotype—phenotype map), where an organism’s
genotype is considered the major influencing factor in the development of its phenotype.
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state units with largely agonistic behavior. Static polarity functions to limit the scope of
conflict among competitive units by dually limiting the diffusion of consolidated power
and the number of units in the system. However, as state units inevitably increase and
consolidated power diffuses across the system over time, more dynamism is reflected in
the system, and its relations must transition from a dominant agonistic form of interaction
to a more reciprocally altruistic one to accommodate the unit changes.
Likewise, reciprocally altruistic relations may be a necessary behavioral
disposition to achieve systemic stability within a polar dynamic structure composed of
mostly weak states. Reciprocal altruistic relations function to limit the scope of conflict
among an increasing number of weak states by discouraging power-balancing behaviors
among them and allowing them to act in concert where they could not act alone. As more
functional states unilaterally arise within or outside a polar dynamic integrative system,
the system must transition to a more agonistic form of relations in order to deter conflict
in the event those states do not wish to cooperate. Functional stability has historically
been achieved through organizing the system’s structure and relations according to the
principles of either a fixed regime of interactions based on limited state mobility or a
floating regime of transitionary interactions based on the vertical mobility of states.94
The fixed or floating principle has been necessary to manage transitions in structure as
the unit composition of the system changes and as systemic transitions occur from
periods of instability to periods of stability.
Systemic transitions in structure and unit relations are initiated by changes in the
system’s unit composition. The unit composition of the system changes as its number of
94The Exed and floating principles of monetary policy originally applied to the concept of international
stem change and transition by the researcher within this study.
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state units increases or decreases and as individual states increase or decrease their
aggregate power over time. The state’s ability to accumulate aggregated power is
ultimately limited by its degree of structural complexity or ability to simultaneously
compete, cooperate, and specialize in varying degrees. As states become more complex
and functional, their capacity to accumulate vast amounts of aggregated power
dramatically increases. As a result, increases in state functionality are accompanied by
increases in aggregate state power. As the state’s degree of functionality and
accumulation of aggregate power change, its relations with other states necessarily also
change to reflect the increase or decrease. The dominant behavior emerging out of these
changes among the most influential and powerful states in the system then forms its
general relational pattern. That general relational pattern, in turn, determines how the
system’s structure will function; either functionally or dysfunctionally. In either
scenario, the system must act to either accommodate or constrain the behaviors brought
about by the changes in the system.
The Metafunctionalist Model of State Behavior and Relations
The metafunctionalist model of state behavior and relations illustrates how the
structure of the international environment and the tangible characteristics of the
international system and its state units drive state behavior and relations (Figure 3). The
model presents a system of ordering the international environment and outlining the
processes by which its relations and interactions occur. It utilizes a metatheoretical
approach to highlighting multiple primary behavioral determinants emerging out ofboth
system and state variables. Its format streamlines a circular system ofpolitical inputs and
outputs from the anarchical structure of the international environment to the institutional
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Figure 3. The Metafunctionalist Model of State Behavior and Relations
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processes and outputs of the state. The model is subdivided into seven segments
occurring in sequential order: environment inputs, global variables, system and state
characteristics, behavioral determinants, variants, policy institutions, and behavioral
outputs. These broad headings house the foundational general assumptions regarding the
international environment, international system, state units, and the multiple theories
describing each behavioral determinant.
International Environment (3a)
This model begins with the assumption that there is an international environment
existent on the globe in which all human beings and life exist and contend for order and
fulfillment of their needs and wants. More specifically, the international environment
refers to the collective territorial and social organizations of the globe and their constant
internal actions and external interactions with each other from a position of limited
resources and scarcity.95 These actions and interactions constitute specific behavioral
patterns that may be systematically examined and measured to identify the motives or
basis for those particular actions.96 On an ongoing basis, the international environment
constantly bombards the state with requirements, requests, challenges, and obstacles that
must be effectively addressed to ensure the state’s survival and effective interaction with
other international actors. The collective environmental dynamics constantly facing the
state are referred to as environmental inputs.
Global Variables (3b)
A secondary assumption is that the international environment is organized into a
~ Kegley and Raymond, 55.
96 Ibid., 53-54.
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system (international system) founded upon the anarchical structure of the international
environment.97 That system is composed of multiple base units98 (multiunit system
composition); the state units dominating the international environment are generally
rational actors based on pursuit of their national interests.99 The multiunit composition of
the international system includes the nation-state as well as the artificial multinational
state’°° historically emerging out of European colonialism. The determinants in the
state’s behavior and relations emerge as outgrowths of the primary global variables of
state and system.’°’ The systemic influences on state relations refer to those influences
emanating from the structure and order of the international environment, while state
influences refer to those influences emanating from the structure and organization of the
state.
System and State Characteristics (3c)
The dominant characteristics ofboth the system and state are the products of
collective processes of evolution and have evolved over an extended period of time.
System-based characteristics include realist, liberal, and international class
characteristics, while the state’s dominant characteristics include its functional
composition, perception and cognitive awareness, and decision-making capacity. These
characteristics are identified through the theories of functionalism and evolution and in
turn house the behavioral determinants dictating state behavior and relations.
~ Goldstein, 10.
~ Ibid., 10.
~ Ibid., 68, 102.
100 This term and its definition have been introduced by the researcher.
101 Goldstein, 16.
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Behavioral Determinants and Variants (3d)
The central determinants of the state’s behavior are an outgrowth of the dominant
characteristics of the system and state that have evolved over time. The behavioral
determinants emerging out of the system’s realist characteristics are power and balance.
Their corresponding variants include national interest, material capability, and
structure.’°2 The behavioral determinants emerging out of the system’s liberal
characteristics are institutionalism and interdependence. Their corresponding variants
include international instiftitionalism, complex interdependence, and globalization.’03
The behavioral determinants emerging out of the system’s international class
characteristics are economic stratification and political hierarchy.’°4 The international
class characteristics’ corresponding van ts include neocolonialism dependency d
underdevelopment.
The behavioral determinants emerging out of the state’s functional composition
are structure and function. The state structure and function factors refer to those
influences emanating out of the institutional and territorial organization of the state as a
national and domestic conduit for sociopolitical inputs and processor of its outputs.’°5 Its
corresponding variants include structural and functional independence and dependence.
The behavioral determinant emerging out of the state’s perception and cognitive
awareness is a predominating worldview. The state’s woridview is derived from an
amalgamation of elite, mass, and leadership understandings of the international
102 Hughes, 47, 48.
103 Ibid., 53-56.
‘°4Kegley and Raymond, 40-42.
105 Chilcote, 133,135.
environment and their preferences for both domestic and international~ ~
corresponding variants include globalist-regional-national views, centrist-peripheral
views, polar-satellite views, racial-ethnic-religious views, and civilizational views. The
behavioral determinant emerging out of the state’s decision-making capacity is leadership
type or style.’°7 Its corresponding variants include national-leadership, democratic
leadership, kieptocratic leadership, neopatrimonialism, and clientelism.
Institutions (3e) and Behavioral Outputs (31)
Through institutional processes, the environmental inputs bombarding the state
are systematically converted into behavioral outputs.’°8 The inputs and requirements
imposed on the state are filtered through state institutions that ideally, in consideration of
all pertinent factors, develop formal behavioral responses in the form of foreign and
domestic (public) policy.’09 These institutions vary and may be centralized or
decentralized based on the governing structure of the state.110 In the 21 ~-century era of
globalization and complex interdependence, policy formulation has emerged largely as
intermestic in nature.’11 Intermestic policy refers to the development of domestic and
foreign policies so closely linked to both national and international outcomes that they
cannot generally be separated from each other in the process ofpolicy formulation.”2
106 Hughes, 39-40.
‘°7Kegley and Raymond, 63-65.
108 Chiclote, 127-129, 133-135.
109 RobertO. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 48-50.
110 Kegley and Raymond, 5 9-60.
111 Keohane and Mimer, 3-4.
112 Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process 5th
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Tntermestic policy exits the state as behavioral outputs, entering the international
environment, where it adds to the milieu of activity comprising the environmental inputs
constantly bombarding all states in the system. Beginning again with the assumption of
the international environment, the process restarts itself in continuity with the ongoing
behavioral life cycle of the state and maintenance of the international system.
System Relations: Competitive, Cooperative, and Self-Isolating Behaviors
Based on the dominant characteristics afforded to the international system by the
dominant evolutionary processes governing the international environment, the behavior
and relations of its dominant actors are governed by a combination of competitive,
cooperative, specialist, and isolationist behaviors geared towards their more efficient
survival.”3 States in relation to each other and their interests either: (i) compete; (ii)
cooperate; (iii) compete and cooperate; (v) compete, cooperate, and specialize; or (vi)
self-isolate (delink). The relations of the international system generally take the forms of
political, economic, and military relationships and interactions. States dually engage in
multiples of these behaviors depending on the actors they interact with.
Competitive behaviors, as dictated by natural selection within the realist
characteristics of the system, are either conflictual, of an antagonistic military, economic,
and political nature, or enhancing, resulting in economic and political innovation that
ultimately paves the way for greater cooperation. Cooperative behaviors, as dictated by
coevolution within the liberal characteristics of the system, are either mutualistic (dually
beneficial) based on collective interests; commensural (unnecessary) based on public
ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003), 373.
113 Competitive, cooperative, and self-isolating behaviors are based on evolutionaiy patterns of behavior
present within each of the major processes of evolution outlined in this study.
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goods, friendship, and symbolism; or parasitic (dually beneficial and harmful) based on
diverging long-term and short-term interests. Specialization, as dictated by
group/multilevel selection within the class characteristics of the system, is based on either
enhanced multistate cooperation or state competition. States within a system of
economic interdependence specialize in order to reap the greater benefits of international
trade. States within a largely competitive environment specialize to grant themselves a
competitive edge or advantage over other states also competing for scarce resources and
security. Self-isolating behaviors occur when states wish to neither compete nor
cooperate with other states, opting to delink from the international political and economic
system.
These broad state behavioral choices are generally chosen or pursued based on a
cost-benefit analysis of how one behavioral choice relative to the others enhances the
state’s prospects for more efficient survival.”4 Generally, where it is more beneficial to
compete rather than cooperate, states will choose to compete and vice versa ‘Where it is
more beneficial and possible to do both, states will undertake both activities. Likewise,
states will specialize based on which behaviors grant the greatest benefits. If the costs of
undertaking both cooperative and competitive behaviors are greater than the costs of
delinking from the system, states will then choose to self-isolate.
State Categories
The determinants in the state’s behavior and relations are the products of the
characteristic attributes of the international system and the state. Based on the
combination of active determinants in state behavior, states exhibit distinct sets of
114 Goodson, 38. Rational choice, decision making, and actions towards more efficient survival are
based on the evolution-based principle of functional causality.
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structural characteristics and behavioral patterns. These groupings of state characteristics
and behavioral patterns have been reproduced among states to a degree warranting broad
categorizations in a process paralleling evolution’s biological speciation. The categories
representative of these select patterns of behavior and structural characteristics have
evolved over a period of time in response to the selective pressures within the
international environment. The selective pressures of resource and security scarcity drive
states to evolve and develop at different rates and times based on their geography,
population makeup, and proximity to other states or social formations.
The states of the international system in the post-WWII era have traditionally
been broadly informally divided into a hierarchy of three tiers of states based on their
aggregate state power and influence: the first and smallest numerical tier composed of the
system’s most powerful and influential states, the second tier composed of mid-range
strength states, and the third and largest numerical tier composed of the system’s weakest
states.”5
However, within these broad tiers, six specific categories of states may be
identified based on the combination of general behavioral responses to each of the
dominant behavioral determinants. These broad categories include hyperfunctional
states, equ~functional states, hypofunctional states, pathofunctional states,
protofunctional states, and neutrofunctional states.”6 Within the first tier are all
hyperfunctional states and the most powerful and influential equifunctional states.
Within the second tier are the weaker and less influential equifunctional states and most
115 Goldstein, 79-81.
116 The six categories of states have been originally developed and defined within this study.
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powerfiul hypofunctional states, and in the third tier are pathofunctional, protofunctional,
and neutrofunctional states.
Modem states either progress or regress through these six categorical behavioral
stages, but from differing starting points based on the historical manner and period of a
state’s formation. Modern states have a host of historical origination points, including
19th~ and 2Oth~century colonialism, indigenous or heterogeneous population expansion,
empire regression, ethnic and tribal consolidation, migration, security-based
consolidation, and religious isolation or 17
To date, the general pattern of historical progression indicates that states generally
proceed from a protofunctional or pathofunctional state to a hypofunctional state; from a
hypofunctional state to an equifunctional or h erfunctional state; and from a
hypofunctional state to an equifunctional state. Hyperfunctional states have historically
eventually regressed to an equifunctional condition in which they begin an integration
process with other equifunctional states. Pathofunctional states have in multiple
instances demonstrated the ability and tendency to regress to a protofunctional or
neutrofunctional stage. All states are subject to regression where they are not able to
adequately compete, cooperate, and specialize relative to other states in the system or
adapt to significant changes in the international environment.”8
Hyperfunctional States
Characteristics — Realist: Superpower, hyperpower, greatpower. Liberal:
interdependent. mt. Class: center. Structure and Function: functionally independent,
117 Goldstein, 29-33, 43-45.
118 Goodson, 46-49. Survival dictates that evolution is an ongoing process of successful and
unsuccessful adaptations to changing environmental conditions. States likewise evolve and regress based
on their ability to adapt more efficient survival traits and techniques.
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structurally independent. Leadership Type/Style: democratic, authoritarian moralist,
nationalist. Perception/Woridview: globalist, regional, polar.
Example: The United States, China, Japan, and Germany.
Hyperfunctional states are those states housing an enhanced degree of structural
organization and institutional complexity that effectively hyperaccelerates the normal
functioning of its institutions and societal productivity. This level of hyperfunctionality
super-enhances the state’s capacity to compete, cooperate, and specialize relative to other
states in the international environment through repetitive innovation and security.
Hyperfunctional states evolve from either hypofunctional states or equifunctional states.
These states become cultural and technological staples of the system, evolving cultural
and structural adaptations adopted by other states. Hyperfunctional states have the
greatest capacity for long-term rapid growth and development and become central
hegemonic pillars within the international order. They are central to the maintenance of
the system, as they contain the greatest capacity to contribute to international public
goods. They encourage systemic and institutional participation among other states by
creating conditions for those states to free ride and enjoy the benefits of the system
without paying the bulk of the cost to maintain it. However, based on the principle of
diminishing returns on military expenditure and the limits of developmental space and
resources, hyperfunctional states in the long term will settle into an equifunctional
condition, more closely cooperating and integrating with other equifunctional states.
Hyperfunctional states’ primary relationships are largely mutualistic or parasitic
in nature. In their mutualistic relationships, hyperfunctional states accrue massive
benefits along with the other participating parties in the relationship. In their parasitic
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relationships, they accrue massive benefits at the expense of the other participating
parties in the relationship. Their secondary relationships are comrnensural, adding to
international public goods and system stability.
Hyperfunctionalism represents a supra-normal state condition in which the state
exhibits behavior markedly beyond the most functional actors in the system. Even so,
hyperfunctional behavior hinders the state’s capacity for integration with other
hyperfunctional or equifunctional states. Their adeptness at unilateral competition,
security maintenance, and political and economic specialization limit their political
cooperation to multilateral regimes, international institutionalism, and bilateral
agreements. The benefits of political autonomy and hegemonic influence within the
system are significantly greater than the benefits of greater political and economic
integration under a supranational authority. Being central providers of international
public goods, hyperfunctional states necessarily rationalize that other states need the
benefits of their independent capacity more than the hyperfunctional states needs their
participation and cooperation. As a result, with the exception of Germany,
hyperfunctional states generally have not sought greater political integration with other
states.
Within the hyperfunctional state, the degrees of institutional strength,
development, and systematic organization result in extreme socioeconomic functionality
with manageable degrees of structural and behavioral dysfunction. The most significant
societal dysfunctions present in the hyperfunctional state have been great disparities in
economic wealth, in-imigration issues, and either extremely limited or overactive political
participation. However, along with equifunctional and hypofunctional states, their degree
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of environmental destruction and degradation is beyond an acceptable point of
management.
Equifunctional States
Characteristics - Realist: great power, middle-range powers. Liberal: interdependent.
mt. Class: center. Structure and Function: functionally independent, structurally
independent. Leadership Type/Style: democratic, authoritarian moralist, nationalist.
Perception!Woridview: regional, multiregional, multipolar, civilizational.
Examples: England, France, Russia, Italy, Spain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Brunei, and Dubai, among others.
Equifunctional states are those states exhibiting a general level of institutional
organization and normalized degree of structural complexity that allow for the basic
functioning of their political and economic institutions towards meeting the resource and
security needs of the state. Equifunctional states generally evolve from hypofunctional
states or come about as the result of the developmental stagnation and regression of a
hyperfunctional state. The equifunctional state’s level of economic productivity and
political organization has reached an acceptable point of equilibrium between the basic
wants and needs of the population and the state’s capacity to adequately provide them.
This level of equilibrial functionality grants the state an above-average capacity to
compete, cooperate, and specialize within the international environment relative to other
states. Individually, they continue to specialize within the global resource production
process, internally maintaining high levels of repetitive innovation in the production and
distribution of goods and services. An equifunctional state’s primary international
relationships are mutualistic with secondary parasitic and commensural relationships.
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Equifunctionalism represents the most normal state condition, exhibiting the most
consistent behavior among functional actors and the second most consistent behavioral
patterns of all actors in the system. Along with hyperfunctional states, equiflinctional
states become the primary cultural and technological developers and providers within the
system. They evolve production, organizational, and cultural practices and processes
adopted by the other states of the system. The structure of the international system
hinges in part on the formal organizational cooperation of groups of equifunctional states.
Together with hyperfunctional states, equifunctional states account for the largest
percentage of the global production of consumer and capital goods and services. Based
on the costs of diminishing military returns, limited developmental space, and the relative
costs of military conflict versus cooperation, equifunctional states opt for cooperation
with hyperfunctional and equifunctional states, and, where possible, integration with
other equifunctional states as the most effective means by which to provide for the
essential wants and needs of the state. In groups and partnerships, these states are adept
at competition in the security and economic spheres, and politically have an advanced
capacity for cooperation to a degree allowing for political integration beyond economics.
The equifunctional state’s limited accumulation of aggregate power and enhanced
functional complexity fundamentally allow it to integrate with other equifunctional states
as opposed to hindering such processes, as is the case with hypofunctional states.
Due to their institutions functioning at a level of equilibrium, equifunctional states
do not house great enough productive capacity to individually extend international public
goods and benefits to the system or other states. However, in concert, they are able to
maintain consistent degrees of innovation and security, collectively contributing to
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international public goods in a degree beyond their individual capacity.
The equifunctional state is subject to largely manageable degrees of social,
political, and economic dysfunctions. These dysfunctions include terrorism, immigration
issues, ethnic and racial discrimination, and religious discrimination. However, along
with hyperfunctional and hypofunctional states, their degree of environmental destruction
and degradation is beyond an acceptable point of management.
Hypofunctional States
Characteristics — Realist: ascendingpowers, middle-range powers, regional powers,
minorpowers. Liberal: emerging markets. mt. Class: semi-peripheral, developing.
Structure andfunction: dysfunctional and structurally independent, functional and
structurally dependent. Leadership Type/Style: democratic leadership, authoritarian
moralist leadership, nationalist leadership. Perception/Woridview: regional,
multiregional, multipolar, civilizationaL
Examples: India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Libya, Poland, Czech Republic,
Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina,
Chile, Cuba, Bangladesh, Panama, Costa Rica, Belize, among others.
Hypofunctional states are those states in which the basic level of institutional
organization and structural complexity function just below the equilibrium point between
the demands of the state in terms of basic wants and needs and the state’s ability to
supply and provide for those wants and needs. The state’s needs outweigh its productive
capacity, where its institutions are complex enough in their organization and development
to allow for rapid economic growth and development but are too limited to extend those
processes and their benefits to the entire state. This level of subequilibrial functionality
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grants the state an above-average capacity to compete, cooperate, and specialize within
the international environment relative to other states. Hypofiinctional states generally
evolve from protofunctional and pathofunctional states or emerge as the result of the
developmental stagnation or regression of an equifunctional state. Their primary
relationships are mutualistic, in which they accrue great benefits from the relationship
along with other participants, and secondarily commensural, of a symbolic or political
nature. Hypofunctional states generally do not have the aggregate power necessary to
enforce and maintain parasitic international relationships in which they primarily benefit.
They are powerful enough, however, not to be forced into parasitic relationships with
other states in which they are hurt.
Hypofunctional states are the second smallest group of states functioning below
the normal equilibrium middle state condition of equifunctional states. They exhibit both
partial equifunctional and pathofunctional behaviors, with a great capacity for growth
even beyond the equifunctional level. Hypofunctional states are important within the
international system as secondary replicators of cultural adaptations and technological
innovations developed in hyperfunctional and equifunctional states. They are key
components of the international system as agents of regional stability. Their degree of
technological and cultural innovation is low, with little contribution to international
security and public international goods. They are adept at competition in terms of state
security but house a significantly lower degree of economic specialization than
equifunctional and hyperfunctional states.
Hypofunctional states are adept at international cooperation through multilateral
institutions and organizations, successfully participating in most international regimes.
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They are also party to numerous bilateral agreements with hyperfunctional and
equifunctional states in which they trade and insource foreign resource production
processes. Internally, their level of institutional development and systematic organization
result in below-average socioeconomic functionality and considerable degrees of social,
political, economic, and environmental dysfunctions that are increasingly difficult to
manage. These dysfunctions include massive poverty, extensive national debt, brain
drain, high levels of unemployment, population displacement, terrorism, and
environmental degradation.
The level of state dysfunction growing out of the underdevelopment of the state’s
political and economic institutional structures teamed with their large size generally
hinders the hypoflinctional state’s ability to engage in advanced cooperation in the form
of political integration with hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and other hypofunctional
states. Hypofunctional states are prone to cooperation with pathofunctional and
neutrofunctional states, often having common interests with those groups of states.
Pathofunctional States
Characteristics — Realist: weak. Liberal: marginal. InL Class: peripheral, dependent,
underdeveloped. Structure andfunction: dysfunctional and structurally dependent.
Leadership type: authoritarian survivalist, neopatrimonial, matrimonial, nationalist,
neocolonial, pseudo-democratic. Perception/Woridview: regional, national, satellite,
racial, unarticulated and loosely defined, donor-recipient.
Examples: Most of the states of sub-Saharan Africa, Guyana, Suriname, Guatemala,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Columbia, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
among a host of others.
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Pathofunctional states are those states in which lower levels of institutional
organization and structural underdevelopment drastically impair and retard the normal
functioning of the state’s institutions. The state does not house enough productive
capacity to independently maintain its own survival or ensure the survival of its
population without external assistance. Its extreme degree of subequilibrial functionality
impedes the state’s ability to compete, cooperate, or specialize in any effective manner
within the international environment. The retardation of the pathofunctional state’s
institutions is produced by an inversion of their bureaucratic processes that causes them
to work in the reverse, underdeveloping the state in a manner that makes it an instrument
of human insecurity as opposed to security.
The inversion of institutional bureaucratic processes and resulting fiscal deviation
from rational-choice decision making is rooted in an institutional culture clash (or
incompatibility) between the prescribed values for the institutions and the values of the
individuals staffmg them. Based on this incongruence of values, state institutions begin
working against the interests of the population as the centralized government actively
undermines the population’s survival and development prospects through corruption,
incompetence, and the rape of state resources. The state becomes a domestic
antagonizing force whose institutions are inefficient tools for addressing both domestic
political needs and the challenges of the international environment. This reversal of
institutional functioning systematically destroys each institution’s capacity to
autonomously maintain, repair, or reinvent itself, ultimately crippling the state’s capacity
to act effectively.
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The pathofunctional state’s extended degrees of institutional underdevelopment
and absence of structural complexity produce only marginal socioeconomic functionality
in the state’s political and economic centers. Beyond those centers, without the
centralized government as a major organizing instrument of societal order, there is
statewide societal dysfunction. These dysfunctions include massive poverty, extensive
national debt, brain drain, high levels of unemployment, population displacement, civil
and political instability, civil conflict, underdevelopment, and ethnic and racial conflict,
among a host of behaviors atypical of functional healthy states. Pathofunctional behavior
does not easily allow for the integration or adoption of structural and behavioral
innovations produced domestically or externally. With few exceptions, the
underdevelopment of the state’s political and economic institutional structures hinders the
pathofunctional state’s ability to achieve basic political or economic integration with
states of most other types beyond parasitic relations. The East African Community
(Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) present an exceptional case, as they have achieved
advanced political and economic cooperation at the pathofunctional stage of
development. Southern Africa also presents a special case, as South Africa as a
hypofhnctional state has facilitated political cooperation among the pathofunctional states
of Southern Africa through the South African Development Community (SADC).
Pathofunctional states represent the largest group of states within the international
environment exhibiting behaviors drastically different from those of the most functional
states in the system. They have generally evolved as the products of parasitic
relationships with hyperfunctional and equifunctional states in the 19th and 20th centuries.
These postcolonial states emerged from 19th~ and 20th_century colonialism as extra-state
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extensions of hyperfunctional and equifunctional states maintained by force. As the
productive and functional capacity of hyperfunctional and equifunctional states declined,
these extra-state extensions became independent entities.
Since their emergence as independent entities, pathofunctional states’
relationships have been primarily dominated by parasitic relations in the form of
neocolonialism, matrimonialism, and dependency. -Tn these parasitic relationships, the
state and its population are significantly harmed by resource exploitation but dependent
on the relationship to ward off structural collapse and institutional failure.
Pathofunctional states’ secondary relationships are largely commensural in nature, where
they benefit at the leisure of more functional states and maintain cordial relationships
with other pathofunctional and protofunctional states. Pathofunctional states are
regularly dominated by hypofunctional and equifunctional states but engage in
cooperation with hypofunctional states. They have the tendency to compete with
protofunctional states and other pathofunctional states for access to international aid and
select resources.
Pathofunctionalism or pathofunctional behavior represents an abnormal
behavioral condition and structural disorder that, without external aid, will ultimately
lead to state structural collapse and institutional failure. The structure of the international
system reinforces pathofunctional behavior through regimes of dependency, international
aid, juridical recognition, and the political interests driving the economic stratification of
the global economy. Pathofunctional behavior may necessarily lead to similar problems
in bordering states constantly in contact with the pathofunctional state politically,
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economically, socially, and culturally. Its social dysfunctions may be extended to
neighboring states through both social and economic exchanges.
Protofunctional
Characteristics — Realist: weak. Liberal: marginal. mt. Class: per4pheral, dependent,
underdeveloped. Structure andfunction: dysfunctional and structurally dependent.
Leadership type: authoritarian survivalist, neopatrimonial, neocolonial, matrimonial.
Perception/Woridview: national, satellite, racial, tribal, clan, religious, unarticulated
and loosely defined, donor-recipient.
Examples: Afghanistan, Haiti, Niger, Myanmar, Congo, Zimbabwe, Central African
Republic, Sudan, Tajilcistan, East Timor, among other states.
Protofunctional states are states that in practical reality have essentially no active
centralized national institutions beyond their centers, which house their governing
officials, military, and police forces. National institutions in these states not only have
failed, but also have been neglected or are simply not used as tools to service the wants
and needs of the population statewide. The state government primarily acts as the prime
intermediary between the state and other international actors, maintaining a military and
police force to guarantee its own security, protect private and public investments, and
maintain control of the population. The state performs no significant functions outside of
maintaining its capacity to interact with extrastate actors and control the population. The
state is essentially decentralized and does not entail significant degrees of systematic
organization beyond its administrative center. It is territorially maintained by the
juridical recognition of other states and essentially supported by regimes of international
economic and security aid from other states and organizations. Its relations are
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essentially parasitic, as it feeds off of the international system and its actors to maintain
any semblance of statehood. Without external aid, protofunctional states will regress into
a neutrofunctional stage and structurally collapse, as the government and military have no
resources by which to support themselves and maintain their functions. Protofunctional
states hold the possibility of evolution into pathofunctional states through drastic reform
and external developmental aid.
Protofunctional states have also generally evolved as the product of parasitic
colonial relationships with hyperfunctional and equifunctional states in the 19th and 20th
centuries. They also come about as the product of conflict and postconflict states. These
states are completely dysfunctional and do not compete, cooperate, or specialize in any
significant degree in the international environment. Protofunctional states are dominated
by hyperfunctional and equifunctional states, cooperate with hypofunctional states, and
compete with pathofunctional and other protofunctional states for international aid and
select resources.
Neutrofunctional
Characteristics — Realist: weak. Liberal: marginal. mt. Class: perz~heral,
maldeveloped. Structure andfunction: structural collapse, institutionalfailure, quasi-
statism. Leadership type: warlordism, tribal, clan. Perception/Worldview: racial,
tribal, clan, religious.
Examples: Somalia, Afghanistan. Previously collapsed and failed states include Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and Congo.
Neutrofunctional states are structurally collapsed states in which the official
formally organized political, economic, and social institutions of the state have ceased to
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function or no longer exist in their capacity as the organs by which to organize and order
the state.”9 The state has no formal governing authorities or standing military. A state
becomes neutrofunctional through civil, national, or international conflict; economic
sanctions; natural disasters; or political collapse. With no functional institutions and no
active political or economic system, the state is unable to serve as a mechanism to deliver
scarce resources to its population. With no effective governing or societal institutions by
which to effectively organize it, the state experiences structural collapse culminating in
the erosion of its political, social, and, territorial integrity.120 In essence, there is not an
actual state but a shadow of a state maintained by the juridical recognition of
international institutions and other states. It has primitive forms of decentralized
leadership revolving around religion, clan, tribe, warlordism, and quasi-states. It has no
significant international relationships other than those of foreign aid regimes and private
businesses. Neutrofunctional states may be resuscitated through external aid to a
protofunctional or pathoflmctional stage of development.
Transitioning States
Examples: Ghana, Bangladesh, Peru (pathofunctional to hypofunctional)
Within the six state categories, select states are in a transitional phase where they
display the characteristics of two state categories to a lesser or greater degree as they
transition from one category to another. The state’s characteristics tend to lean more
greatly toward one category of state than the other and may be categorized based on the
more dominant characteristics. They also must necessarily be described and
119k William Zartmaz~, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration ofLegitimate Authority
(Boulder, CO: Lymie Rienner Publishers, 1995), 1-2, 5-6, 10.
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acknowledged as transitioning states to adequately describe the characteristics and
behavior of the state. Ghana is the foremost example on the African continent of a
transitioning state displaying the distinct dual characteristics of a pathofunctional and
hypofunctional state, though leaning more towards its pathofunctional behaviors.
State developmental transitions are an inherent part of the evolutionary pattern of
states as they leave one phase of development and enter another phase above or below it.
Under the principle of functional transition, all states must go through phases of transition
until they reach an evolutionary ceiling or floor in their development.’21 Each state’s
category and behavioral characteristics determine its relations with other states and state
types in the international environment. Once the state transitions into a different
category, its behavior and pattern of relations with other types of states also change to
reflect the transition.
General Patterns of State Behavior
Based on the collective characteristics of the six state categories, five general patterns
of behavioral interaction occur between the different state types as they seek to survive
and interact with each other within the international system and international
environment.
1. Historically hyperfunctional states have generally competed with each other until
being essentially forced into long-term cooperation through military or political
applications of force. Voluntary long-term cooperation between hyperfunctional
states presently has no historical precedent but stands to possibly evolve between
the United States and China. Hyperfunctional states have generally cooperated
121 Goodson, 37-38. The principle of functional transitions is an original concept developed in this
study based on the evolutionary principle of functional causality, where an organism’s behavior is always
reflective of the structural and behavioral characteristics of the organism in its present state.
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with equifunctional and hypofunctional states while dominating pathofunctional,
protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states.
2. Equifimctional states have historically cooperated with hyperfunctional states;
cooperated, specialized, or integrated with other equifunctional states; competed
with hypofunctional states; and dominated pathofunctional, protofunctional, and
neutrofunctional states.
3. Hypofunctional states have presently displayed trends in which they generally
either cooperate with or self-isolate from hyperfunctional states; compete with
equifunctional states; cooperate with other hypofunctional states; and cooperate
with pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states.
4. Historically, pathofunctional states have competed with protofunctional and other
pathofunctional states and sought to cooperate with states of all other types.
5. Historically, protofunctional states have generally either cooperated or self-
isolated from states of all other types.
6. Elements within neutrofunctional states by necessity will cooperate where
possible with states of all other types.
In practical application, the principle of functional transition would dictate that as a
hypoflinctional state transitions to a hyperfunctional state, it will likely dominate as
opposed to cooperate with pathoftmctional and neutrofunctional states. Likewise, if a
hypofunctional state transitions to an equifunctional state, it will no longer compete with
other equifunctional states. It will instead seek to cooperate, specialize, and possibly
integrate. Likewise, if a pathofunctional state such as Mali successfully transitions to a
hypofunctional state, it will likely go on to compete with hyperfunctional states such as
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the United States and China as opposed to being dominated by them, continue to
cooperate with hypofunctional states such as India and Brazil, compete with
equifunctional states such as Britain and France as opposed to being dominated by them,
and cooperate as opposed to compete with pathofunctional and protofunctional states
such as Cameroon and Niger.
Systemic Structural Transitions
Systemic transitions in structure and unit relations are initiated by changes in the
system’s unit composition. The unit composition of the system changes as its number of
state units increases or decreases, and as individual states increase or decrease their
aggregate power over time. The state’s ability to accumulate aggregated power is limited
by its degree of functional complexity. As the state becomes more socially,
economically, politically, and institutionally complex, its capacity to accumulate vast
amounts of aggregated power dramatically increases. Increases in state functionality are
accompanied by increases in aggregate power as the state transitions from one category
to another. As it changes category, the state’s behavior towards other units necessarily
changes to reflect its degree of functionality. The dominant relational pattern of the most
powerful and influential states towards each other then forms the general relational
pattern of the system. When the structure of the system can no longer accommodate the
dominant behavioral trend, the system structure transitions to one better able to
accommodate those behavioral changes. The general relational pattern of the system
fundamentally shifts or changes as the diffusion of state functionality and aggregate
power across the system increases or decreases over time. Changes in the general
relational pattern, in turn, eventually warrant changes in the system’s structure.
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Changes in pathoflinctional states and below essentially have little bearing on the
general interactions of the system, due to the very small reach afforded the state by lower
degrees of functionality. Downward and upward changes outside of conflict in most
equifunctional states have generally been uncommon in the modem history of the
international system, which has displayed a remarkable degree of consistency in this
regard. Historically, it has primarily been the emergence or disappearance of multiple or
single hyperfunctional states, or the emergence of multiple hypofunctional states that has
fundamentally impacted the unit relations of the system. Based on the scope and size of
hyperfunctional states’ interactions with other states, significant changes in their degree
of functionality impact the interactions of a significant percentage of the system’s actors.
Based on the behavioral disposition of those states towards competition, cooperation, or
self-isolation, the system must act to either accommodate or constrain the behavior
brought about by changes in those states.
Evolution by Necessity/Regression by Adaptabifity & Inefficiency
The state has evolved as the primary mechanism by which to provide resource
and physical security for individuals within an environment of resource and security
scarcity. At history’s present juncture, the state has become the most efficient form of
social organization to provide for the wants and needs of most individuals on Planet
Earth. Due to the changing nature of the international environment and the continual
contraction of global resources, states must continually evolve and adapt to remain
efficient mechanisms for providing resource and physical security for their populations.
Hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and hypofunctional states have the capacity to provide
for basic wants and needs of the majority of individuals within the state at a degree of
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efficiency prompting future growth and development. Pathofunctional, protofunctional,
and neutrofunctional states are significantly less adept at undertaking those same
processes and are prone to patterns of regression, underdevelopment, and
maldevelopment. They provide minimally for the wants and needs of a minority of their
populations and in many cases offer no resource security for the majority of individuals.
The majority of the population is left to subsist, rely on international aid, or defer to other
de facto forms of social organization such as clans or tribes.
If any state is unable to effectively manage its internal institutional organization
towards adapting to the ecological, economic, and political changes in the international
environment, it will regress increasingly towards a highly dysfunctional condition and
ultimately become a source of human insecurity. As a source of human insecurity, the
state will serve to hinder the capacity of the individuals within its boundaries to meet
their basic wants and needs. Resources and physical security may become scarcer within
the state than outside its territorial boundaries. Analogous to biological evolution, the
state will continue to evolve with both structural and behavioral adaptations until it
reaches an evolutionary ceiling. At that point, it will either mutate and fundamentally
change form, be overtaken by a competing form of social organization, or decline and
become extinct due to its inadaptability as a source of human security.
CHAPTER 4
THE METAFUNCTIONALIST MODEL OF STATE BEHAVIOR AND RELATIONS
Global Variables
The System (The International System)
Metafunctionalism first assumes that in the absence of a global government, the
international environment exists in a state of anarchy with no world government to
provide for the needs of all of its inhabitants.’ Within this state of anarchy, the
international environment is organized into a political and economic system2 dominated
by multiple state units at its base3 (multiunit system composition).4 However, the state of
anarchy is hierarchical in nature, experienced in varying degrees across states based on
their relative strength and position within the tiers of. The international system itself is
1 Goldstein, 74.
2 Ibid., 74, 76, 104.
~ The position of the state as the base unit of the international system is common to the most
conventional theories and major scholars of JR. Realism, liberalism, and international class theory all
consider the state as the primal base of systemic activity. I agree with this view and do not accept the
alternate views as they relate to ER. The degree of influence that states have as enablers or constrainers of
activity within the system is well beyond the scope, influence, and power of all other actors. The state as
the base unit of the international system provides the operational base from which all other institutional and
non-institutional actors must move. States must fundamentally contend with the actions of numerous
nonstate actors in the system. Several of these nonstate actors seek to influence both the state and system
in order to use them as tools to amass wealth and influence. In most instances they do not seek to
supersede the state as it is essential to their goals. Select other nonstate actors seek to destroy the state and
international system in order to impose a different form of order conducive to their interests. International
institutions as instruments of governance and not government, are still reliant upon states for funding,
housing, personnel, and implementation of major social, economic, and security initiatives. However,
international institutions have become necessary to manage state relations in order to prevent conflict and




organized through a number of international political and financial institutions and
organizations.5 These institutions and organizations are hierarchically structured and
stratified6 according to power, material capability, class, civilization, ethnicity, race,
religion, and ideology among other factors. Its state units are accompanied by a host of
non-state actors both inside and outside the system including IGOs, NGOs, iFIs,
multinational corporations (MNCs), international terrorist organizations, national
liberation movements, political parties, and transnational crime syndicates.78
Hierarchical Anarchy Hierarchical anarchy describes the systemic imposition of varying
levels of anarchy on states in which relatively weak states are subject to greater levels of
structural or institutional regulation and subordination bordering on governance, while
the most powerful and influential states experience the greatest degree of anarchy as they
structure and maintain global order in an environment of ongoing self-help.
Conventional conceptions of systemic anarchy present it as a system wide condition
generally experienced by all state units.9 However, this study deviates from conventional
conceptions of anarchy instead holding it to be experienced in varying degrees across
~ mid., 74, 76, 104.
6 Ikenberry, 33.
~ Goldstien, 12-14.
8 The international system is first a means of organizing the interactions of states and regularizing their
behavior with predictability relative to each other. International institutions exist and are maintained by the
purview of states. Nonfinancial or political institutions do not fundamentally serve as a basis for
organizing states and mediating conflict among them in the post Napoleonic international system.
Institutions such as the Roman catholic church do not organize states or dictate state policy formulation at
the domestic or international level. Conflictual and aggressive organizations such as terrorist ne orks
incur the wrath of states for the activities they commit and recruit primarily from states.
~ Ibid., 74.
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states based on their power, material capability, structural composition, type of economic
system, and rank in the international hierarchy of states.’° A critical evaluation of
systemic anarchy versus the mixed structure of the contemporary international system
suggests that the weaker the state and the lower its position in the international hierarchy
of states, the greater its regulation and subordination to international institutions and
organizations to a degree bordering on governance.”
The states of the international system may be broadly divided into a hierarchy of
three broad tiers of states. The three tiers are further subcategorized into six specific
categories of states within the three tiers. The first and smallest numerical tier is
comprised of the system’s most powerful and influential states. The first tier includes
subcategories of hyperfunctional, select equifunctional, and select hypofunctional states.
The second tier is comprised of mid-ranged strength states with subcategories including
most equifunctional and hypofunctional states. The third and largest numerical tier is
comprised of the system’s weakest states. The third tier includes subcategories of
pathofunctional, protofunctional, neutrofunctional states.12
The third tier states experience the smallest degrees of anarchy within the system
due to their dependence on the system itself. The third tier states are the most highly
subject to the system’s rules and conventions and largely have no means by which to
affect the rules from their relative position in the system. The first tier of states
10 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theon’ ofInternational Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 106




contemporarily experiences the greatest degree of anarchy within the international system
as they maintain the system of international order. However, most first tier states are not
materially dependent upon the international system for their material well being and
survival. First tier states face the greatest security threats from other first tier states,
second tier states wishing to forcefully enter the first tier, and non-state actors wishing to
fundamentally alter or break the system. The second tier of states experiences a degree of
anarchy greater than the third tier, but significantly less than the first tier. Second tier
states may or may not be dependent on the system for their survival and material needs,
but stand to benefit greatly from participating in the system and following its rules. Some
second tier states have the potential or possibility to enter the first tier and may pose a
substantial threat to the first tier based on aspirations to join it.13
The position of weaker states in the system make them reliant on it for survival as
the system makes available necessary resources in the form of international aid that
enable states to survive. Ongoing access to those resources requires adherence to
systemic rules and norms set by the most powerful and influential states that enforce
them on systemic participants to ensure their compliance. 14 These institutional forces
mitigate the effects of anarchy as the weaker and least influential states as a consequence
ofparticipation must answer in some degree to governing bodies of these institutions and
organizations. Further, within an environment of self-help, international aid regimes are
made available to the weakest and least influential sates mitigating the effects of the
13 The positions on the degrees of anarchy are the theoretical conclusions of the researcher after
examining anarchy, structural realism, and liberal institutionalism.
14 Goldmann, 30.
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security dilemma on those states as they rely on international institutions, organizations,
and powerful states for their survival.’5
The greater role of international institutionalism in the post-World War II
international system along with the onset of globalization and complex interdependency
in the post-Cold War world are responsible for the imposition of intense levels of
regulation and subordination on the weaker and less influential states.’6 The intense
levels of systemic regulation over the system’s weakest states is largely rooted in their
dependence on the system’s institutions and most powerful actors for the maintenance of
their territorial integrity and daily material survival. 17 In many areas, this relegation and
regulation by the system’s institutions goes beyond the realm of choice for the state
where adherence to international rules and norms are a requirement for systemic
participation and access to vital tools, resources, and services. The international system’s
institutions and most powerful states take on a paralleling role to governance for weak
states in regulating international economics and trade, aiding in the provision of regional
and civil security, and providing aid packages, credit, and financing.’8
The most powerful states undergirding and maintaining the system exist within an
environment of complete self-help with no higher governing authorities to whom they
must answer. They maintain the system as a means of mitigating interstate conflict and
15 Goldstein, 476-478, 522-525, 526-528.
16 Hughes, 329.
~ Goldstein, 476-478.
~ mid., 476-478, 522-525, 526-528.
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maximizing the benefits of interstate cooperation.’9 Powerful and influential states set
the rules and norms of the international system and make their resources available within
a systemic institutional pooi to aid weaker states as it meets their interests to do so.20
They do not necessarily need the system to survive and are not reliant on it to secure their
own material survival or to receive essential resources.21 The absolute anarchy
experienced by the most powerful states relative to each other, with no higher
organization authority existing, warrants international institutionalism and international
regimes to mitigate the security dilemma growing out of international anarchy.22 As a
result of being the most powerful and influential actors in the system, the system’s top
tier states experience the eatest degrees of anarchy with no greater authority over them
to order their interactions.
Multiple Unit Composition
Metafunctionalism assumes the multiunit composition of the international system
with state units being generally rational actors pursuing their own s interests. The base
units of the international system are structurally composed of two distinct state types: the
nation-state and artificial multinational state. Numerically, a majority of states in the
Global South characteristically fall within the description of the artificial multinational
state as opposed to functional nation-states. The functioning of their institutions and
behavioral outputs differ greatly from the functional nation-states primarily occupying
~ Hughes, 47-48, 53.
20 Goldmann, 27, 28.
21 Hughes, 352-354, 369.
22 Kegley and Raymond, 34-35.
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the Global North. The founding of behavioral generalizations solely on any one form of
state unit will necessarily lead to inaccurate and poorly descriptive conclusions of the
other. Such an act will distort the basic consistency of the “system-unit structure of the
international system upon which JR theory is built. 23 Therefore, by necessity either two
sets of generalizations must be introduced, or the most dominant similar characteristics of
both types of state must be presented as the features of the state. Within this study the
first option has been opted for in order to elaborate on the characteristic structure and
functioning ofboth types of state and how those differences affect their behavior and
relations.
The State
Metafunctionalism conceives of the state as a multilayered ecosocial24 and
political organism structured minimally to comprise a geographically bounded territory,
population, governing system, economic system, material culture systemlset, and
language systemlset. It is the base unit of the international system carrying the most
influence and is the platform from which most other actors in the system act. The state is
formally defined as the sovereign political entity organizing and governing a defined
national territory and the population within it. It is politically organized under a
sovereign governing authority accepted nationally and internationally as the supreme
authority over the state. The state and its governing authorities derive their legitimacy
and sovereign authority from their citizenry, the international system, or both. It is
23 Meehan, 57-58.
24 Josef Riegler. “Eco-social Market Economy” Agricultural Economy. Vol. 3, No. 49 (2003): 101—
105.
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diplomatically recognized by other states and international institutions who acknowledge
its territorial borders and governing authorities.25 States are generally rational actors in
their behavior and relations based on the pursuit of their own self interest.26 In the
twenty-first century, the state units of the system include both the nation-state and a
second form of state27 here referred to as “the artificial multinational state.” Each state
houses its own set of characteristics and behavioral responses to the system and
international environment.
Within the hierarchical anarchy state of the international system, the state must
employ any strategy available to it by which to ensure its survival. State survival is a
systematic and rational process of negating or minimalizing the failure of national
institutions and collapse of state structures by both internal and external elements. The
state must prevent its destruction through the dissolution of its territorial integrity by
military conflict, the natural environment, or structural collapse from internal and
external sociopolitical and economic pressures. The national interest of the state pursued
through its foreign policy and international relations must have at its base the goal of
state survival which may be achieved through enhancing state power and influence,
expanding state material capabilities, participating in international institutions, economic
or political integration, institutional restructuring, establishing strategic alliances, force
via large scale military con±lict, among a grand host of means. The identification of the
25 Goldstein, 10.
26 Goldstein, 68-69, 102-103.
27Ibid, 10-11.
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base goal of the state as survival necessarily suggests that the international relations of
the state must revolve around fostering external relationships that will contribute to the
maintenance of the state’s integrity.
The Nation-State
The nation-state refers to a state where the national group identification of its
population (nation) approximates the territorial boundaries of the state.28 Within this
form of state, national identification and allegiance to an overarching state national
identity take primacy over other forms of social identifications such as ethnicity, race,
religion, and culture. The nation-state may be multinational or multiethnic in
composition where the population chooses first to collectively identify with the national
identity over allegiances and loyalties to other forms of social and national identity.29
The functional nation-state’s allegiance to an overarching national identity and agreed
societal norms of behavior and political process have historically allowed for great civil
stability, economic growth, development, and a genuine pursuit of a truly national
interest. Functional nation-states categorically engender great degrees of sovereignty and
the internal means by which to maintain that sovereignty and are largely found in the first
and second tiers of states within the global north.3° Nation-states are found primarily in
the first and second state tier within the categories of hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and
hypofunctional states.
28Ibid, 10.
29 Nana Poku, “Colonialism and Sub-Saharan Identities” Identities in International Relations, Jill
Krause and Neil Renwick, ed. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996),180-181.
~° Goldstein, 10-11, 78-8 1.
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The Artificial Multinational State
In contrast to the general conventional assumption that the nation-state forms the
central base unit of the system,3’ this study assumes the greater numerical proliferation of
a significant second state formation existing and acting within the international system. 32
This second state unit is referred to as the Artificial Multinational State.33 The artificial
multinational state is one in which multiple national groups or nations inhabit the
boundaries of the state, embracing and maintaining loyalties to social identifications of
ethnicity, race, religion, and culture over the embrace of an overarching national identity.
The designation of this form of state as artificial is derived from its historical emergence
out of European imperialism and colonization (non-settler) of groups of non-European
peoples. These states became theoretically independent states in the 19th and 20th
centuries. Most artificial multinational states through the process of colonialism have
externally imposed multinational, multiethnic, and multireligious population
compositions and are mostly located in the third tier of states.34
Artificial multinational states have generally been charactenzed by domestic
group insecurity, ethno-racial and religious interpretation and determination of the
national interest, extracontinental maintenance of territorial and political sovereignty, and
soft sovereignty regimes.35 These characteristics have contributed to a host of challenges
~ Kegley and Raymond, 54.
32 Goldstein, 10-11.
~ This term and its definition have been introduced by the researcher.
34n,ia., 10—11.
~ Most artificial multi-national states characteristically fall into the category of lesser developed
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endemic to the states of the Global South such as political instability, civil conflict, and
institutional corruption.36 Very few artificial multinational states have been able to
develop the political tools and mechanisms in the long term to absorb, ameliorate, and
resolve the complexity of the issues arising out of the structure and history of this type of
state. States such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa have with some level of
success, addressed these problems in such a manner as to allow for long term political,
civil, and economic growth and stability.37 However, the majority of artificial
multinational states have not successfully developed the sociopolitical mechanisms
necessary to mitigate or insulate against the effects of its multinational composition and
resulting multinationalisms. The structure of the artificial multinational state creates
sociopolitical and economic conditions that serve to foster excessive degrees of substate
nationalism within the state.38 Within these excessive degrees of substate nationalism,
individual identifications and allegiances within the state are first to identities of culture,
ethnicity, race, or religion over a unitary national identification and allegiance to the
state.39 Excessive degrees of multinationalism within the artificial multinational state in
turn foster unstable levels of group insecurity within the state based on assumed zero sum
countries/states occupying the “Third World” or “Global South” consistent with the sociopolitical and
economic behavior of those categories. Hughes, 346-347.
36 Kegely and Raymond, 107-108.




interpretations of socioeconomic and political security.40 Within environments of
extreme imagined or real resource scarcity and institutional weakness, the level of group
insecurity becomes greatly exacerbated leading to extreme responses in the state’s
domestic and international behavior. Artificial multinational states are found primarily in
the third tier and segments of the second tier among pathofunctional, protofunctional, and
neutrofunctional states.
Domestic Group Insecurity
Unstable levels of national group insecunty in the state are reflective of an active
and ongoing Domestic Group Security Dilemma within its boundaries.4’ The Domestic
Group Sec ~ty Dile a refers to the zero-sum interpretation of the sociopolitical,
economic, and military gains of one national group as a decrease in the sociopolitical and
economic security of other competing groups in the state. This circumstance of
perception within the artificial multinational state is an outgrowth of its colonial history
in which the colonial state was built and maintained on forced population inclusion,
integration, group disempowerment, and subordination to a central authority.42 This
arrangement was structured to order colonial society in such a manner as to allow for the
effective administration and ongoing subordination of all native groups within the colony
to a central foreign minority authority.43
40Thid., 185.
‘This term has been quoted by the researcher to describe the application of the international Security




Contemporarily, without strong central institutions or external mediators to
guarantee egalitarian group security within the artificial multinational state, modem
Western political institutions function to reinforce domestic insecurity among national
groups.~ As a result, it has become common place for individual or multiple groups to
seek external or international support to strengthen their position within the state.45
Within this insecure environment, the government as the primary instrument for
establishing and maintaining externallintemational relationships is perceived as the
central instrument within the artificial multinational state to enhance individual group
security relative to all other groups.46 This interpreted role of government teamed with
real and imagined perceptions of limited resource access, and historical group
incompatibility, results in the zero sum competition within the state for control over its
governing instruments and resources. The political process is reduced to a competition of
relative gains and losses between national groups for control of the instruments of
political power that guarantee group security through unfettered access to national and
international resources. ~ These absolute gains and losses become extremely important in
subnational group behavior when faced with the very real prospects of economic
marginalization, military suppression, and genocide via military force by those in control
of the state. At present, these processes dominate the governing process of most artificial
~Thid., 184-185, 188.
~ Letitia Lawson and Donald Rothchild, “Sovereignty Reconsidered” Current History vol. 104, no. 682
ay2005) :229.
46 Taylor, 414.
~ Poku, 185, 187.
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multinational states in the third tier in difference to conventional modern conceptions of
government. The zero sum game of domestic politics serves as the instrument and tool
by which to settle societal disputes, ensure group security, and distribute national wealth
and income within the state
National Interest in the Artificial Multinational State
Based on the politics growing out of the domestic group security dilemma within
the artificial multinational state, the pursuit of the national interest is reduced to the
security considerations of the those groups controlling the state rather than a collusion of
competing domestic interests. This occurs in the absence of effective political
instruments and institutions by which to build and establish a national consensus among
competing groups on the composition of interests and objectives to be pursued by the
state in the international environment. The pursuit of individual group interest via
international means reinforces the environment of insecurity as participating groups
perceive the pursuit of those interests by the governing elite as undermining the meeting
of their own interests. Faced with an overwhelmingly powerful state ruling group, non-
ruling groups may abandon political processes in favor of force or autonomy seeking,
establishing their own substate or non-state foreign policy interests and relations.
Artificial and Soft Sovereignty
The third dominant characteristic of the artificial multinational state is its
artificiality and soft structure. Within realist and liberal theory the modern state system is
founded on the principle of state sovereignty and functions by the dictates of that
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regime.48 State sovereignty referring to the ability and capacity of the state to control,
maintain, and protect its territorial integrity and national boarders while maintaining
internal order, stability, physical security, and essential material security for its
population.49 A state’s sovereignty is legitimized essentially by three dominant factors:
first, by its ability to act out all aspects of its sovereign responsibilities to a degree
capable of maintaining its structural and territorial integrity, second, by the conferring of
ultimate governing authority over its territory and inhabitants to governing officials by
the population, and last, by the recognition of other states and international institutions in
the international system.5° The majority of functional nation states of the first and second
tier of states generally display all the requisite characteristics of a sovereign state. Their
sovereign state characteristics greatly contribute to their ongoing stability.
However, the larger percentages of artificial multinational states in the third tier of
states do not engender or practice state sovereignty according to conventional definitions
and descriptions of state sovereignty. These states have historically been unable to
maintain or enact all aspects of their sovereignty within an acceptable degree of
effectiveness as compared to the system’s fully sovereign states.51 Rather, most artificial
multinational states may instead be described as adhering to regimes ofArt~ficial and Soft
“s Examples of the sovereignty regime: States generally respect and do not impinge on the territorial
rights of other states. In diplomatic exchanges most states generally accept the governing regime as the
legitimate authority within that country.
‘~ Goldstein, 74, 76.
~° Christopher Rudolph, “Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age” International Studies
Review, no. 7 (2005): 12-13.
51Anderson, 9-10.
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Sovereignty. Within this regime ofArtificial Sovereignty, the state’s territorial
composition and borders have essentially been determined by or in relationship to the
former colonial powers of Europe and the Middle East and are maintained by
international conventions and agreements regionally and through the United Nations.52
However, due to general inability of third tier states to practically perform all aspects of
their sovereign responsibilities to a functional degree, they consequently must rely on
international assistance to meet their sovereign obligations. As such, the state’s
sovereignty and very existence are largely derived and legitimized by external elements
rather than internal elements. Without the internal means by which to maintain the
sovereignty of the state, external actors effectively grant the state’s governing officials
and offices the sovereign authority to govern the state and manage its international
relationships.53 The historical background of this artificial sovereignty regime is rooted
in the artificial state’s transition from colonialism to independence, where even though
theoretically independent, it did not have the practical means to fully exercise sovereign
authority over its territory and population.54
Artificial sovereignty regimes have had a host of historical problems contributing
to the challenges of state building in the artificial multinational states. These include
limited or absent popular political legitimacy, irredentism, civil instability, and






practical application and implementation of state sovereignty is soft or lightly
administered relative to the hard applications of fully sovereign states. As such, soft
sovereignty may be described as the limited or marginal application and execution of the
elements of state sovereignty as prescribed by the modem state system.56 The structural
weakness and institutional inefficiency of weak states restricts their ability to fully
employ their internal resources toward fully meeting their sovereign responsibilities.57
The state cannot by itself effectively control and protect its territorial integrity and
national borders, ensure internal domestic security, provide for domestic social and
political order, facilitate economic stability, or ensure the essential material security of its
population. Weak states, most of which are in the third tier of states, are unable to
undertalce all of these roles simultaneously or individually to a practically effective
degree. This is in contrast to the hard applications and executions of fully sovereign
states in carrying out their sovereign responsibilities.
The State: Complex Coexistence and Transition
The nation-state and artificial multinational state exist in a continually frictional
relationship as nation-states dominate the international system even though numerically
outnumbered by artificial multinational states. This friction is institutionally evident in
the structure of the United Nations system as the Security Council’s (15 members) power
and authority outweigh that of the General Assembly (all other members), and the
diffusion of economic power towards the minority of states in the Global North as
‘~ This definition is introduced by the researcher.
~ Lawson and Rothchild, 230
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evidenced in the breakdown of World Trade Organization negotiations due to Global
South state opposition.58 The nation-states of the global North account for the bulk of
international economic activity and resource consumption, generally enjoying higher
standards of living. Most artificial multinational states are in the Global South,
nonindustrialized, and generally have lower standards of living than functional nation-
states in the Global North. They consume significantly smaller percentages of global
resources and account for a significantly smaller portion of international economic and
political activity in the international system59 In its current structure, the internal system
facilitates a system of cyclical dependency6° in which most artificial multinational states
have historically been economically dependent on functional nation-states and carry only
20% of global income though accounting for 80% of its populations. 61 The possibility of
structural transition from the artificial multinational state to the nation remains
questionable, particularly as a means by which to alleviate the problems posed by state
artificiality, multinationalism, and soft sovereignty.
System and State Characteristics, Behavioral Determinants, and Variants:
Realist Characteristics
In response to the scarcity of resources and security (anarchy) within the
international environment, the forces of natural selection have resulted in a number of
systemic attributes paralleling those of realism. The realist characteristics of the system
~ Goldstein, 262, 265-267, 329-321.
~ Kegley and Raymond, 99-100, 107-108.
60lbid., 111.
61 Thid., 99, 107.
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are those attributes dictating physical force and relative gains as a means of providing for
wants, needs, and physical security. Realism’s primary attributes of “power” and
“structure” form the central behavioral determinants emerging out of the system’s realist
characteristics. Their variants include national interest, balance, bandwagonning, and
material capability. 62
In order to compete effectively for scarce resources and security, states must
continually seek to augment their power by enhancing their material capabilities via
growth, development, and alliance building. The building of material capabilities
enhances the state’s ability to compete, engage in conflict, and ultimately establish a
sphere of influence for themselves. Competing states will continue to build their material
capabilities until a balance of power develops among them conducive to their survival
and security needs. Where a balance of power has not developed, conflict will likely
ensue among competing states for scarce resources and security.63
Power (Determinant)
In the international environment the pursuit of resource and security scarcity
creates competition between states seeking to ensure their survival. This competition at
its base is decided by the amount of relative power amassed and exercised by each state.
The states amassing and maintaining the most power become the most adept at
competing for scarce resources and maintaining their security. The exercise and




state relations are based. Power in its hard and soft forms is enacted through different
political and security instruments that ultimately allow a system of international
cooperation to be formed and maintained.64 Historically state power has been directed
into the pursuit of state interests (national interest), diffused and distributed through
balancing, and limited by structural and mstitutional regimes. Realists emphasize the role
of hard power in its military form as the ultimate instrument of averting conflict through
deterrence. Realists also maintain that liberal institutionalism and economic
interdependency are reliant on the aggregate power of a hegemonic actor in the system to
achieve order. States seek power and as a means to influence the structure of
international order in a manner amenable to their long term interests.65
Structure (Determinant)
The distribution ofpower between actors within the structure of the international
system ultimately serves to constrain each state’s ability to act in pursuit of their own
interests. All state decisions must be measured against the potential costs and conflict
their actions will bring from other actors.66 Structuralism serves as a formal means of
managing regional and subregional balances of power between states by creating
parameters and limits within which states must act. The distribution of capabilities
between states within the system’s parameters allow for greater levels of predictability in
state behavior among competing states.67 Security treaties and arms agreements





formalizing the distribution of capabilities in the system allow for the management of
hegemonic power, limiting of arms races, information sharing, and relative increases in
state power without conflict. The United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), and numerous regional
organizations set the structural parameters for the exercise of state power.
National Interest (Variant)
State resources and power ideally are not used randomly without direction and
purpose, but directed and employed specifically towards meeting the specific national
interests of the state. The core interests of the state ideally include maintaining and
protecting its territorial integrity, its population, and its sovereignty authority; while its
instrumental interests theoretically include enhancing or maintaining its economic and
military capabilities and power.68 It is the pursuit of its interests that leads the state to
establish and maintain specific international relationships and act out select behaviors
relative to other actors. However, there are significant challenges to state decision
makers in deciding what actions are required and necessary in the pursuit of which
interests. State decision makers must make complex short-term and long-term
calculations regarding the costs and benefits of pursuing particular actions relative to the
value placed on specific interests.69
Balance of Power (Variant)




struggles to establish global, regional, and subregional balances of power amenable to a
broad range of state interests. Balance ofpower refers to the concept of state power
being used to limit the actions and choices of other states in a given region or area.70
Considerations in balance of power systems are national security, material capabilities,
and geo-politics. The enhancing of state material capabilities and alliance building have
been effective means of creating balances ofpower. Effective balance of power systems
adequately provide for the security needs of each state, result in long term stability, and
limit conflict between the parties involved. 71
Balance of power systems are limited in their effectiveness to the cooperation of
states in the region or subregion. Each actor’s cooperation is based on a rational
calculation of the benefits and costs of cooperation and participation versus defection.
State perception of the international environment and understanding of the distribution of
capabilities across the system relative to its own power dramatically affect its ability to
rationally calculate its alternatives. Without a constant flow of accurate information
about competing states, the state will have to act on the unitary rational assumptions
deemed most likely to guarantee its security.72
Balances of power not inclusive of the most powerful states in the region or
subregion do not necessarily mitigate conflict as outlying states are not bound by those
rules and may not adhere to them. As a result, states may have incentives to act outside
of established frameworks to ensure their security. Further, states for varying reasons
70 Goldstein, 77-78.
~ Ibid., 48, 124-126.
72 Kegley and Raymond, 221-222.
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may choose not to act to balance the power of other states, but may instead jump on the
bandwagon of aggressive states seeking to alter the current balance ofpower.73
Bipolarity and even multipolarity have great potential to deadlock the active capacity of
institutions and regimes where major actors cannot come to agreement. Balance of
power systems do not conceive of alternative means to power via the threat of force as a
means by which to achieve a system of peace and order. Within a balance of power
system, force and its threat is the only means by which to punish actors acting outside of
the system’s rules.74 Balance of power politics practically plays itself out in a number of
security enhancing behaviors including spheres of influence, balancing, and
b dwagonning
Spheres of Influence
Within balance ofpower systems competing states may establish formally or
informally recognized spheres of influence. Along with power and geographic
proximity, spheres of influence may be assumed based on historical relationships, race
and ethnicity, and cultural association. Formalized spheres of influence established in
concerts or treaties are intended to mitigate or minimize conflict through mutual
recognition of the power and influence of a given actor or actors over a defmed territorial
space.75 Informal spheres of influence are based on a rational calculation and projection






However, concerts and treaty systems may represent a fragile balance of power
system due to the lack of incentives for political cooperation relative to increases in state
power and a system of alliances. A state may seek to expand their sphere of influence or
increase its territory based on a rational calculation of the diffusion of power among
actors beyond the obligations of any treaty or regime. Calculated expansions of state
influence based solely on power the form of force then lead to states utilizing it to meet
their interests.
Balancing Behavior
When faced with the potential or real threat of a significantly more powerful
regional or subregional actor, weaker states will seek to balance the power, influence,
and capabilities of the stronger state.76 The foundational principles of balancing behavior
suggest that the more powerful the state, the greater the threat perception and insecurity
of its regional neighbors; and the farther away the potentially threatening state, the
greater the likelihood of states to take steps to balance its power.77 Those states may
form a larger competing unit through political, economic, and security agreements or
alliances with one another. Balancing may be accomplished unilaterally, bilaterally,
multilaterally, organizationally or institutionally through diplomatic action, treaties,
international regimes, financial censure, containment, and deterrence.78 States may
76 Stephen M. Walt, Origins ofAlliances (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17-2 1.
~ Ibid., 27-32.
~ Goldstein, 77-78, 86-88.
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dramatically increase their own arms (deterrence) or voluntarily participate in the
reduction of their security apparatus (arms control and reductions) based rational self
calculations such as mutually assured destruction or detente. States may also seek to
utilize international or regional institutions and organizations in which most or all of the
regional actors participate to bind or check the power and actions of a threatening state.
The ultimate balancing option available to the state is the reduction of the threatening
state’s material capabilities and security apparatus through military action. Through
force (warfare) a state may neutralize a neighboring state’s ability to act in any significant
fashion by destroying it partially or completely.79
Bandwagonning Behaviors (Variant)
State behavioral responses in seeking to achieve or maintain regional and
subregional security necessarily changes when a more powerful potentially threatening
state is in close proximity to that state. Relatively weak states when faced with a more
powerful and potentially threatening state actor near to their borders will likely display a
form of bandwagonning behavior.80 The foundational principles of bandwagonning
behavior suggest that the closer the threatening state to a relatively weak state, the greater
the threat perception and the greater the likelihood of the weaker state cooperating.
Likewise, the farther away the threatening state, the lesser the threat perception of its




more likely to exhibit balancing behaviors.8’ The potential or real security threat may be
ofboth a military or economic nature.
Bandwagonning behaviors are characterized by the cooperation of the weaker
state with the more powerful state actor in order to maintain their security and survival.
The weaker state may accede or submit to annexation or becoming a participant in
political, economic, and security alliances and agreements with the threatening or
potentially threatening state.82 They may grant unconditional political and diplomatic
support to the stronger state in international or regional institutions and organizations
such as the United Nations and African Union, or ally with the stronger state in an
interstate or regional conflict. This cooperation is undertaken if necessary even at the
expense of select segments of the bandwagonning state’s national interests and alliances,
or the compromise of a third states’ security and integrity.
Material Capabifity (Variant)
The power available to the state is practically expressed or understood in terms of
material capabilities or the sum total of tangible and intangible resources the state may
employee in pursuing its national interests.83 The state’s material capabilities are
themselves largely the outgrowth of the state’s sociocultural makeup, political and
physical structure, geography, military, natural resource endowment, physical




84 Ibid., 80, 84-85.
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international system determines its structure and the relationship of the units to each
other.85 State material capability in turn informs the power position of the state within
the international system and determines its capacity to interact with other state and non-
state actors. The greater the state’s material capabilities, the greater the options available
to it to act within the system. Conversely, the lesser the state material capabilities, the
less the alternatives available to the state in managing its international relationships and
the lower its power position within the international system.
Liberal Characteristics:
In response to the costs of conflict and limitations of economic autarky, the
international system has developed structural and relational characteristics paralleling the
dominant attributes of liberalism. The liberal characteristics of the international system
are those attributes facilitating cooperation and global governance in the absence of a
global government. The dominant liberal attributes of institutionalism and
interdependence are the behavioral determinants emerging out of the system’s liberal
characteristics. Their corresponding variants include globalization, regionalism, and
international aid regimes.
International Institutionalism (Determinant)
States within the system engage in relationships of cooperation, interdependence,
and mutual coexistence as a more efficient alternative to pure competition and conflict.
States seek to better meet their survival needs by collectively creating institutions that
facilitate cooperation, manage competition, and limit conflict.
~ Ibid.
167
International institutionalism suggests that international order through cooperation
may be achieved by institutionalizing behavioral norms and rules. Institutions contribute
to state behavior by systematically structuring choices, providing incentives, distributing
power, and defining roles within the international system.86 International institutionalism
is housed on the principle of absolute gains and provides a framework for mutual wins
beyond a zero sum political game.87 Institutionalism is successful where the benefits of
cooperation and participation are greater than the benefits of defection.88 Punishment for
not adhering to international standards and rules of behavior are meted out institutionally
by restricting participation.
International institutions provide a steady source of information regarding actor
behavior that limits the need for rational actors to base their relations solely on assumed
unitary rationality. Actors can instead base their relations with other actors on agreed
institutional principles and rules of interaction. Institutionalism helps to dispel the
security concerns of actors outside of the system and provides incentives for their
participation by addressing the same rules to all participants. International
institutionalism is a part of evolving efforts to achieve global governance in the absence
of a global government.89
The contemporary international system is institutionally organized through the
United Nations system and Bretton Woods fmancial institutions. The United Nations
86 Goldstein, 109, 256-259.
87 Hughes, 54-55.
88 Goldstein, 102-103, 105.
89 Thid, 109, 256-25 9
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provides for the system’s political organization, while the Bretton Woods institutions
provide the system’s financial and economic organization.9° The primary decision
making institutions in the system are the UN Security Council, UN General Assembly
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.
Complex Interdependence (Determinant)
This condition of complex interdependence describes a structural characteristic of
the international system in which the formal and informal relationships between states
actors are dynamically linked across economic, political, and security spheres. The states
in the system are linked in a manner hinging the survival of each on the others and
international institutions.91 Institutional cooperation and international trade have
facilitated the development of system wide interdependence. States depend on each other
for international markets for raw materials, labor, production centers, consumer goods
and services, and consumers.92 In order to produce goods and services more efficiently,
states engage in resource production specialization for exchanges with other specializing
states. This form of international trade produces a higher and more efficient global yield
of goods and services than economic autarky. The process of complex interdependence
results in absolute economic gains taking precedence over relative security gains.93
The interdependence of the international system has both simplified and
90 Ibid., 259-260, 327-329, 35 1-353.
91 Hughes, 242-243.
92 R. J. Barry Jones, Globalization and Interdependence in the International Political Economy:
Rhetoric and Reality (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995), 94-95.
~ Ibid.
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complicated the relations between powerful and wealthy states. Military force is no
longer a first means to settle state disputes because conflict serves to obstruct regional
and international trade.94 Each state must seek to cope with the challenges imposed by
global level phenomena utilizing the state level instruments at their disposal. States are
now increasingly dependent on international institutions to help them manage the various
aspects of globalization. Institutional management of the global economy and
international system are required to mediate and settle state disputes in order to avert the
conflicts arising out of complex interdependence.
Globalization (Variant)
The post-Cold War world has seen the rapid expansion and development of
capitalism into every region of the world. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and its
competing globalized system of state-sponsored communism and socialism allowed for
the full global extension of capitalism. The unipolar international system has facilitated
the full participation in the global economy of the world’s largest and most promising
regional economies including China, Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa.
The production of goods and services is now diffused across the globe as the capital and
resources necessary for the production process gravitates to those areas promising the
most efficient return. The component parts of consumer and capital goods and services
may be produced in any number of states, assembled in another, and sold in yet another.
The net result of these collective processes has been the unleashing of a period of global
economic growth unprecedented in the world’s history.
This evolving political phenomenon commonly referred to as globalizatio
~ Jones, 213.
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characteristically includes rapid technological advances in communications and
information technology, highly efficient and globally available transportation services,
the global liquidity and rapid movement of capital, a globally competitive labor market,
state level competition to host production centers, the global diffusion of media, the
internationalization of crime syndicates, unparalleled environmental destruction, and the
development of paralleling socio-political and fmancial institutions by which to govern
it.95 The behavior and relations of the state are in part characterized by an ongoing
process of elevating the state’s position in the value chain of the global economy. The
state actively engages in this process while synonymously positioning itself to benefit
from the production and position of other competing states in the system.96
Regionalism (Variant)
Institutionalism has also diffused to the regional and subregional levels. This
diffusion of international institutionalism by region has become known as regionalism in
which multiple states in similar geographic proximity formally organize themselves
institutionall to address their collective needs. States act in concert to address issues
more effectively than they have the capacity to manage themselves. Regional integration
has today become a staunch facet of the international system97 that provides the
benenefits of enhanced regional political stability, economics and trade, collective
security, and conflict management. Regional institutions have been used by states to
~ Goldstein, 304-305.
96 Ibid., 307-308.
~ Kegley and Raymond, 262-263.
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amplify their own power while restricting the power of their neighbors. This is
accomplished through collective security regimes, economic agreements, and institutional
management of regional conflicts. The diffusing of the responsibilities of the
maintenance ofpeace and security to neighboring states reduces the likelihood of
escalating conflict between member states. Collective security lightens the burden of any
one state having to maintain their own security relative to all of their neighbors.98
International Aid Regimes (Variant)
International aid regimes have become a key and defining facet in the behavior
and relations of the third tier of states to which most subSaharan African states
categorically fall. More than 90% of all development and humanitarian aid to poor
Global South states is provided by the wealthy states of the Global North and select semi-
periphery states (North America, Western Europe, Japan, and China).99 International aid
theoretically serves as a means by which to develop the state through enhancing its
material capabilities, functionalizing the state structure, strengthening societal
institutions, and aid in the creation of an environment conducive to political stability.
However, when not strategically and meaningfully applied aid regimes have been
counterproductive effectively bolstering ethnic and class divisions, militarizing the state,
destabilizing the economy, foster corruption, and encourage political and civil
instability.’00
~ Ibid., 255-256, 258-260, 3 16-317.
~ ibid., 528.
100 Percy S. Mistry, “Reasons for Sub-Saharan Africa’s Development Deficit” African Affairs, no.
104/417 (2005) : 666, 677.
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Within the third tier of states, international aid regimes have generally led to the
development of international relationships centered on debt accumulation that
subordinate debtor states to the dictates and interests of aid providers. 101 The manner in
which international aid has been distributed in regions such as subSaharan Africa, Latin
America, and South Asia has not directed the assistance to the key areas that most
significantly enhance the capabilities and institutions of the state. Aid packages have not
served to alleviate state structural handicaps nor eliminated the systemic handicaps weak
states face within the international system. Aid in both the Cold War and post-Cold War
period have not focused on national economic and social development, but have included
disproportionate amounts of military aid, industrial oil and mineral extraction equipment,
and personal political aggrandizement and corruption.’°2 The ultimate outcome of
western aid packages to third tier states has been the mass accumulation of large-scale
debt’°3 and reinforcement of dependency among recipient states.
International aid packages have encountered the challenges of absorptive capacity
in donor states, and the immoral or self-interested conditionalities of donor states.
African and other states often have severely limited structural and moral capacities by
which to receive and productively implement aid. Donor states often attach self serving
conditions and applications to aid resulting ultimately in a hire cost to the recipient state.
Liberal international aid packages to poor nonindustrialized states have served both as a
tool by which politicians ingratiate themselves domestically, and as a tool of wealthy
01 Thid, 670.
02 Stephen Williams, “Justice for Africa” African Business (AugustlSeptember 2005): 16.
103 Ibid., 17.
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countries to maintain the hierarchical and stratified structure of the global economic and
political system)°4 In practical terms, aid packages have directed assistance primarily to
iiifrastructural support of existing extraction and distribution centers, debt servicing and
forgiveness, budget support, and military aid.
International aid regimes are also part of a system wide economic and political
process that serves to continually undermine the position of weak global south states in
the third tier of states in a manner that contributes to their underdevelopment and keeps
them cyclically dependent.’°5 Those same processes act to maintain the position of
developed industrialized states atop of the global hierarchy of states enhancing their
national development. The global system is politically and economically structured to
create and perpetuate the conditions and relationships that require African and other poor
states to seek international aid in the first instance.
Within the production value chain of the global economic system and its
paralleling global division of labor and production, third tier states have been limited to
the lowest level of production providing primary agricultural and mineral goods. Primary
resource extraction and production yield the lowest value and generate the smallest
amount of income and revenue in the production value chain and are absolutely vital to
the higher level production processes of developed and developing states. Secondary and
tertiary production processes in contrast yield the greatest value and revenue in the global
production process and consequently engender the highest cost in their distribution on the
104 Jagdish Bhagwati, “Development Aid: Getting it Right” The OECD Observer Paris iss. 249 (May
2005) : 27-29.
105 Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence” The Amen can Economic Review, vol. 60
(May 1970) :231-232.
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global market. The cumulative result of this in the structure of the production value chain
is that the primary resource exporting states receives the smallest amount of revenue for
its main exports of goods and services, but pays a disproportionately high price for the
capital and consumer goods and services produced form those resources in industrial
states)°6
The dependent states in the third tier face the distinct challenge of meeting the
deficit between their limited purchasing power and meeting the financial obligations of
the state. To account for this deficit, the states utilize international aid assistance to meet
its daily budgetary, structural, developmental, and societal needs. In this manner the
structure of the global economy facilitates a systematic process by which poor states are
pushed to incur large scale debt accumulation through credit and loan fmancing to make
up for the limitations of their national revenue base.’°7 The donor states of the Global
North in the first tier actively maintain the global economic system facilitating
dependency and underdevelopment which subsequently necessitates the availability of
international aid. Third tier states in the Global South are systematically placed in a
position where they must seek aid from the very same state and nonstate sources that
generate the most wealth from the exploitation of their resources.
International Class Characteristics
The process of group multilevel selection grants characteristics to the
international system paralleling those of international class conflict. The international




stratification and global division ofproduction and labor. The defining attribute of the
international class characteristics of the system is class conflict or struggle. Class
conflict’s variants include hierarchy, stratification, and subordination.
Class Conifict/Struggle (Determinant)
The behavior and relations of the states are due in part to a system-wide social and
political class struggle between elite and the mass groups over control of the state to
determine the ownership and distribution of its resources. Domestically, through control
of government institutions and resources, the masses or elites are able to determine how
the accrued benefits of the production process will be distributed throughout the state and
how it will ultimately be structurally organized. Elites in each state throughout the
system ally themselves to maintain elite dominated states within the international
system.’°8 They seek to control state resources and the means of production through the
state’s governing institutions to maintain their position at the top of the class hierarchy
over the masses of workers.
Likewise, within a framework of international class conflict elite states also seek
to dominate the international system with a corresponding distribution ofpolitical power
and economic 09 Once it is in the interest of the maintenance of their power
and position, the ruling elites in each state furnish support to the ruling elites of other
states in an effort to secure the superstructure of the world system and their states
108 Chilcote, 284.
109 Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, Political Economy of Conremporaiy Africa 2”°’ ed.
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1985), 36.
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position within it.110 If it is outside of the interest of the maintenance of elite power
positions to support a particular state’s controlling elite, other elite groups will not grant
support and likely work towards the removal and exchange of one ruling elite in that state
for another more amenable to their interest. As a result, ruling elites in third tier states in
Africa, Latin America, and Asia receive state level support and aid from regional and
extra-regional elites in the second and third tiers of states of the center and semi-
periphery. These relationships largely play themselves out along the lines of dependency,
underdevelopment, and neocolonialism as elite support is not given freely and comes
with a price.”
The masses worldwide are theoretically in a constant struggle to wrestle control of
the state from elite groups to employ state power and resources in their interest. The
masses do not consider elite control of the state to be in their interests as elites constantly
seek to distribute state resources, the benefits of production, and the benefits of
international relationships to themselves at the expense of the livelihood and welfare of
the masses. Elites use their power position to subjugate and exploit the masses
themselves or allow the same to be done to them by external actors. The masses initially
may seek to utilize democratic political process in the form of party politics and popular
or representative elections to place popular leaders in control of the state to act in their
interests. However, if the masses are unable to meet their objectives through democratic




personnel, or assume control of state resources and infrastructure in revolutionary efforts
to have their interests met. Civil conflict may ensue if the masses are provided continual
access to the resources necessary to maintain ongoing action against the state and its
ruling elite.”2
Political Hierarchy and Economic Stratification (Variant)
Within the post-Cold War international system, the center-periphery”3 relations
of the international system have been institutionalized and regimented to govern the
relations between the first tier states of the global north and the second and third tier
states of the global south.114 Both the UN system and Bretton Woods Institutions along
with the WTO are elitist instruments by which to maintain the class structure of the
international system with its corresponding political hierarchy and economic
stratification. Within the international environment there exists both a formal and
informal hierarchy among states determined by a host of factors including the
international division of labor and production, military power, economic power,
geostrategic value, population, religion, ethnicity, race, culture, and civilization.
The system of global order was established and is maintained by the most
powerful and influential states in a manner to maintain their elite positions in the system
while undermining the power and sociopolitical mobility of weaker or ascending states
that may seek to change or destabilize the system. International institutions,
112 Goldstein, 464.
113 Wallerstein.
114 This study goes beyond lmmanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems model of international class
analysis to suggest that center-periphery relations have been institutionalized and regimented in the UN and
Bretton Woods systems. The United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and WTO are elitist instruments by which
to maintain the class structure and economic stratification of the international system.
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organizations, and regimes are the primary instruments used to govern and maintain the
international status quota.”5 The United Nations and International Financial Institutions
(IMP, World Bank) may all be considered elitist institutions with the permanent members
of the UN Security Council and their closest allies representing the elite group of states in
the system. The distribution of military power among states necessitated the
development of a hierarchy among states within an institutionalized framework that
mitigates conflict and provides for peaceful relations between those states with the
greatest military capability. The destructive potential of these states to threaten different
regions and each other raise them to the top of the hierarchy along with states essential to
the maintenance of the stability and functioning of the system. The states with the least
destructive capacity and least bearing on its stability and functioning are consequently
pushed down to the bottom of the hierarchy.
Both the digital divide and North-South gap”6 are descriptive terms around the
stratified structure of the global economy describing the diffusion of economic and
productive capacity between first, second and third tier states. Secondary and tertiary
advanced techno-industrial processes, capital accumulation, and mass market exchange
largely reside in the global North and select states in the semi-periphery. Those
processes and goods and services yield the highest value in the global economic value
chain. Energy supplies and extraction resides largely in select second tier, and primarily
in third tier states. Energy extraction to supply the techno-industrial processes of the
115 ilcenberry, 24, 26.
116 Kegley and Raymond, 107, 274.
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center and semi-periphery yield the second highest value in the global economic value
chain. Primary resource commodity agriculture and mineral extraction reside primarily
in the peripheral third tier states of the global south yielding the lowest value on the
global economic value chain.”7
Primary resource extraction and production yield the lowest value and generate
the smallest amount of income and revenue, but are vital to the higher level production
processes of developed and developing states. Secondary and tertiary production
processes in contrast yield the greatest value and revenue in the global production
process, and consequently engender the highest cost in their distribution in the global
market. The cumulative result of the stratified structure of the global economy and its
production value chain is that the poorest and least influential states of the periphery
receive the smallest amount of value (revenue) for the production of their goods and
services, but pay a disproportionately high price for the capital and consumer goods and
services produced from those resources in first and second tier industrial states.
Conversely, first and select second tier states in the global north receive the highest value
for their goods and services, but with the exception of energy pay a comparatively low
price for the agro-mineral resources produced in third tier states. As a result there
develops an economic hierarchy of importance among the different tiers of states with the
first ranking as the most important and the third as the least important.”8
The states of the upper tiers of the international hierarchy of states work t
117 Hughes, 352-355.
118 Dos Santos, 23 1-234.
180
remove or undermine ruling elites and popular leaders who seek to alter the order of the
global hierarchy of states by enhancing their state’s position through expanding state
material capabilities, enhancing state security, military conflict, and amplification of the
state’s power through international institutions. Elite actions against such state leadership
effectively discourage national leaders from taking positive actions in their states interest
that would possibly upset the status quota. As a result, in third tier states there has been a
preponderance of leadership willing to maintain the status quota at the expense of state
interests.
Institutional Subordination (Variant)
State behavior and relations are also in part shaped by the parameters imposed on
the state by the rules and regimes of international institutions and organizations in
managing the international system. Those elitist institutions and organizations impose
numerous regulations developed by first tier states on the weaker and less influential
states within the system which both directly and indirectly subordinate the decisions,
actions, and behaviors of the weakest states to the dictates of the system elitist controlling
elements.
The greater role of international institutionalism in the post -World War II
international system along with the onset of globalization and complex interdependency
in the post-Cold War world are responsible for the imposition of intense levels of
regulation and subordination on the weaker and less influential states.”9 The intense
levels of systemic regulation over the system’s weakest states is largely rooted in their
dependence on the system’s institutions and most powerful actors for the maintenance of
119 Hughes, 329.
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their territorial integrity and daily material survival. 120 In many areas this institutional
regulation goes beyond a system of sovereign participation by choice for the state, where
adherence to international rules and norms are a requirement for participation and access
to necessary and financial resources and services. The international system’s institutions
and most powerful states take on a parallel role to governance for weak states in
regulating international economics and trade, aiding in the provision of regional and civil
security, and providing aid packages, credit, and financing.’2’
Compliance with institutional and international rules and regulations is held as
perquisite and requirement for access to international financial and security instruments
necessary for economic and national security. Financial institutions such as the World
Bank and IMF have evolved relationships with several states in which they essentially
take on roles paramount to national governance and policy determination in those states.
Common fiscal areas in which this occurrence is repeated are economics and trade,
domestic civil security, and the material provision of select essential goods and services
such as food provision and disease control. 122 The weaker and least influential states as a
consequence of participation must answer in some degree to governing bodies of these
institutions and organizations. Weak states are placed in a subordinate position to
international institutions and powerful actors based primarily on their almost absolute
dependence on the system’s institutions and powerful state actors for their material
120 Goldstein, 476-478.





The state’s functional composition characteristics refer to those attributes growing
out of its organism type structure comprised of interlocking social, political, and
economic institutions.’23 State institutions are organized in an equilibrial relationship in
which changes in one institution are reflected in changes in adjoining institutions. The
behavioral determinant emerging out of the state’s functional composition characteristics
are “structure and function.”Structure and function’s corresponding variants are structural
and functional dependence and independence, and structural institutionalism.
Structure and Function (Deter ant)
The structure and function factors of state behavior and relations describe those
influences emanating out of the institutional and territorial organization of the state.’24
The behavior and relations of the state are in part a product of the degree to which the
state is able to functionalize its political, economic, territorial, and social structures
towards independent survival. Within this study structure describes both the manner in
which the parts of an institution, society, state, or system are systematically organized,
and the principle upon which the relationship between the parts are formed.’25 Function
refers to the manner in which the parts of an institution, society, state, or system interact
with each other to produce specific outputs. The state’s ability to compete, cooperate,
123 Goodson, 37-38. All complex life forms are functionally composed with every trait in their
biological system serving a function towards survival. Life and its differing characteristics evolve based on




and specialize in the international environment are all enabled or limited by the manner
and principle upon which it is structured, and the effective functioning of its institutions.
Functional outputs are generally dictated by structural organization and as a result the
state will only function as it is structured to. Changes in the state’s behavioral outputs
will either be the product of changes in the state’s internal structure, or changes in the
structure of the international system.
State structures are largely based on normative ideological, religious, or
philosophical preferences such as liberalism, socialism, or Islam. The structural
preference informs the type of political system adopted by the state. 126 If liberalism is
adopted as the state’s structural preference, the political system will likely be based on a
form of democracy. Paralleling the system of democratic government capitalism would
dominate the state’s economic structure. Likewise, if socialism is adopted as the state’s
structural preference the political system will likely be based on socialism or
communism. Paralleling the socialist system of government a command or mixed
economy would dominate the state’s economic structure. Where there is a general
divergence between the normative preferences of the society and the state’s political and
economic structure, institutional dysfunction and civil unrest will occur constantly.
Structural and Functional Independence and Dependence (Variant)
Structural dependence and independence are the products of institutional and
systemic factors interacting in a manner that either hinders or enhances the state’s ability
to provide for its own needs. States are structured to function in a variety of ways based
1’6
- Almond, Dalton, Powell, Strom, 3 1-35.
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on their historical development. States are generally structured to be either functionally
independent, able to provide for their own basic needs and wants; functionally dependent,
largely reliant on the efforts of other actors to provide for their basic needs and wants; or
a position in-between with varying degrees of both. States also display different
combinations of dependence and independence in their structure and functioning. States
may be structurally independent and functional, structurally independent and
dysfunctional, structurally dependent and functional, and structurally dependent and
dysfunctional. Some states have no degree of functionality due to national structural
collapse and institutional failure.127
Structural and Functional Independence
Structural and functionally independent states are found primarily in the first and
upper second tiers of states. These states’ institutions are organized in such a manner as
to allow for the efficient use of resources towards providing for the needs of the state
without external support. Their political systems serve as effective societal organizing
tools by which to meet the collective interests within the state. Government in these
states have great degrees of accountability and transparency in the extraction, allocation,
and distribution of resources. Examples of states of this type are the United States,
Canada, Australia, Germany, England, France Russia, Japan and China.
Structural Independence and Dysfunctionality
Structurally independent yet dysfunctional states are found in the lower first and
second tiers of states. These states’ institutions are organized in a manner ensuring only
127 The concept of structural and functional dependence and independence have been introduced and
defined by the researcher after having examined theories of statism, structure and function, and
dependency.
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the most basic employ of resources towards the provision of the state’s essential needs
without external support. These states’ degree of institutional organization facilitates
institutional inefficiency and corruption that adversely affects the states productivity.
The state’s political process and governing institutions ensure only enough transparency
and accountability to enable an inefficient and limited production of goods and services.
These independent states have the option of seeking external assistance and support in
areas beyond essential goods and services production. Examples of independent and
dysfunctional states are India, Iran, Indonesia, and South Africa.
Structural Dependence and Functionality
Structurally dependent and functional states are found primarily in the lower
second tier and upper third tier of states. Their political systems are organized to a
sufficient operational degree to work in concert with external structural support systems
to mobilize state resources to meet the basic needs of the state. These states’ institutions
are organized in a manner that facilitates significant enough degrees of institutional
inefficiency and corruption to necessitate external support structural support. The
political process and governing institutions ensure enough transparency and
accountability to secure external assistance to operate maintain a functional system of
production of goods and services. Even though existing in a state of dependency, these
states engender an acceptable degree of functionality and have the possibility of
transitioning to a condition of structural independence. Examples of states of this type
are Ghana, the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines.
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Structural Dependence and Dysfunctionality
Structurally dependent and dysfunctional states are found primarily in the lower
second and third tiers of states. These states’ institutions are organized in a manner that
hinders or negates the efficient employ of state resources towards the provision of
essential goods and services. Rather than serving as an effective societal organizing tool,
the political system facilitates institutional inefficiency and corruption without a system
of accountability. The state’s ability to internally provide for itself severely
compromised and process of resource extraction, allocation, and distribution is adversely
affected. The cumulative result of the level of institutional organization is the state’s
complete reliance on external support to maintain the institutional and territorial
structures of the state. These states exist in a condition of chronic dependency
completely reliant on external support mechanisms to provide essential goods and
services to the state. Without external support many states in the third tier would regress
into a state of structural collapse and institutional failure. Examples of states of this type
are Togo and Benin.
Institutional Inertia
State decision making and policy formulation may be constrained by the
occurrence or development of unusually high levels of organizational rigidity and
complacency within national institutions that constrain their ability to evolve to reflect
the changing needs of society and the state. This element of institutional inertia develops
when the sociopolitical and economic institutions of the state systematically reproduce
specific behavioral outputs regardless of the type of societal inputs. The institutions
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become rigid and dogmatic, reinforced in their approach to addressing societal needs and
wants.128
This condition is often precipitated by leadership styles and perceptions which
may be conservative and invested in existing institutional processes and outcomes.
Ongoing occurrences of dependency, underdevelopment, neocolonialism, debt,
corruption, poverty, and civil conflict may be assumed to be facilitated and perpetuated
by national institutions. These institutions are often sufficiently rigid that even with new
reformist leadership, tremendous influxes of international aid, and favorable trade
agreements institutional outcomes continue to be similar. To produce different
institutional behavior, the state must fundamentally restructure or reconstruct its central
institutions.
Institutional Culture Clash
The structure and functioning of the state is dynamically affected by
incompatibilities between the institutional culture of modem institutions and the political
culture of the populations utilizing them. National institutions may suffer from an
incompatibility between the values of society and those required for national institutions
to function effectively.’29 The incompatibility of societal and national institutional values
refers to the occurrence of an institutional culture clash. Institutional culture clashes
serve to minimalize the functionality and efficiency of an institution rendering it largely
ineffective and dysfunctional. The indigenous populations of most Global South states
128 Kegley and Wittkopf, 486.
129 Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing
Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).
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have been dealt the task of adapting their traditional political ideas and institutions to the
modern state.’30 The integration of traditional political cultures into Western and Eastern
political and economic institutions has not been perfect or seamless. The governing
elements of third tier states have been unable to secure an efficient mode of operation
resulting in socio-political and economic fallout. The most common fallouts have been
zero sum interpretations of western democratic political processes, bureaucratic
inefficiency, rent seeking, nepotism, and an absence of financial and economic
transparency.’3’
Structural Collapse and Institutional Failure
State collapse and institutional failure generally occur in the third tier of states,
with the possibility of occurring in any state as a result ofmilitary conflict. A structurally
collapsed state may be described as one in which the formal political, economic, and
social institutions of the state have failed, ceased to function, or no longer exist to order
the state.132 Structural collapse and institutional failure occur when the state’s political
and economic system are no longer able to convert political inputs into policy outputs.
The institutions become overwhelmed with inputs and begin to falter in their inability to
process the growing number of societal demands. They eventually cease to function as
an effective means by which to order society. With no effective governing institutions by
which to effectively organize it, the state’s structural collapse culminates in the erosion of
‘30Thid.
131 Rod Alence, ‘Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa” Journal
ofModel7l African Studies, 42, 2 (2004): 166-167.
132 I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration ofLegitimate Authoritj
(Boulder, CO: Lyrine Rienner Publishers, 1995), 1-2,5-6, 10.
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its political, social, and, territorial integrity. The collapse and failure of the state are
paralleled by i.nfrastructural collapse as the resources required for their maintenance are
no longer available.133
However, state collapse may also occur due to civil or intrastate conflict in which
the state’s institutions and infrastructure are destroyed in military conflict.’34 State
collapse may also describe a condition in which the state’s material capabilities are
reduced to such a degree that the state is no longer able to maintain the elements of its’
own sovereignty. The state essentially has no means by which to pursue its national
interest, enhance its material capabilities, or provide for its national security. The state is
essentially powerless to act. To ward off the continual possibility and likelihood of state
failure and collapse, its governing elements seek out international relationships that will
maintain the integrity of the state. External assistance and intervention serves as a means
to secure the state’s immediate survival and facilitate its rehabilitation. United Nations
peace keeping and humanitarian regimes, international aid regimes in the form of loans
and credit financing from the ilviF and World Bank, and institution building assistance
from wealthy developed and developing states all aid in keeping the state from
disintegrating.’35 Collectively these measures have all become necessary within the





Cognition and Perception based Characteristics
The cognition and perception characteristics of the state are those attributes
allowing the state to collectively perceive itself, its environment, and its collective wants
and needs relative to other actors. The state’s primary cognitive and perceptive attribute
is a nationally shared and articulated woridview that forms the normative basis for
collective state action. The worldview is one of the primary determinants in state
behavior and relations and numerous types of views have broadly developed among
different states.
State institutions in the service of the population create a common entity most
individuals have an interest in maintaining as a provider of their resources and security
needs. Individuals in the population are serviced by the state in a contractual exchange of
allegiance for services. Through state institutional bodies a national level of awareness
linked to the political and economic system develops within the state population.
Through this group level of awareness the populations becomes cognizant of not only
their collective interests, but also of the interests of the populations of other states. In the
international arena the group level of awareness and interests are formally articulated as
the national interests pursued by policy institutions. By formally pursuing the broad
interest of the population through national institutions the state is transformed into a
perceptive and cognitively aware entity.’36
Perception/World View (Determinant)
The behavior and relations of the state are also in part an outgrowth of the
~ The concept of state-level cognitive awareness was developed in this study.
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combined perceptions and world view of the state. The state’s broad world view is a sum
combination of the preferences of the masses, elites, government institutions, and
national leadership of the state. Leadership perceptions and world views are derived
from the background, culture, education, experiences, and personality of governing
officials. Institutional perceptions and woridviews are derived from institutional
specialization, tradition, and bureaucratic process. The perceptions and world view of
individuals and institutions create the normative parameters for the decision making
process by shaping the lenses through which the decision maker perceives political
realities Preferences for domestic and international order, and epistemological
orientation preclude any rational pursuit of domestic or international interests.’37 The
variants in perception and worldview factors include globalist-regional-national views,
center-/polar-satellite views, racial and ethnic views, religious views, and civilizational
views.
Global, Regional, and National Views
Drawing dually from their populations and governing officials, states have a
general view of themselves and their role in the international environment based on the
extent to which they are able to project power and influence. State power and influence
maybe projected at the national, regional, global, and atmospheric levels.’38 The elite
group of first tier states with the greatest economic, military, political, and diplomatic
capacity, perceive the international environment in global terms. Their pursuit of
~ Kegley and Wittkopf, 483-484, 506, 528.
~ This study holds power projection in both military and non-military forms as a key facet of the
imagery state leaders and institutions hold of themselves and the world in establishing their preferences for
domestic and international order.
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national interests through foreign policy and international relations are global in scale and
reach. The relationships of these states extend into the most important regions of the
world and account for the greatest percentage of international activity. These states
include the United States, Japan, China, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Brazil,
Russia, India and the European Union.’39
Select other states in the first, second, and third tiers do not have global reach, but
have positioned themselves within the global economy and political system to make them
globally relevant. States such as Taiwan, South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, Switzerland, and Cuba have assumed such positions. The remaining first and
second tier states subscribe to a regional view in formulating foreign policy and
conducting international relations. In terms of economics, military, and political
influence, they do not have the capacity for global reach or expansion. Their national
interests are best pursued and realized through a regional approach. Individually their
influence largely does not extend beyond their neighbors and they may seek to act in
concert or through international institutions to augment their influence. Examples of
states with an overwhelmingly regional view are Malaysia, Norway, Portugal, Poland,
Ghana, Argentina, and Chile among others.’4°
Most third tier states participate in some form of regional organization or
institution, but subscribe to an overwhelmingly national world view. Their foreign policy




overcome their domestic problems. They do not house the structural capacity to
effectively project political or military power beyond their own boarders.’4’ This national
view is practically played out in isolationist and dependency relations. States subscribing
to a largely national world view generally weight bilateral relations with first and second
tier states over those of regional relations. Examples of third tier states with a largely
national view include Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Tajikistan among others.
Polar-Sateffite/Center-Periphery
Several states subscribe to a polar-satellite view of the world occurring within the
context of center periphery relations.’42 Within this view the world is ultimately divided
into a series ofpoles of power where states fall under the polar influence of one of the
system’s most powerful state actors.143 These global metropoles constitute the center of
the global economic and political system and are primarily made up of first tier states.
The elite group of first tier states and select second tier states with the greatest power and
influence, perceive the international environment in terms of a global division of spheres
of influence. Their behavior and relations are determined the international distribution of
power. States overwhelmingly subscribing to this polar view include the United States,
Japan, China, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Russia, India, and
the European Union.
The system’s metropoles maintain satellite states in the system’s periphery from
141 Ibid., 81.
142 Within this study dependency and the world system’s framework are also considered to be general
views that inform institutional culture and policy formulation.
143 Chilcote, 240.
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the second and third tiers.1~ Satellite states are determined by their geostrategic value,
resources, sphere of influence, and historical relationships. Satellite states perceive their
existence and role in the international environment within the parameters of existing
international power poles. Their foreign policy and international relations are
conditioned by their relationship with a metropole. As a result, the pursuit of the national
interest, institutional participation, and development efforts are based first on
considerations of polar interests. The greater percentage of independent Francophone
states in Central and West Africa essentially view themselves and behave as satellites of
France.
However, select second tier states in the system are not classified as metropoles
nor as satellites. These states form a semi-periphery in the system and display both the
characteristics of satellites states and of metropoles. This group includes states such as
Argentina, Nigeria, and Indonesia among others.
Centralized Leadership Characteristics
The centralized leadership characteristics of the state are those attributes
facilitating centralized national decision making within the state. As a cognizant and
perceptively aware entity, the state characteristically has developed the rational capacity
to measure the costs and benefits of its decisions. Aware of its capacity to act in its own
interest, the population centralizes its decision making and policy processes in the form
of a governing body. Every governing body is headed by an individual who, based on the
system of government, acts in concert with the governing body on behalf of the state.
144 Wallerstein.
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The individuals occupying leadership and government positions are as important to the
state’s capacity to act as the institutions themselves.145
Leadership Style/Type (Determinant)
The ultimate result of the state centralizing its own decision making capacity are
conditions in which the type and style of leadership exercised on behalf of the state
dynamically affect the manner in which it will act or behave. Leadership type and style
are one of the primary determinants in state behavior and relations. State leadership
ultimately either enhances or stifles the ability of the state to effectively act in the interest
of its population.’46 Leadership type and style are an outgrowth of the impact of the
state’s culture, institutions, social composition, and education on the personality,
character, and background of its governing officials. Both individual and group decision
making in policy formulation are the byproduct of the intersection of institutional
structures and the worldview governing officials.’47 State leadership acts as a central
institution in facilitating either structural dependence and dysfunctionality, or structural
independence and functionality. The variations in leadership style and type broadly
include authoritarian-moralist, authoritarian-survivalist, democratic, kieptocratic,
nationalist, neopatrimonial, neocolonial, and theocratic style rule.
Authoritarian-Moralist
Authoritarian-moralist leadership is preoccupied with systematic efforts t
145 Kegley and Witt1copf~ 464-465, 503-504.
146 Ibid.
~ Kegley and Wittkopf, 503, 506, 517.
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preserve, maintain, and extend leadership offices beyond any democratic or constitutional
mandate in order to build a functional state. Authoritarian moralists seek to establish
strong institutions and a national identity while minimizing domestic opposition.’48
Leadership seeks to govern in the broad interests of the state by focusing on enhancing
the population’s material well being and quality of life.’49 Both foreign and domestic
policy serve as tools by which the governing elements of the state secure their regime’s
survival. Leadership positions are gained both through democratic and nondemocratic
means, and maintained by any method necessary to retain power. Justifications for
leadership positions are based dually on the moral capacity of state leadership to act in
the interest of the population, and on the ability of the ruling regime to maintain their
power and position. State leadership domestically wards off competition through
incremental limited political participation, financial co-optation, and the application of
force. International relationships are utilized by moral-authoritarians as a tool to bolster
and reinforce their power position in efforts to control opposition groups. Ghana’s Jerry
Rawlings was an example of this form of leadership.
Authoritarian-Survivalist
Authoritarian-survivalist leadership is preoccupied with systematic efforts to
preserve, maintain, and extend leadership offices for an undefined period of time beyond
any democratic or constitutional mandate)5° This form of leadership is common in
148 The term authoritarian-moralist has been used to describe authoritarian regimes which engage in
developmental governance and have elements of nationalist leadership.
~ Alence, 164, 176-177. Rod Alence makes reference to the effectiveness and virtues of non
democratic regimes in developmental governance in Africa.
1z0 The term authoritarian-survivalist was utilized to represent both personalistic and militaristic forms
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unsecure environments housing competing national, ethnic, and race groups. Both
foreign and domestic policy serve as tools by which the governing elements of the state
secure their regime’s survival and hold on to national power. International relationships
are utilized as a tool to bolster and reinforce the power position of an individual leader or
group in an effort to control competing or threatening internal state elements. State
leadership domestically wards off competition through incremental limited political
participation, fmancial co-optation, and the application of force.’5’
Justifications for leadership positions are based on the ability of the ruling regime to
maintain their power and position relative to political competitors. Leadership positions
are gained through democratic and nondemocratic means, but are maintained by any
means necessary and available inclusive of external assistance. Small inner circle groups
are employed in the decision making process for policy formulation. Survivalist regimes
may forgo the pursuit of national security objectives in exchange for regime security
guarantees by facilitating relationships of neocolonialism, dependency, and
underdevelopment with other international actors. Nigeria’s late dictator Sani Abacha is
an example of this form of leadership.
Democratic
Democratic leadership centers on decision making through a majority rule system
designed to mediate or arrive at a consensus between competing interests. Justifications




rule of law. Leadership seeks to govern by satisfying the broadest range of group and
individual interests. Pluralistic and liberal institutions are utilized in the decision making
process and policy formulation. The power of the executive office is checked by
secondary and tertiary branches of government in order to limit the possibility of the
abuse of executive power. Leadership positions are justified based on the popular
consent of the populationJ52 Ghana’s Samuel Kuffour is an example of democratic
leadership.
-Kieptocratic
Kieptocratic rule refers to a form of leadership where the decisions, actions, and
behavior of the state domestically and internationally are merely an extension of the
leader’s personality and personal preferences. Both domestic and foreign policy are an
outgrowth of the personality type, education, self perception, and sum total of the life
experiences of the national leader. The behavior and relations of the state may be
predicted with great degrees of accuracy based on an assessment of the leader. The
population of the state in turn suffers or benefits from the determinations of the national
leader whether it be prospects for modernization or ongoing dependency and
underdevelopment. The international relationships formed and maintained by the state
become the sole determination of the national leader with little or no domestic
accountability for the repercussions of their decisions or actions. Kieptocratic leaders
gain their positions by varying means but maintain their position through a combination
of co-optation, domestic repression, force, and external assistance. Power is the central
‘~2Lim, 159-161.
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basis by which leadership positions are justified. Uganda’s Idi Arnin and Zaire’s Mobutu
are examples of the kieptocratic form of rulership.
Nationalist
Nationalist leadership focuses on creating a structurally independent and
functional state through building internal institutions and emphasizing a national state
identity. Leadership seeks to govern in the interest of the state national group defmed in
terms of enhancing their material well being. Justifications for leadership positions are
based on the moral authority and capacity of the leaders to act in the interest of the
national group. Leadership positions are gained and maintained both through systems of
fair elections and by force and power. Both authoritarian and pluralistic political
institutions are employed in the policy decision making process of nationalist leaders and
governments.’53 Tanzania’s Julius Nyere was an example of a nationalistic leader.
Neo-patrimoniai
Neo-patrimonial rule refers to a form of leadership in which the national leader
rules primarily in their own personal interest, and second in the interests of societal
clients through a network of patron-client relationships. Neo-patrimonial rule employs
executive power dually in their personal interests and the interest of their clients and
patrons towards enriching the national leader and maintaining their power. Neo
patrimonial rule combines the characteristics of classical patrimonialism, presidentialism,
and clientelism within the structure and institutions of modern government. Like
patrimonialism, it suggests that the possessions and resources of the national territory are
153 Kegley and Wittkopf, 517, 520.
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at the disposal of the leader to do with as they see necessary. Neopatrimonialism’s
elements of presidentialism centralize government and state power solely into the
executive office with essentially no high level checks or balances on their actions. Its
clientelist elements allow for the granting of personal favors, resources, and services to
varying societal groups and individuals to solicit unbridled political and personal
support.’54
Justifications for leadership positions are based on the ability and capacity of the
leaders to satisfy interests and maintain the loyalty of their patrons. Leadership positions
may be gained and maintained either through a system of elections or by force and
power. Executive decision making utilizes group consultation with patrons and allies in
the fonnulation of domestic and foreign policy. The interests of ethnic, tribal, and class
groups are met through their representative in the executive office’s unlimited access to
the resources and tools of the state. The international relationships of the state become a
tool to secure the domestic interests of select groups within the state. Uganda’s Yoweri
Museveni is an example of neopatrimonial style rule.
Neo-colonial
Neo-colonial style leadership is a system of leadership in which the national
leaders of the state govern according to the directives and interests of its former colonizer
or other external powers.155 frrespective of the manner in which they come to power or
maintain their rulership, they govern and maintain international relationships according to
154 Kebonang, 5-6.
155 This study interprets Kwame Nicrumab’s “Neo-Colonialism” not only in international class and
political economy terms, but also as a type or style of state leadership.
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the dictates of an external power. Authoritarian or democratic means may be utilized to
achieve the directives of the foreign state based on whether or not the masses perceive
such a relationship to be in their interests. Irrespective of how the decision making
process occurs or the institutions and groups involved, state decisions reflect a
neocolonial relationship. Justifications for leadership positions are generaUy externally
based primarily on the willingness and ability of the leadership to execute the directives
of the former colonizer. If the executive office cannot act in the interests of the former
colonizer and maintain domestic order and stability, that leader is subsequently removed
and a new leader installed. The Republic of Chad’s president Idriss Derby is
representative of such a leadership style in the relationship he maintains with France.
Theocratic Rule
Theocratic leadership is a system of leadership in which the national leaders of
the state govern according to the directives and interests of a specific religion.
Leadership seeks to govern in the interest of the moral and spiritual development of the
population while attending to their material well being and needs. Justifications for
leadership positions are based on the moral and spiritual authority of the leaders as
granted by God and the religious body to govern in the interest of the population. The
rulers believe themselves to be guided specifically by their religious beliefs and both they
and their religious advisors see themselves as emissaries of their god. Leadership
positions are gained and maintained both through appointments, systems of fair elections,
and by force or power. Both authoritarian and pluralistic political institutions are
employed in the policy building and execution process to enact directives based on divine
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revelation and inspiration.
This type of rule is largely exercised in a theocratic form of government where
rule is directed by a nationally held belief in a specific deity or religion. This is the case
in the Vatican City State where the Pope is both the head of government and the head of
the Roman Catholic Church. Iran maintains elements of theocratic rule withm its
democracy as elected officials running the day-to-day practical aspects of Iran’s
government answer to the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council which are Islamic
religious authorities. Likewise, Saudi Arabia also entails elements of theocratic rule
within its monarchy as the government is largely run according to Sharia law and the
Qu’ran is the foundational document of the constitution.
Policy Institutions and State Behavioral Outputs
In response to the mputs imposed on the state by the international and domestic
environment, the state responds through developing policy that practically addresses its
wants and needs. State decision-making is consolidated and formalized through its
policy making institutions in which the determinant influences on the state’s behavior are
filtered through its domestic and foreign policy institutions. The state’s foreign policy
institutions are responsible for the official actions or inactions of the state as sanctioned
by its governing authorities towards other actors and the international system.’56
Whereas, the state’s domestic policy institutions are responsible for the official actions or
inactions of the state’s governing officials towards the state and its internal elements to
156Kegley and Wittkopf, 7.
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address its internal needs and requirements.’57
However, rather than emerging as wholly divided and separate entities, in the age
of globalization and interdependency state behavioral outputs increasingly emerge in the
form of intermestic policy. Intermestic policy suggests that states’ foreign policies are so
closely linked to national domestic outcomes that they cannot be wholly separated from
domestic policy considerations and vice versa.158 The globalized and interconnected
structure of the international political and economic system dynamically link the
domestic issues of most states to the international issues of the international system in the
post-cold war era. As a result, foreign and domestic policy both have either a directly or
indirectly corresponding foreign or domestic policies to balance their internal and
external effects. Policy balancing is managed institutionally where governments have
developed the means by which to mediate or moderate between foreign interests and
domestic interests in order to negate policy clashes.’59
However, where government instruments are not present to moderate or mediate
between domestic and foreign policy effects and outcomes, foreign policy effects on
domestic policy and vice versa, are determined by the dominant political paradigm or
organizing principle around which the state government functions.’6° In such an instance
there may be no counter balancing between the effects of domestic and foreign policy on
157 Robert 0. Keohane and Helen V. Mimer ed., Internationalization and Domestic Politics
ambridge: Cambridge University, 1996), 3.
158 Kegley and Wittkopf, 373-3 74.
~ Ibid., 373-374.
160 Kegley and Raymond, 59-60.
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each other. As a result, policy linked to globalization and the interconnected structure of
the international system, along with the general international effects of those phenomena,
may adversely affect the state domestically. In the African region where
multinationalism overwhelmingly dominates the political process and democratic
government has not fully taken hold, the domestic political fallout and impact of foreign
policy on the state plays itself out along neopatrimonial, neocolonial, kieptocratic, ethnic,
tribal, religious, and class lines.’6’ This occurs particularly in regards to the process by
which determinations for the expenditure of government revenues, disbursal of
international aid, and management of the economic exploitation of national resources and
wealth are made.
The intermestic policy of the state then enters the international environment as
behavioral outputs to which other international actors and the international system itself
must contend as environmental inputs.’62 Each state, theoretically adding to the milieu of
activity comprising international relations, actively engaging in the process of statehood
and with active systemic participation. From the assumption of the existence of an
international environment with dominating system and state variables, the process begins
again in continuity of the ongoing behavioral life cycle and maintenance of the
international system and its states. 63
161 Kebonang, 5-6.
62 Kegley and Wittkopf, 15. Kegley and Wittkopf’s “Funnel of Causality” foreign policy model
illustrates the emergence of policy as outputs that generate feedback into the international environment and
renter the state as inputs.
163 Ibid., 15-16.
CHAPTER 5
CATEGORIZiNG THE AFRICAN STATE
The Majority: Pathofunctional States
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Caineroon, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Ivoiy Coast, Kenya, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland
(31 states)
Characteristics — Realist: weak. Liberal: marginal. mt. Class: peripheral, dependent,
underdeveloped. Structure andfunction: dysfunctional and structurally dependent.
Leadership type: authoritarian survivalist, neopatrimonial, matrimonial, nationalist,
neocolonial. Perception/Worldview: regional, national, satellite, racial.
With few exceptions, a majority of sub-Saharan African states overwhelmingly
display the dominant characteristics of the pathofunctional state. Within the
metafunctional model of state behavior and relations, states are categorized according to
the manner in which the central determinants in state behavior and relations are factored
and played out. The African state is described generally as weak within its realist
characteristics, marginal within its liberal characteristics, peripheral-dependent
underdeveloped-neocolonial within international class characteristics, and dysfunctional
and dependent within its functional composition characteristics. Within its cognitive and
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perceptive characteristics, the woridviews generally predominating the African state are
regional, national, satellite, racial, tribal, clan, and religious views. The African state
overwhelmingly practices authoritarian survivalist, neopatrimonial, matrimonial,
nationalist, and neocolonial forms of leadership within its centralized leadership
characteristics.
Economically, pathofunctional states in Africa have general figures of
unemployment averaging 40 to 45%, with an average of 45 to 50% of the population
below the poverty line. The top 10% of the population generally accounts for at least 30%
of the resource consumption and consumer spending in these countries. They generally
are running high trade deficits, and public debt generally averages 20 to 30% of GDP.’
Their United Nations Human Development Index scores are all below 0.66 in the
medium and low human development category.2
Realist Characteristics:
Weakness
The realist characteristic overwhelmingly shared by a majority of sub-Saharan
African states is state-level “weakness,” or a relative absence of accumulated aggregate
state power.3 All African states save South Africa are relatively weak in comparison to
These figures were calculated by the researcher based on individual country figures taken from the
CIA World Factbook. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.govilibrary/publications the-world
factbook/geos/so.html. [accessed May 1, 2010].
2 These figures were calculated based on individual country figures taken from the United Nations
Human Development Report. Human Development Report 2009, Palgrave Macmillan (for the United
Nations Development Programme), New York, 2009.
I. William Zartman, ‘~National Interest and Ideology.” Vernon McKay, editor, African Diplomacy:
Studies in the Dete,-minants ofForeign Polici’ (London: Pall Mall Press 1966): 34-35.
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the super, great, and middle-range power states of the international system.4 Regional
measures of military expenditure, GDP, GNP, PCI, and percentage of votes in
international institutions are all indicators of region-wide weakness among African
states.5 Since their independence, African states have generally been unable to enhance
or maximize their relative power internally or externally in pursuit of their national
interest or the greater survival of their populations.6 The absence of increasing societal
complexity in the African state curtails its ability to accumulate aggregate power. The
African state’s power deficit is historical, and its limited functionality impedes its ability
to simultaneously compete, cooperate, and specialize within the system.7
The relatively limited power position of the African state dictates that it has little
leverage by which to influence the system and is more influenced and regulated by it than
the system’s most powerful actors. The African state does not have significant or
sufficient military, economic, or political sanctions to bring to bear on the system and its
most powerful actors to affect its structure or functioning. The power deficit facing the
African state is so significant that the state historically and presently has been unable to
prevent penetration by external actors into its domestic affairs.8 The states of the sub
Saharan region of Africa continue to face an elusive quest and dilemma as to how to
~ I. William Zartman, Vernon McKay, 34-35.
World Economic Outlook Database 2009,
www.imf.orglextemallpubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodataldownload.aspx [accessed May 1, 2010].




substantially increase the aggregate power of the state within the present international
order.
National Interest
Within pathofunctional and protofi.inctional African states, the pursuit of the
national interest is reduced to the economic and physical security considerations of those
groups controlling the state as opposed to a collusion of competing domestic interests.9
The multinational structure of the African state has proven a major obstacle to state
building and the formation of a liberal or consensus-based national interest.’0 Ethnic,
tribal, and class politics have proven a destabilizing agent leading to a zero-sum
interpretation of politics in the African state.” The conduct of foreign policy and IR
becomes reflective of the domestic group insecurity dominating the politics of the state.
Most African states generally lack effective political instruments and institutions
by which to build and establish national consensus among competing groups on the
composition of interests and objectives to be pursued by the state in the international
environment.’2 Each sub-national or class group within leadership positions seeks to act
in its own interest as opposed to those of the state, where the pursuit of a truly national
interest is of secondary importance to the practice of rentierism and government
Taylor, 411-414.
I. William Zartman, Vernon McKay, editor, 30-32.
Poku, 184-186.
2 Jennifer Widner, “Africa’s Democratization: A Work in Progress” Current History: A Journal of
Contemporary World Affairs vol. 104, No. 682 (May 2006) : 216-217.
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corruption.’3 The immediate individual benefits of self and group aggrandizement
outweigh the political and economic costs of addressing and mediating between
competing state interests.
Within this environment of zero-sum politics, it is perceived to be more conducive
to individual and group interests to maintain political office by pursuing policies that
reinforce the international status quo and power structure of the system than to lack the
support and aid of the international community and neighboring states.’4 The pursuit of
individual and group interests via international means reinforces the environment of
insecurity, as subnational and class groups perceive the narrow pursuit of private and
communal interests by the governing elite as undermining the meeting of their own
interests. Faced with an overwhelmingly powerful state ruling group, nonruling groups
may abandon political processes in favor of force or autonomy seeking, establishing their
own substate foreign policy interests and relations.’5 The cumulative result of the zero-
sum political game within African politics is the long-term failure to establish and pursue
a truly national interest based on consensus and competing domestic interests.
African State Material Capabifities
The fundamental weakness of the African state lies in its underdeveloped material
capabilities.’6 The limited material capabilities of the states of sub-Saharan Africa were






predecessor states. The structural handicaps limiting the state’s ability to develop its
material capabilities were written into the state structure in the negotiated and conflict-
induced transitions from colonies to independent states.17 Many of these handicaps were
subsequently reinforced during the Cold War and through neocolonial relationships with
the former colonizing states of Western Europe and other actors.’8 These structural
handicaps include the following: the inherited absence of a military industrial complex
and limited military and police forces capable of adequately policing and protecting the
state from internal and external threats; the acceptance and reinforcement of national
boundaries along colonial lines inconsistent with the ethnic and tribal realities of the
region; and the absence of strategic material capability enhancing alliances or agreements
with powerful and influential actors.’9
The first and most significant factor limiting the development of the material
capabilities of the African state is the inherited absence of a military industrial complex
and limited military and police forces capable of adequately policing the state and
protecting it from internal and external threats.2° With the exception of South Africa, no
sub-Saharan African state possesses the industrial capacity to produce advanced military
17 Tordoff, 40.
~ Ibid.
19 Ansamoa, 136-137, 158-161. Tordoff, 37-41. I linked the development of state material capabilities
to the limitations and challenges of the colonial legacies inherited by the African state. It is my position
that these legacies are among the fundamental factors limiting the enhancement of African states’ material
capabilities.
20 Au A. Mazrui, Africa ‘s international Relations: The Diplomacy ofDependency and Change
(London: Westview Press, 1977). It is the position of the researcher after surveying the available literature
that territorial security is the most important factor in developing states’ material capabilities.
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weapons, equipment, and training.2’ Very few have the capacity to make long-term
modernizing purchases and maintain such equipment along with conducting advanced
indigenous police and military training. These limitations minimize the ability of the
African state to independently exercise domestic coercive power over the entire state or
project military power beyond its borders m defense of its national interest. All Sub
Saharan African states are reliant upon military support from extra-continental actors to
maintain internal and external security. In order to maintain its security, the African state
is subject to continual dependency on external actors for the means by which to do so.22
External actors provide military support only in amounts nonthreatening to
themselves or the system. This support is conditioned by terms regulated by the system’s
most influential actors, requiring the political and economic compliance of national
governments to varying international regimes and political and fmancial agreements.
These agreements, however, are generally not in the best interests of the state.23
The acquisition of military equipment is also a function of the state’s ability to
finance its security needs. In the sub-Saharan African region, based on the limited
revenues and purchasing power of the state, the countries of the region face severe
fmancial constraints in what they are able to purchase and maintain relative to their
needs. 24 The economic structure of most sub-Saharan African states generally does not
21 Ma.zrui, 240-242.




allow for continual large-scale military purchases and upgrades in a measure satisfying
the national security requirements of the state. Their military and security needs are
supplemented through international aid packages from select states with large military
industrial complexes. Even so, among exceptionally wealthy regional states with
significant fmancial resources, military purchases and aid are limited to amounts
necessary to maintain domestic security and limited regional power projections.25 The
regional implication of these circumstances is that the African state does not generally
have the military instrument of force available to it by which to influence the system and
its actors in its interest.
The combination of dependency-based sec ty and U ~ted adv ced police and
military forces, in turn, limits the ability of the state’s internal elements to elect, appoint,
maintain, influence, and protect capable, responsible, and legitimate leadership.26 This
factor was most evident in the first two decades of African independence wrought with a
host of both externally funded and internally generated coups.27 In order to undertake
measures to enhance its relative power position, each state must establish and maintain
capable leadership and institutions that will act to develop the state’s material capabilities
in its national interests as opposed to those of small groups and external actors. The
absence of a credible military threat greatly limits the ability of the state to protect its
leadership or deter external efforts to destabilize and remove it. Leadership within the
25 McKay (William J. Foltz), 69-72, 79-81.
26 This is the position of the researcher. An effective security apparatus is a necessary requirement to
maintain legitimate, responsible, and capable leadership in the executive office.
27 Patrick J. McGowan, “Coups and Conflicts in West Africa 1955-2004 pt H.” Armed Forces &
ociety, vol. 32, no. 2 (January 2006) 234-235.
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state that acts against the interests of the system and its strongest actors historically has
been a target for removal, coercion, or punishment into complying with the interests of
foreign actors.28
The third factor limiting the development of the material capabilities of the
African state is that with few notable exceptions, most African states lack strategic
alliances or agreements with the most influential actors in the system that significantly
enhance their security, material capabilities, or power positions relative to the most
powerful states in the international system.29 In order to supplement the military,
economic, and industrial deficits of smaller or weaker states, alliances or agreements with
more powerful and influential state or non-state actors may be formed to elevate the
power position and negotiating power of the state. African states generally have not
secured relationships that facilitate the industrialization process or the ability to project
military force beyond their sub-region or region.3° Instead, the majority of sub Saharan
African states have participated in long-term relationships of dependency,
neocolonialism, and exploitation.3’
During the Cold War period, the United States and Soviet Union pursued the
policies of bipolar politics through proxy conflicts and state militarization. The military
aid granted to African states was based on regimes of security dependency that did not
28 Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa and the Modern World (Trenton: Africa World Press Inc., 1986), 140-
141.
29 McKay, 59-63, 64-65 (Andrew M. Kamarck).
30Thid., 56-58, 79-81.
31 William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa, 2,Id Edition (Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1993), 38-41.
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enhance the state’s ability to indigenously manufacture its security from within or spur its
development. As a result, the exit of the superpowers from the continent in the
immediate post-Cold War period resulted in massive chaos and increasing
underdevelopment and marginalization for over a decade across the continent.32 These
relationships of dependency and exploitation continue to undermine the development and
advancement of the African state and undermine its position in the international system.
They occur in stark contrast to the relations of the most powerful and influential actors in
the international system, who maintain strategic alliances and trade agreements with other
key actors in order to consolidate and maintain their power positions within the system.
African states have little to offer major actors in terms of security, technology, or
trade beyond raw material extraction. African states pose a major liability due to their
high levels of civil and political instability as well as chronic underdevelopment and debt.
Only a few states such as Angola, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan have been able to secure
significant agreements with powerful states that significantly enhance the material
capabilities of the state. However, the large-scale entry of the Chinese into the continent
in the post-9/l 1 era may hold some long-term prospects for alliances or agreements that
significantly expand the material capabilities of the African state. This has afready been
observed in Sudan’s relationship with the Chinese.
The fourth significant factor limiting the development of the material capabilities
of the African state is the acceptance and reinforcement of national boundaries along
32 Keller and Rotbchild, 16-17.
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colonial lines inconsistent with the ethnic and tribal realities of the region.33 The
multinational structure of the African state dictated by its colonial boundaries has proven
a major obstacle to state building and the formation of a liberal or consensus-based
national interest. Ethnic, tribal, and class politics have proven a destabilizing agent
leading to a zero-swn interpretation of politics in the African state. ~ Each sub-national
or class group within leadership positions seeks to act first in its self-interest or small-
group interests, holding the enhancement of state material capabilities secondary in
importance. ~ As a result, within the African state, the long-term relative development of
state material capabilities is not a major objective within political office.36
alances of Power and sub-Saharan Africa
On the African continent in the Cold War and thereafter, the balance of power
politics among the competing states of sub-Saharan Africa has largely revolved around
international aid and trade, regional security and stability, and the strategic interests of
the international system’s most powerful and influential actors. International
organizations such as the United Nations, regional organizations such as the African
Union, and sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community Of West
African States have been necessary in managing the balance of power among a region
~ The observation of the relative impact of the retention of colonial boundaries on the enhancement of
ate material capabilities reflects the position of the researcher.
~ Poku, 184-186.
~5Poku, 184-186.
~ McKay (Zartman), 30-31.
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composed of mostly pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states
In sub-Saharan Africa, due to the severely limited military power and capability
of most states to successfully wage sustained interstate warfare in their interest, balance
of power considerations regarding state security do not strongly revolve around military
threats or buildups from other states. Juridical sovereignty regimes established by the
United Nations and the system’s most powerful actors essentially guarantee the territorial
integrity of the African state and discourage territorial or resource aggrandizement on the
continent. As a result, state security considerations revolve around domestic security,
civil stability, national resource exploitation, the distribution of national wealth and
benefits, and international aid and trade considerations.38
In the post-Cold War period, throughout the African region, military force is
applied largely in a domestic fashion to enforce civil stability and facilitate or protect
natural resource exploitation. With few notable exceptions,39 minor military
skirrnishes/standoffs and limited territorial occupation have been employed by African
states to settle bilateral state disputes. Conflicts over these disputed areas are generally
minor, limited to the area under dispute as opposed to any full national extension of the
conflict into a neighboring state. Even so, large-scale military force has been applied by
multilateral organizations to settle domestic civil conflict within African states.40
~ McKay, 7-10.
~ McKay, 28-29 (Zartman).
~ Ethiopia Somalia conflicts, Ethiopia Eritrea conflicts.
40ECOWAS/ECOMOG interventions into Sierra Leone and Liberia, SADC interventions into Congo




The liberal characteristic overwhelmingly shared by a majority of sub-Saharan
African states within the international system is economic and politic~i “marginality.”
African states have a relatively low degree ofparticipation in the global economy and
international political system as compared to the most integrated states in the system.4’
African states generally exhibit only limited degrees of interdependence in the global
economy and hold no significant voting power in the most important international
institutions and organizations. At its current rate of growth and development, sub
Sahar Africa will continue to be the most highly underdeveloped region in the world
throughout the first half of the 21st century.
Interdependence
The relatively low degree of economic integration of most African states into the
global economy, teamed with meager levels of formal regional sub-Saharan trade,
contribute significantly to the marginalization of the African state in the neoliberal
economic order. The sub-Saharan region of Africa continues to have the second lowest
cumulative percentage of global (international) and intraregional trade, as well as the
lowest GNP, PCI, and regional growth percentages in the world.42 In the post-Cold War
period, the sub-Saharan region from 1990 to 2006 accounted cumulatively for less than
3% of global trade, whereas Asia by 2006 accounted for 27.8% of all global trade. In this
41 Keller and Rothchild, 19-21, 30-31. Bora, Bouet, and Roy, 1. lyoha, 5. Ferguson, 9.
42 Thternational Trade Statistics, 2009, WTO Publications, World Trade Organization, Lausann
Geneva, 8-9.
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period, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 3.1% of global exports and 2.4% of global
imports. Sub-Saharan Africa’s intraregional trade has also been extremely limited, with
only 15% of regional merchandise exports going to other countries in the region. Only
10% of those merchandise imports actually originated inside the region.43
African economies are structurally underdeveloped, with little portfolio diversity.
Structured in a largely linear fashion, African states generally participate at only the
lowest level of added value processes in the global production chain.44 African
economies continue to be based on agro-mineral and energy extraction, as opposed to the
foundational industrial and technological elements driving the latest wave of
globalization.45 In order to broaden its economic participation, the African state must
engage in the secondary and tertiary levels of the production process that will make it
economically diverse.
However, at present, the structure of most African economies and societies does
not require the rapid integration of new technology into daily life or a national education
base beyond the primary level to continue at the current rate of development. Modem
advances in construction, telecommunications, information technology, satellite
technology, and rapid transportation have not diffused in large degrees throughout
African society. Where some diffusion has occurred, it has been limited to the most
~ The World Bank Group, 2006 Development Indicators,
http://devdata.worldbank.orglwdi2006/contents Section6 I .htm [accessed May 1, 2010].
~ Bora, Bouet, Roy, I.
~ Peter M. Lewis, “African Economies’ New Resilience,” Current Histoiy vol. 109, No. 727 May
10: 194, 199.
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urbanized areas of the state.46 As low-density, low-consumption societies, African states
do not constitute major primary and secondary markets for modem consumables from
industrial states. Many of the consumer items of industrial societies are not highly
profitable items to be sold in African spaces, due to lifestyle differences and the
underdeveloped nature of those societies. The general education level and lifestyle of the
state must significantly advance to present a mass market for advanced consumer and
capital goods.
Further, due to the intense levels of state dysfunction across the region, Sub
Saharan Africa has not been globally pursued by private capital for foreign direct
investment. Foreign investment fails to gravitate to Africa due to the limitations posed
by political and civil instability, undereducated and unskilled labor, high labor costs, and
inadequate national infrastructure across the continent.47 The region has not been
considered an environment in which secure returns on foreign direct investment in sectors
beyond mining, oil, and telecommunications (mobile phones) will be successfully
realized.
The nonliberalized or under-liberalized structure of the African state’s economy
and its chronic underdevelopment do not easily allow African states to integrate or
participate in the global economy beyond marginal participation. To participate beyond a
marginal position, African states require more capital and industrial, educational, and
political tools, which are necessary prerequisites for greater integration into the global
46 Taylor, 2 14-217.
~ Taylor, 2 16-217.
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economic and political system.
International Institutionalism
With the exception of South Africa (020), African states hold no permanent votes
or significant voting power in the most important institutions and organizations of the
mternational system (UN Security Council, 020, OECD, etc.). The bulk of global
production, technology, and political activity is generated by the most wealthy and
developed states, which dictate the production process and structure of international
order. 48 African states are dependent on North American, European, and Asian states for
markets to sell their primary goods. Demand in the industrial and industrializing states
for commodity goods has been the engine of African economies since the colonial era.
Save South Africa, African states have little or no significant impact on the functioning
of the international system and thus are not entitled to decision-making positions in the
most important political and economic institutions or organizations. The most important
institutional vote African countries hold is the rotating seat afforded to the region on the
UN Security Council by the permanent council members.
Even so, African states have to some effective degree utilized regional institutions
and organizations in the areas of economics, trade, and crisis management to their
benefit. Regional organizations have been essential in managing regional informal
economic interdependence as well as in serving as organizing bodies and mediators in
conflicts .‘~ The informal economy accounts for significant percentages of trade, income,
48 Wallerstein, 139-142.
~ Mark Malan, “The OAU and African Subregional Organizations: A Closer Look at the Peace
yramid,” Institute for Securth’ Studies. Occasional Papei~ No 36 (January 1999): 1-6
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and employment in the region due to historical ties, the porous nature of African borders,
and the irredentist makeup of the states of the region.5°
Within the formal economy, regional organizations such as the South African
Development Community have facilitated South Africa’s regional economic penetration
of its neighboring states while granting those states access to goods and services available
through the South African economy. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West
African States has been key to Nigerian economic penetration of the region as well as
managing regional conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast. In East Africa, the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development has also been essential in managing crises
in Sudan Somalia and the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflicts In the west, east, and central
African sub-regions, neighboring states have managed refugee movements wrought by
civil conflict in conjunction with the United Nations. To date, the East African
Community inclusive of Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda has
demonstrated the greatest degree ofpolitical integration and central coordination of
economic policy.51
Marginality and Education
African governments in the era of globalization have the challenge of preparing
the population to compete in the international labor market. This entails providing a
necessary education base for a literate and skilled population as well as maintaining a
50 Scott D. Taylor, “Labor Markets in Africa: Multiple Challenges, Limited Opportunities,” Current
History vol. 109, No. 718 (May 2009) : 215.
~ Eric G. Berman, “African Regional Organizations’ Peace Operations: Developments and
Challenges,” African Security Review vol. 11, No. 4 (2002) : 1-7.
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stable and conflict-free political climate within the state. From the inception of
independence to the present, African states have largely failed to provide an educational
base that produces individuals who are able to rapidly produce or integrate technology
into production processes or draw foreign investment. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest
primary education completion rate of any region in the world, with only 60% of all
enrollees finishing. Further, only 30% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa is
composed of recipients of a primary education, and only 26.5% is composed of education
recipients at the secondary level. 52
International Class Determinants: Peripherality, Dependency, Underdevelopment
Peripherality
Africa’s pathofunctional and protofunctional states display three distinct
international class characteristics: peripherality, dependency, and underdevelopment.
The first and most significant of these characteristics, from which the fmal two
characteristics emerge, is economic and political “peripherality.”53 African states
generally function as primary production and extraction points in the global economy.
By contrast, North America, Europe, Asia, and areas of South America function as
capital goods, consumer goods, and primary goods producers that house secondary and
tertiary production processes. Within the stratified structure the global economy, sub
Saharan Africa receives the lowest value for its cash crops and minerals while North




their capital and consumer goods and services.
The agro-mineral economies of a majority ofAfrican states were directly
inherited from the state economic structure of the colonial state and maintained by the
succeeding national governments.55 The region is the least industrialized in the world,
accounting for the smallest percentage of industrial output of any region in the world at
under 2% of global output. Excluding South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa’s share of global
industrial output measures under 0.3 0% of total global output.56 Consistent with this
economic position, the region accounts for the smallest revenue base of any equivalent
population in the world, with a per-capita income average of $1968.00 and 36.2% of the
population living on less than a dollar a day.57 Based on the region’s peripheral income
base, African states will necessarily be low-demand, low-consumption societies based on
their limited purchasing power. This degree of economic peripherality further dictates
that its global market position also be necessarily tertiary for most goods and services.
Dependency
The second international class characteristic overwhelmingly shared by sub
Saharan African states within the international system is dependency. Dependency
describes a condition in which the center-periphery structure of the international system
makes the states of the periphery dependent on the production processes and trade of
~ Immanuel Wallerstein, 4-7. Wallerstein, 139-142.
~ Tordoff, 40-4 1.
56 Industrial Report 2005, United Nations Industrial Development Organization No. 424, 129-130.
~ UNDP, http://undp.org [accessed Mayl, 2010].
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center states for their material survival and development.58 At independence, the
postcolonial African state was still economically structured in the same dependent form
as the colonial state from which it evolved.59 The artificial multinational structure of the
African state in conjunction with the political bias employed against it by its former
European colonizers and their American allies reinforced this condition of dependence.
Within the value chain of global production and labor, the African state as a
primary goods producer receives the lowest value for the goods upon which its economy
is based. With this comparatively small revenue base, the African state pays a
disproportionally high cost for necessary capital and consumer goods relative to its
revenue stream. Cash-crop agriculture and mineral extraction yield the lowest value and
generate the smallest amounts of income while staple crops, capital and consumer goods,
and information technology generate the highest revenue and the greatest cost of
purchase. Without the capacity to produce those essential goods and services itself, the
African state is dependent on industrialized and industrializing states for the conversion
of its primary resources into essential goods and services. In this structurally repetitive
cycle, African state resources and labor are continually exploited at the lowest cumulative
costs within the global economy.
Aid Dependency
International aid since the 1970s has become a core component of the African
state’s chronic regime of dependency. The sub.-Saharan region of Africa, after over forty
~ Dos Santos, 23 1-232.
~ Tordoff, 40-41.
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years of the continuous receipt of international aid in amounts well beyond $500 billion,
remains the poorest and most underdeveloped region of the world.60 Sub-Saharan Africa
has received larger amounts of aid per capita than any other region of the world, yet the
region’s level of dependency on external aid is annually increasing as opposed to
decreasing.6’ Even with substantial extended aid, the states of the region have been
unable to significantly improve the conditions existing within the state. Instead, they
have regressed in a cycle of underdevelopment and exponential increases in poverty. The
conditions and direction of aid distribution have had the result of most African states
becoming chronically dependent on aid and unable to function without it. 62
International aid regimes are a part of a systematic economic and political process
that serves to continually undermine the development of the African state in a manner
that reinforces its position in the periphery and donor states’ position in the center. The
class structure of the international system is politically and economically structured to
create and perpetuate the conditions that require African states to seek aid in the first
instance.63 In practical terms, this has translated to economic aid being directed primarily
to the infrastructure of extraction and distribution centers in the form of ports, roads, rail,
power generation, and communications networks to and from extraction centers.64
60 Mom Siddiqi, “G8 Pledges: Old Wine in a New Bottle?” African Business (November 2005): 19.
61 Goldsmith, 411-412.
62 Jonathan Glennie, “More Aid Is Not the Answer” Current History vol. 109, No. 727 (May 2010):
208-209.
63 Dos Santos, 23 1-232.
64 Glennie, 205-209.
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Military assistance is provided in a disproportionate amount relative to education,
health services, and industrial development, which are vital to the internal growth and
development of the state in conjunction with domestic civil security. Aid towards
education, social services, and health programs is only given in amounts and areas
necessary to ward off social and civil collapse around vital resource areas and labor
supplies Military aid is distributed only in amounts necessary to maintain regional
stability and domestic order within the state and to maintain the power and control of the
groups that facilitate resource exploitation and corruption.
Aid packages to sub-Saharan Africa have not directed assistance to the key areas
that significantly build the institutions of the state and beneficially integrate it into the
international system. Aid in both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods have not
focused on national economic and social development or served to alleviate the structural
handicaps African countries face in the international system. 65 Most importantly, in spite
of the gross mismanagement of international economic aid in the form of loans,
international aid continues to be funneled to sub-Saharan African states by international
fmancial institutions and developed and developing states without any significant
prospects for improvement.66
Aid packages have been systematically structured to be cyclical in nature. Based
on the disproportionate revenue streams and costs within the global economy, African




power and the essential needs of the state. To account for this deficit, the states utilize
international aid assistance to meet their daily fiscal and societal needs. In this manner,
the structure of the global economy facilitates the systematic process by which African
states are pushed to incur large-scale debt through credit and loan fmancing to make up
for the limitations of their national revenue base. African states are systematically placed
in a position where they must seek aid from the very same state and non-state sources that
generate wealth from the exploitation of African resources. These same actors actively
maintain the global economic system contributing to the African state’s peripherality.
Aid dependency is a contributing factor in African states generally being unable
to modernize their state structures or achieve the level of sustainable development and
economic growth necessary to make the state functional.67 The material and fmancial
states of dependency together constitute a condition of “systemic dependency” in which
systemic collapse or failure would adversely affect the structural and territorial integrity
of the African state. This condition relegates the African state to the periphery of world
politics and economics, where it faces increasing underdevelopment.
Underdevelopment
The third international class characteristic overwhelmingly shared by sub-Saharan
African states within the international system is structural, economic, and political
underdevelopment. 68 The center-periphery relations of the international system and the
resulting regimes of cyclical dependency have resulted in the underdevelopment of most
67 Glennie, 208-209.
68 Walter Rodney, 18-42.
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African states to the pathofunctional degree and below. The extraction and exploitation
of the region’s primary resources by center and semiperiphery states restricts the ability
of the African state to ftilly develop its own resources. The extraction of primary goods
from the periphery towards industrial development in the center results in long-term
production learning effects in the center as opposed to the periphery. North American,
European, and East Asian development is spurred utilizing African raw materials, but
African states do not receive the same learning effects from the production of capital and
consumer goods that they are dependent on from these states. The regimes of
dependency created by the center-periphery relations of the international system restrict
the technical expertise necessary to build secondary and tertiary production processes to
center states. The result is the long-term economic underdevelopment of the sub-Saharan
African region, accompanied by political and social underdevelopment in those
societies.69
The ultimate indicator in per-capita terms of the sub-Saharan region’s general
underdevelopment is the region’ housing of the largest percentage of individuals living in
abject poverty, with 3 6.2% of the population in 2009 living on less than a dollar a day.7°
A second noteworthy indicator of the region’s social underdevelopment is sub-Saharan
Africa’s rate of infection of HIV and AIDS, which is the highest in the world, with an
estimated 22.4 million people living with HIV in 2009. Sub-Saharan Africa constitutes
~ Rodney, 18-30.
70 UNDP, http://undp.org [accessed Mayl, 2010].
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two-thirds of the global total of indlividuals infected with HIV7’ The most telling
indicator of the African state’s political underdevelopment is its post-independence rate
of coups and coup attempts. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest rate of coup and coup
attempts in the first decade of the second millennium, as well as the second highest
regional rate in history. Between 1961 and 2004, the region experienced a reported 80
successful coups and 181 failed coups.72
Structural Functional Characteristics:
Dysfunctional Dependency
The structural functionalist characteristic overwhelmingly displayed by a majority
of African states is dysfunctional dependency.73 Most of Africa’s independent states are
structured as dependent entities within an international system founded on independent
sovereign states. The contradiction between the African state’s independent status and its
dependent structure result in society-wide dysfunctions as the state’s efforts to act
independently and utilize modern political institutions are limited by the outputs of the
state’s dependent structure. Governing officials’ attempts to act in the greater interest of
the state are limited and restricted by a colonial structure designed to act in the interest of
a foreign colonizing state.
The superstructure of the African state was inherited from the colonial state and
built upon using modern western political and social institutions. As a result, African
71 Averting HTV and AIDS, HIV and AIDS in Africa, http: www.avert.org!hiv-aids africa.htm
[accessed Mayl, 2010].
72 Naison Ngoma, “Coups and Coup Attempts in Africa: Is There a Missing Linic?” African Security
Review vol. 13, No 3 (2004):
~ This term and its application within a structural functional analysis have been introduced by the
researcher.
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governments have had the task of functionalizing a forced pluralism within artificial
territorial boundaries utilizing institutions founded on foreign cultural and societal values.
The national institutions and economic systems of the African state were designed to
meet the national and personal interests of external actors as opposed to meeting the
national interests of the state. As such, the international relationships of the sub-Saharan
African state have been more beneficial to those external actors than to itself and its
population.
African states share a host of common structural characteristics that directly
impact the institutional behavior of the state and its capacity for managing its
international relationships. The first and highest-impact characteristic is the retention of
the artificial state boundaries introduced and established by European colonialism. The
territorial boundaries ofboth the colonial state and postcolonial state reflected primarily
European rational as opposed to indigenous African interests, with grave implications for
political stability and the establishment of interest groups. Artificial state boundaries
force traditionally separated and autonomous ethnic groups to live and be governed in the
same space under a central authority without their consultation or approval. In the
colonial state, this arrangement served to allow for the stable governance of the colony
but fostered strong problematic sentiments of ethno-nationalism within the state. What
was required in the new states was nationalism as a necessary component of nation and
state building.
The second structural characteristic shared by African states is the introduction of
western political and economic institutions as the means to organize and order the
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modem state. Within the African state, there are tremendous incompatibilities between
the institutional culture of national institutions and the political socialization and culture
of the populations utilizing and staffing them. National institutions suffer from an
incompatibility between the values of African societies and those required for their
national institutions to function effectively. ~ These institutional culture clashes
minimalize the functionality and efficiency of an institution, rendering it largely
ineffective and dysfunctional.75
The third structural characteristic shared by African states is the continued
undermining and eroding of traditional authority and institutions in the state. The
employment of modem political institutions by the new national governments further
isolated traditional authorities and institutions from the process of modem state building
and national political participation. Colonial administrations utilizing direct rule (French,
Portuguese, Belgian colonies) largely bypassed the chieftaincy and directly administered
the colony from the home government. Where possible, traditional chiefs and leaders
were undermined by the appointment of nontraditional European chiefs to secure political
order. Where colonial administrations employed a system of indirect rule (British
colonies) utilizing local systems of authority, colonial authority still superseded all
others. In like fashion, the postcolonial state’s central power and authority reside with
the national government above that of the traditional authorities and institutions. Despite




is subordinated to the authority of the national government.
The fourth structural characteristic shared by African states is an urban-extractive
developmental bias. The African colonial state administrations concentrated funding
towards developing state iiifrastructiire, transportation networks, public and financial
administration services, and socio-cultural services to essential areas of agro-mineral
extraction, production, transportation, distribution, and administration. This policy was
pursued to the neglect of the majority of the territorial areas of the state classified as
nonessential to the production and extraction process. The long-term results were the
uneven development of the colony as a small number of urban areas connected to large
agricultural production and mineral extraction centers advanced. These areas attracted
large amounts of landless peasant workers from rural areas seeking employment, with the
consequence of infrastructural overstretch and mass unemployment. As a result, the
urban extractive bias of the colonizer served to curtail development in the urban centers.
The national governments of independent African states continued this policy of
urban developmental bias, funneling financial and infrastructural resources to urban
centers and agro-mineral extraction points. They took no substantive measures to
develop the large rural areas, resulting in the same mass migration of peasant workers to
the cities seeking employment. Most major cities of the region are presently faced with
imfrastructural overstretch and high unemployment.
The fifth structural characteristic overwhelmingly shared by African states is
structural dependency. The colonial state in Africa was dependent on its relations with
the home state to maintain the structural integrity of the colony in terms of security and
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economy. So too is the postcolonial state dependent on the system’s developed states and
international institutions to secure its survival. With few exceptions, independent African
states have not made significant efforts to restructure their economies to be self-sufficient
or provide for a vast majority of their own needs. International aid has become a staple
upon which the state survives, warding off collapse and failure. This systemic regime of
dependency has allowed the continuation of the exploitation of African state resources
that began in the colonial period.
The sixth structural characteristic overwhelmingly shared by African states is the
militarization of the state as means of maintaining social and civil order. The African
colony was established and maintained by force and violence through locally stationed
foreign military and police forces to ensure social order and compliance with the system
of colonial exploitation. Likewise, in the African state, civil and social order is largely
maintained and enforced via military and police forces that are the ultimate guarantors of
political power and legitimacy. The results of this policy have been a reinforcing of
ongoing sociopolitical and civil instability and disproportionate expenditure on military
and police forces.
Leadership Style/Type Characteristics:
The leadership style type characteristics overwhelmingly exhibited by the
pathofunctional and protofunctional states of sub-Saharan Africa are neopatrimonialism,
authoritarianism (survivalist), and neocolonialism. These traits are often veiled and
presented under a façade of pseudo-democracy and liberal democratic-style institutions.76
76Asamoa, 108-Hi.
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Contemporary African styles of political leadership are generally the collective
product of the people’s precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial experience. Their
leadership values reflect an aggregation of the social values accumulated over those
periods.77 The marginalization of traditional authorities and institutions and introduction
of foreign institutions within an artificial multinational state have produced forms of
leadership prone to corruption and inefficiency. The integration ofAfrican political
cultures into western political and economic institutions in a postcolonial setting has been
neither perfect nor seamless. Most African governments have been unable to secure an
efficient mode of operation 50 years after independence. African leadership has acted as
the central institution facilitating dependence, underdevelopment, and neocolonialism in
the state.
The African state has historically suffered from institutional culture clashes based
on incongruence between the values required for the institutions to function and the
values of the states utilizing them. On the African continent, it has ultimately led to a
zero-sum interpretation of the democratic political process, bureaucratic inefficiency, and
the large-scale absence of fmancial and economic transparency referred to as
corruption.78
The African state suffers from a general zero-sum interpretation of modern state
governing institutions closely linked to the multiethnic and multinational makeup of the
state. Within the democratic political process, party politics and elections are viewed as
competitions between diverse interest groups for control of state resources to be directed
~ Kebonang, 5-6. Asamoa, 7.
78 Ansamoa, 3-5.
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primarily to the winning group. State resources are to be redirected from the national
interest to the interests of individuals and specific groups at the expense of the livelihood
and welfare of the entire state.
The zero-sum game of domestic politics fosters broad ethnic and class group
insecurity within the state as each group faces a security dilemma with the continual
possibility of being excluded from access to political power. For each group, exclusion
from executive political power is accompanied by the ongoing possibility of being
deprived of access to state resources and subject to state-sponsored suppression. The
result has been a situation in which these longstanding and reinforced collective factors
and attitudes inhibit the development of the collective identity necessary to implement
policies founded on the principles of collective state security found in hypofunctional
states and above.
Authoritarianism (Survivalist)
The first general attribute of African state leadership from which its other
leadership characteristics are enabled is authoritarianism. Authoritarian government in
the African state is characterized by the central weighting of power into the executive
offices of government with little or no institutional checks and balances on executive
power. The internal politics of the African state have been defmed by struggles to control
the executive office, as control of the executive grants leadership and its accompanying
interest groups unfettered access to state resources and the international community. ~
The first independent African governments assumed power through relatively
~ Kebonang, 8.
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democratic elections but were quickly superseded by one-party authoritarian states. The
justifications given for this transition were made in relation to the postcolonial state’s
territorial boundaries, multiethnic composition, and goals of development.80 Based on
the multiethnic composition of the state, single-party systems of an authoritarian
character were theoretically thought more suitable to addressing the nation- and state-
building challenges of the postcolonial state. Multiparty democratic systems of rule were
thought to lead to the fracturing of the state along tribal and ethnic lines and to encourage
dissent.
Across the African continent, one-party centralized states took root in which
political opposition and dissent were outlawed. In this process, the leaders of the African
state rhetorically claimed to be primarily concerned with development, linking one-party
rule to the idea of national unity. Development efforts were theorized to require a unified
political base, and multiparty democratic systems opened the door for opposition.
Development goals were used to further justify the centralizing of power in the executive
and to eliminate governmental checks on executive power. From the centralizing of
power in the executive and a single party, the expansion of state activity in the economic
field was then justified based on the weakness of the indigenous private sector. Based on
this weakness, African leaders justified the need to centralize state power and grant a few
individuals the authority to pursue the state’s development agenda through unrestricted
access to state resources and their allocation.8’
80 Kebonang, 4-5.
~ Kebonang, 4, 5, 8.
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However, most African governments did not pursue effective development
strategies or any strategy at all but repeatedly fell into a pattern of self-aggrandizement
and corruption. Due to the constant ineffectiveness of government and the general
authoritarian character of African governments, regime survival above good governance
became a key fixture of African government. The military, as the state’s most physically
powerful and mobilized institution, was utilized to maintain the power of the executive in
the emerging authoritanan regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. Access to the military more
than popular legitimacy became the means ofjustifying and maintaining the positions of
state leaders and maintaining an authoritarian government.82 The international relations
of the state became a tool to ensure regime security by making alliances and bilateral or
multilateral agreements that maintained the regime in power. 83
Contemporarily, the authoritarian character of the African state has been masked
by a façade of pseudo-democracy practiced among pathofunctional and protofunctional
African states. These states have a system of elections inclusive of opposition parties and
occasional international observers. However, the elections are often flawed and the
opposition subject to massive intimidation and marginalization. The realities of
governance in pathofunctional and protofunctional states revolve minimally around
democratic processes, institutions, and accountability and to a great extent around
neopatrimonial principles enacted in an authoritarian manner.84
82 McGowan, 237-238.
~ Taylor, 415.
84 Jennifer Widner, “Africa’s Democratization: A Work in Progress” Current History: A Journal of
Contemporary World Affairs vol. 104, No 682 (May 2006) : 220-221.
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Neopatrimonialism
The second leadership style characteristic shared by a majority ofAfrican states is
neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonial rule is the dominant political paradigm informing the
leadership and governing practices of the African state in the postcolonial era.
Neopatrimonialism emerged within the context of the centralization of political power
and entrenchment of authoritarianism in the African state. The departure from initial
attempts at democratic rule and the minimization of opposition essentially legitimized an
African patrimonial power structure founded on a system of presidential and clientelist
relations.85
Government in the independent African state blended elements of patrimonial
traditional rule with features of a bureaucratic model of government. In African
neopatrimonial systems, the right to rule is ascribed to an individual as opposed to an
office. The formal political administration and offices are operationalized as a chain of
dense networks of dependent relationships where governing officials maintain networks
of reciprocal reinforcement with their subordinates and superiors in order to meet their
individual interests. The African neopatrimonial system is headed by a “strong-man” or
“big-man” leader occupying the executive office, from which he dominates the state
without accountability to legislative and judicial laws and rules.86
Like authoritarianism, this neopatrimonial system of governance in the African




agreements with international institutions and hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and
hypofunctional states. They continue to maintain these strong-man leaders by continually
granting them international aid and support. Neopatrimonial leaders in Africa have most
often been deposed by military or political coups that reestablish a similar system upon
the change of leadership. They otherwise have historically retained power over the long
term through militaristic means and repression. However, in the post-9/l 1 era, increasmg
international pressure has been brought to bear on several African leaders to adhere to
democratic and constitutional processes in transitioning their states from multiple decades
of rule by single dictators.
Neocolonialism
Just as systems of neopatrimonial rule in the African state have been enabled by
the centralized authoritarian character of government, authoritarianism and
neopatrimonialism have facilitated neocolonial international relationships to take root on
the continent. As a result, in several states, primarily those of Francophone Africa,
neocolonial rule is the dominant leadership attribute. Numerous leaders in states such as
Chad and Congo Brazzaville have ruled in the neocolonial interests of their former
colonizing state of France.87 France or another external power maintains the neocolonial
leader’s political power and position in office in exchange for the executive carrying out
its neocolonial mandate. In the case of Francophone West Africa, there has been
historical difficulty in breaking from the neocolonial relationship with France. France
underwrites the currency of the subregional grouping, maintains advanced security
87 This study interprets Kwame N’Krumah’s “Neo-Colonialism” not only in political econom
development, and IR terms, but also as a type or style of state leadership.
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treaties with most of the states, and most often is the chief trading partner of its former
West and Central African colonies.88 Jirespective of the manner in which they come to
power or maintain their rulership, neocolonial leaders govern according to the dictates of
their former colonizer or other external power.
Perception/Woridview Characteristics
In the post-Cold War era, the general worldview and perception of
pathofunctional states in Africa have been dominated by two distinct characteristics: an
absence of concrete defmition and loose articulation, and a donor-recipient view within
the context of a polar-satellite division of the international environment.89 The dominant
ideas informing or comprising the African state’s woridview were more clearly
articulated and identifiable during the Cold War period than in the post-Cold War era.
Due to the predominance of ideology, there was considerable ease in identifying the
woridviews of the newly independent African states on either side of the east—west
divide. The Cold War informed the dominant ideas upon which the many woridviews
across the continent were based. The most important and prevalent of these included
western capitalism, eastern communism and socialism, pan-Africanism and Affican
unity, European neocolonialism, Islamic pan-Arabism, and global non-alignment.
88 Individual couniry statistics show France to be the major import partner of a majority of its former
West and Central African colonies. CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].
89 In reviewing the literature and numerous country overviews of the African region, great difficulties
were found in identifying succinct stated or implied woridviews in the official documentation or rhetoric of
most African states in the post-Cold War era. As a result, there was great difficulty identifying a general
commonality among the worldviews of African states. This absence of clarity was identified as a
worldview in and of itself. Further, based on the similar experience of underdevelopment region-wide and
the massive amounts of aid funneled to the region, the donor-recipient worldview has been introduced by
the researcher. In the view of the researcher, these two concepts best represent the worldview of a majority
of continental African states.
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Most African states aligned themselves with either the United States and the west
according to a capitalist and neocolonial ideology (Nigeria, Zaire, Ivory Coast); with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc according to a socialist/communist ideology (Angola,
Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia); or according to a pan-Arab ideology (Chad, Djibouti,
Mauritania, Sudan, Somalia). The former Portuguese colonies upon independence were
predisposed to socialism and communism during their independence struggle, whereas
the major states of the horn of Africa eventually chose a relationship with the Soviet
superpower without neocolonial alliances. Sub-Saharan states with significantly large
Arab and Islamic populations (Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Sudan, Somalia)
expressed or pursued solidarity with the states ofNorth Africa and the Middle East. They
interpreted issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as conflicts between Islam and
the west as opposed to isolated regional events. For other groups of states, nonalignment
was central to their foreign policy and development strategies.9°
Kwame Nlcrumah’s Ghana, Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania, and Sekou Toure’s Guinea
at different periods during the Cold War all sought a policy of nonalignment, opting
instead for some regional or subregional form ofpan-Africanism (African Unity). Ghana
sought to play both sides of the global ideological war between the United States and
Soviet Union to quickly build necessary infrastructure and industrialize the state. Other
states espoused a distinct neocolonial view, seeing their development and survival as
intrinsically hinged on a close relationship with the former colonizer. African states such
as Ivory Coast and Congo Brazzaville subscribed to an overwhelmingly neocolonial
90 Olatunde, Ojo and D.K. Orwa, and C. M. B. Utete, 73-80.
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view, perceiving their future as inherently linked to France.
Loosely Defined/Unarticulated:
Contemporarily, there is much difficulty in identifying and isolating what
comprises African state worldviews. The post-Cold War worldview of a majority of
African states has not been clearly defined or articulated in succinct terms by the state’s
governing bodies in domestic politics or foreign policy. One of the key features
distinguishing hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and hypofunctional states from all other
state types is a well defmed and articulated worldview entailing present and future
preferences for state and international order. Pathofunctional, protofunctional, and
neutrofunctional states generally do not entail or espouse greatly detailed worldviews or
environmental preferences.
The challenge of defmition and articulation is further compounded by the
challenge of distinguishing between the ideas, views, and preferences of African
government and foreign policy elites and those of the continent’s masses. African leaders
and governing officials are often leery of articulating a worldview inconsistent with
domestic public opinion, international liberal conceptions of morality, and anti-imperial
sentiment throughout the continent. As such, states with highly neocolonial views in
particular have generally not espoused those views publicly in domestic or international
forums. There has also been an absence of data on the post-Cold War worldview of the
masses in most African states, consistent with the general absence of a thriving civil
society expressing its views across the region.9’
~ There was great difficulty in finding literature on the woridview and general preferences of the
masses of African states.
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Donor-Recipient
However, there is a common thread in perception among the states of sub-Saharan
Africa concerning the reality of the underdevelopment of the region and the historical
lack of indigenous capacity to address this development problem. International aid and
development support has been repeatedly sought after as a foreign policy objective for all
sub-Saharan African countries save South Africa in the post-independence era.92 All of
these countries, currently or in the past, have been indebted to international financial
institutions and developed or developing states. A donor-recipient view of the
international environment has informed the views of the African state since
independence, acting as one of the major deciding factors in the sides taken in the Cold
War, the pursuit of neocolonial relationships, and post-Cold War economic
liberalization.93 Sources of donations are found primarily among hyperfunctional,
equifunctional, and hypofunctional states and international fmancial institutions. The
objective of the African state as an undeveloped dysfunctional state is to seek assistance
from developed and more functional states as a means to functionalize itself. Aid to the
African region has grown exponentially since the 1970s, and the region’s states are slated
to require greater aid in the second decade of the new millennium.
The Minority: Protofunctional States
Chad, Central African Republic, Guinea, Niger, Democratic Republic ofCongo, Sudan,
~ Olatunde, Ojo and D.K. Orwa, and C. M. B. Utete, 96-101.
~ The donor-recipient worldview has been introduced by the researcher as a general woridview among
states within the region. This view, in the view of the researcher, best represents the woridview of a
majority of continental African states, as they are generally underdeveloped and have all been ongoing




Characteristics — Realist: weak. Liberal: marginal. mt. Class: peripheral, dependent,
underdeveloped, neocolonial. Structure andfunction: dysfunctional and structurally
dependent. Leadership type: authoritarian survivalist, neopatrimonial, neocolonial,
matrimonial. Perception/Worldview: national, satellite, racial, tribal, clan, religious,
neocolonial.
Currently, seven sub-Saharan African states overwhelmingly display
protofunctional characteristics consistent with other protofunctional states within the
international system. Consistent behavioral and structural characteristic patterns among
protofunctional states in Africa have been chronic budget deficits, partial absence of
governing and territorial authority, absence of infrastructural development, chronic food
insecurity, warlordism, and lawlessness. All protofunctional states in Africa are reliant
on international aid assistance for the daily operation of government. They increasingly
do not have control over considerable portions of their territory and face open rebellion,
insurgency, secession movements, and long-term civil conflict from their own
populations. Each faces chronic food insecurity, experiencing major famine and crop
failure every couple of years, requiring constant food aid.
Although sharing many of the dominant characteristics of pathofunctional states,
protofunctional states are in constant danger of further regressing to a neutrofunctional
stage. They are structurally fragile to the degree that any major internal or external
trauma to the state (famine, civil war, regional conflict, refugee influx, sanctions, natural
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disasters, global economic downturn) without external assistance will plunge the state
into a neutrofunctional stage of functionality. Protofunctional states in Africa are further
distinguished from pathofunctional states by a greater degree of neocolonialism or an
extreme reaction against neocolonialism that dominates their leadership and woridview
Most governments in protofunctional African states serve largely as go-betweens for the
extraction of state resources by multinational companies and governments of
equifunctional and hyperfunctional states. A select few others such as Zimbabwe have
taken extreme positions against neocolonialism and international institutional
subordination. As a result, the state is sufficiently at odds with many of the system’s
most powerful actors facing international pressure geared towards collapsing its
leadership.
With the exceptions of the per capita incomes of Sudan ($2300.00) and Chad
($1900.00), economically protofunctional states in Africa all fall into the lower income
bracket of formal sector employment. Protofunctional states have average incomes of
$1000.00 and below. With the exceptions of Zimbabwe (95%), Sudan (18.7%), and
Central African Republic (8%), protofUnctional African states do not maintain formal
statistical records of the state’s unemployment average. The average percentage of the
population below the poverty line in these states is 65%, with Chad being the extreme
case with 80% of the population in poverty. The top 10% of the population accounts for
an average of 36% of resource consumption and consumer spending in those countries.
They generally are running high trade deficits and public debt averaging 8.84 billion U.S.
dollars, with Zimbabwe being the extreme case with public debt at 282.6% of GDP.
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Protofunctional states in Africa have widely varying populations, with Chad at the low
extreme of 4.5 million people and the Democratic Republic of Congo at the high extreme
of 68.7 million. 94Their United Nations Human Development Index scores are all below
0.46 in the low human development category.95 Each of these protofunctional states has
been cited multiple times on the Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace failed state indexes
between 2001 and 2009.96 This low rate of general human development teamed with low
per-capita income across states with significantly differing populations and resource
bases indicates that the quality of governance as opposed to income is the basis for these
states’ intense degrees of state dysfunctionality.
The Exceptions: Hypofunctional States — South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles
(3 states)
Characteristics — Realist: ascendingpowers, middle-range powers, regional powers,
minorpowers. Liberal: emerging markets. mt. Class: semi-peripheral, developing.
Structure andfunction: dysfunctional and structurally independent, functional and
structurally dependent. Leadership Type/Style: democratic leadership.
Perception/Worldview: regional, multipolar.
~ These figures were calculated by the researcher based on individual country figures taken from the
CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].
~ These figures were calculated by the researcher based on individual country figures taken from the
United Nations Human Development Report. Human Development Report 2009.
96 Failed States Index (2000-2010). Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, Washington, DC,
www.foreignpo1icy.com/articles/20 10/06/21/201 0_failed_states_index_interactive map and rankings.[[ac
cessed May 1, 2010].
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South Africa
South Africa is the only continental sub-Saharan state overwhelmingly displaying
hypofunctional characteristics comparable to those of other hypofunctional states within
the international system. Economically, South Africa has a per-capita income of
$10,300.00, an unemployment rate of 20%, 50% of the population below the poverty line,
an ongoing trade deficit, and public debt averaging 29.5% GDP.97 South Africa’s Human
Development Index score of 0.683 places the state in the medium human development
category.98 South Africa has a large population of 49.05 million, of which 79% are black
Africans. Even though classified as a hypofunctional state, South Africa shares notable
population and historical parallels with other states in the Southern African region.
Post-apartheid South Africa holds a unique position in sub-Saharan Africa and the
world, being a higher capacity industrial state than most states in Africa, Latin America,
the Caribbean, the Middle East, and South Asia. Its worldview has been clearly defmed
and articulated both nationally and globally, entailing a primary regional focus and
secondary global focus. Its first three post-apartheid presidents and their administrations
assumed that post-apartheid South Africa would play the role of de facto leader of the
African continent based on its material capability and moral transformation and transition
to democratic government. South Africa moved from a racially dominated woridview to
a complex mix of neoliberal and realist views reflective of the post-Cold War world.99
~ These figures are drawn from figures taken from the CIA World Factbook. CIA World Factbook.
[accessed May 1, 2010].
98 These figures are drawn from the United Nations Human Development Report. Human Development
Report 2009.
~ Le Pere, 283, 286, 289.
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The post-apartheid administrations established and maintained the goals of attaining a
middle power, middle income, upper second tier state status in the political and economic
hierarchy of states of the international system by the first third of the second millennium.
They assumed the position that the goals within that worldview ultimately could not be
realized apart from the aggregate development of the region as a whole.’°° This
woridview dynamically affected the leadership style of post-apartheid South Africa,
which was firmly rooted in democratic leadership within modern liberal institutions.
Under President Nelson Mandela, the personality of the president was initially extremely
pervasive in policy formulation, but under the presidencies of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob
Zuma, democratic state decision-making became decidedly more the product of
institutional processes.’°’
The realist characteristics influencing South Africa’s degree of functionality begin
with its traditional power position as the subregional hegemon in Southern Africa and its
regional position as one of the continent’s four most powerful states by any measure. In
the sub-Saharan African region, South Africa is the most industrialized state (limited
industrialization) with the greatest material capabilities economically and militarily.
South Africa has the largest national gross domestic product (GDP), second or third
highest continental per-capita income, and most advanced military in terms of equipment
and training.’°2 Due to the extremely limited regional diffusion of state power in post
°o Le Pere, 283, 288, 290-292.
101 Ibid., 287-288. At the time of the posting of this article, Jacob Zuma was not president, but the first
year of his presidency indicates a continuity of core policy and process from his predecessor Thebo Mbeki.
02 ClAWorid Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].
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Cold War Africa, South Africa has no military challengers in its subregion and few
possible contenders on the continent beyond Nigeria, Egypt, or possibly Ethiopia. As a
result, with no significant security challenges from other states, South Africa’s primary
mterests revolve around the establishment and maintenance of subregional and regional
peace and security as a precursor to further integrating itself and the continent into the
neoliberal structure of the global economy.’°3
Overlapping the realist characteristics in South Africa’s behavior and relations are
its structural and functional characteristics. South Africa may be considered only one of
two structurally dysfunctional but independent states in the sub-Saharan region, along
wi Botswana The state is able to sufficiently provide for the daily requirements and
necessities of the state without external assistance while at the same time absorbing the
fallouts of its dysfunctional institutions and social system. The racial legacy of apartheid
has remained within the economic structure of the state and the distribution of its
benefits. Black Africans still are greatly marginalized educationally and economically
even though they have been politically empowered within the electoral process. As a
result, among that group there is massive poverty, marginalization, and peripherality
within a state with massive industrial capacity.
The liberal characteristics in South Africa’s behavior and relations crossect the
realist factors in its international relations as South Africa’s governing officials seek to
utilize liberal economics and multilateral institutions to enhance the state’s power and
material capabilities. Its governing officials are fundamentally interested in expanding
103 Tieku, 253-255.
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South Africa’s economic base and development domestically, maintaining its subregional
position as economic and security hub, encouraging foreign direct investment in the
continent, and further integrating post-apartheid South Africa into the global economy.
South Africa seeks to position itself as Africa’s central economic, trading, and production
hub for commodity and select capital goods. Its leadership wishes to extend South
Africa’s economic reach and influence across the content with their own investments and
extensions of regional trade. South Africa holds as a core goal the making of itself and
the African continent into attractive destinations for foreign direct investment from
industrialized and industrializing states.104
Regionally, within the parameters of institutionalism, South Africa has favored
the establishment of a four- to five-state balance of power and regional conflict
management system by which to achieve a sociopolitical environment conducive to the
growth of investment and trade. The five to seven most powerful and influential African
subregional actors within the international status quo (South Africa, Nigeria, Libya,
Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal or Ghana) would manage conflict resolution and
the promotion of peace and stability across the continent through subregional, regional,
and international institutions and organizations. South Africa would play a unique role in
this regional management system by positioning itself as the central diplomatic mediator
on the continent.’05 This role would be undertaken alongside Nigeria’s position as the
primary provider of military assistance in peacekeeping initiatives. The promotion of
104 Le Pere, 287, 292-294.
‘°~ Ibid., 287, 290.
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democratic leadership and norms, good governance, and the development of civil society
would form an intricate facet of this institutional approach to developing the region.’°6
However, within its international class characteristics, South African leadership
has adopted the position that in order for South Africa to maintain its position in the
semiperiphery and eventually move to the center, the region must aggregately develop as
a whole.’°7 Continued region-wide underdevelopment is considered a considerable
obstacle to South Africa’s upward mobility in the international status quo. South Africa
requires the upward development of its surrounding states to create larger and more
profitable markets for its consumer, capital, and primary goods and services.
The pursuit of South Africa’s class and liberal economic goals requires region-
wide interstate and domestic civil stability and cooperation to be effectively undertaken.
The magnitude of the tasks involved is sufficiently beyond the military, economic, and
political power and influence of the South African state to undertake on its own. As
such, South Africa’s leadership has sought to utilize multilateralism and institutionalism
as the central mechanisms by which to pursue its subregional, regional, and global class
interests)08 In an action of great foresight, South Africa was one of the three states at the
forefront of the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African
Union as a necessary step to accomplish South African domestic and foreign policy
goals.’°9
106 Tieku, 255.
107 Le Pere, 283, 288, 290-292.




Of African states within the Indian Ocean, there are two states overwhelmingly
displaying hypofunctional characteristics: Mauritius and Seychelles. However, these
Indian Ocean states share little similarity with a majority of continental sub-Saharan
African states, in that their ethnic and racial makeup has no similarity with continental
Africa, being 85% Asian and 75% mixed French descent, respectively. Those states also
have a colonial history and postcolonial political history that differs from those of a
majority of continental states. These states were founded on massive migration of Asian
laborers and indentured laborers to Mauritius and mass migration of French settlers and
African slaves to the uninhabited Seychelles islands. 110
Mauritius’s and the Seychelles’ human development averages, pattern ofpolitical
leadership, trends of economic development, and state behavior have greater parallels to
East Asia and Southern and Eastern Europe than to continental Africa. Economically,
these Indian Ocean African states have per-capita incomes of $13,000.00 and $20,000.00,
unemployment rates of 7.3% and 2%, and 8% and 0% of the population living below the
poverty line. They are also running high trade deficits and public debt averaging 5 8.7%
and 60.2% of GDP, respectively.” Their United Nations Human Development Index
scores are in the high human development category at 0.804 and 0.845.112 These African
states in the Indian Ocean do not share many similarities with the continental states of
110 These figures are drawn from figures taken from the CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].
CIAWorld Factbook. [accessed May 1, 20101.





Botswana, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Namibia (6 states)
-Characteristics — Realist: weak. Liberal: marginal. mt Class: perzpheral, dependent.
Structure andfunction: dependent andfunctional. Leadership type: democratic,
authoritarian moralist. Perception/Woridview: regional and national (defined and
articulated)
Sub-Saharan Africa houses a group of states displaying both pathofunctional and
hypoflinctional characteristics. Even though sharing the same realist, liberal, and partial
international class characteristics as pathofunctional states, these transitioning states share
structure and function, leadership, and perceptionlworldview characteristics with
hypofunctional states. These states are transitioning from a pathofiinctional condition
towards a hypofunctional condition as a result of policy-led growth, increasing
productivity, increasing economic diversity, infrastructural development, foreign direct
investment, new capital markets, or mineral and energy extraction.
This group of developing states has over an extended period achieved and
maintained consistent GDP and per-capita economic growth rates, stable democratic and
authoritarian transitions of political power, and moral and fiscally responsible
government. Their revenues are increasingly invested into societal development and
decreasingly siphoned off by government corruption and economic mismanagement. As
a result, these states are achieving sustained development and effectively reducing their
degree of internal dysfunction. These strides have been achieved by adaptations of moral
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leadership, institution building, fiscal responsibility, and corruption minimization within
the state.
Within transitioning African states, there is increasing complexity of institutions,
infrastructure, and intrastate relationships. Pathofunctional states and below generally do
not exhibit increasing institutional complexity but are in a stagnant or regressive
condition. By contrast, hypofunctional states and above generally display increasing
levels of functional complexity or maintenance of advanced levels of functionality.
States transitioning from a pathofunctional stage display consistent aspects of increasmg
functional complexity. These changes are rooted in policy implementation as opposed to
a lone increase in state revenues based on newly founded natural resources without
significant parallel changes in society.
Economically, in 2010, transitioning states in Africa with the exception of
Equatorial Guinea ($37,500) had formal sector per-capita incomes averaging $7700.00.
These incomes varied from $37,000.00 in Equatorial Guinea to $1500.00 in Ghana.
These transitioning states had general figures of unemployment averaging 23.6%, with
extremes of 7.5% in Botswana and 51.2% in Namibia. The average population below the
poverty line in these states was 24.1%, with extremes of 28.5% in Ghana and 55.8% in
Namibia. The top 10% of the population accounted for an average of 39.7% of resource
consumption and consumer spending in these countries. They generally were running
high trade deficits, with public debt averaging 24.46% of GDP, with extremes of 5% in
Equatorial Guinea and 53% in Namibia.
All transitioning states with the exception of Ghana (23.8 million) have relatively
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small populations under 2.2 million people.’13 The United Nations Human Development
Index scores of all of Africa’s transitioning states with the exception of Ghana (0.526) are
above 0.686, in the middle third of the medium human development category. This
medium-range quality of general human development across states with significantly
differing incomes indicates that policy implementation as opposed to new revenue
streams based on energy or mineral fmds is the basis for their increasing state
functionality. However, with the exception of Ghana, their small populations, along with
those of Mauritius and Seychelles, suggest that functional transitions in sub-Saharan
Africa are more effectively managed across states with smaller populations.
Neutrofunctional States: Somalia
(1 State)
-Characteristics — Realist: weak. Liberal: marginal. mt. Class: peripheral,
maldeveloped. Structure andfunction: structural collapse, institutionalfailure, quasi-
statism. Leadership type: warlordism, tribal, clan, religious/clerical.
Perception!Woridview: racial, tribal, clan, religious.
The African continent’s only neutrofunctional state is Somalia. Somalia is a shell
of a state whose territorial boundaries are maintained by the juridical recognition of its
neighbors and the international community. There is no effectively functioning state
apparatus, and the Somali state is absent of any formal institutional complexity. Somalia
has no centralized state institutions, no domestically recognized governing authority, and
no significant military or police forces. Stateless society in Somalia is characterized by
113 These figures were calculated by the researcher based on individual country figures taken from the
CIA World Factbook. CIAWorid Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].
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factionalism, quasi-statism, warlordism, civil conflict, chronic food insecurity, absence of
governing authority, and absence of infrastructural development. In Somalia, formal
state institutions do not exist to maintain public infrastructure, provide education, or
enforce laws.’14 Somalia is unable to police its waters to protect them from international
dumping or from local pirates. There is no formal economy to speak of, and the entire
population survives on subsistence agriculture, fishing, cattle herding, and humanitarian
aid. Crime and lawlessness are rampant within the capital, Mogadishu, and the coast and
southern countryside are unmonitored as police and military forces do not exist to police
the state. Somalia is distinguished from underdeveloped protofunctional African states
by its condition of maldevelopedment, in which development has ceased and been
reversed. The state exists in a completely dysfunctional condition, serving as a primary
agent of human insecurity for its population.”5
Somalia’s interim transitional government (the Somalia Transitional Federal
Institutions or Transitional Federal Government), inclusive of an elected president and
parliamentary body (Transitional Federal Assembly), does not formally govern Somalia
at present. Its primary function is overseeing the process of restoring the Somali state
through conducting national elections, transitioning to a representative government, and
reestablishing a new Somali constitution by 2011. Even though extremely weak, the
interim government seeks to broker lasting political agreements across Somalia and work
~ Zartman, 78-79.
Ken Menichaus, “State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts” Revie~ ofAfrican Political Econonzj
vol. 30, No. 97 (September 2003): 411-414. Somalia ranks in the low human development category but
has not been included in the United Nations Human Development Report since 2001.
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with international donors to restore governance capacity and distribute international
aid.”6
In the absence of formal state institutions, other forms of sociopolitical authority
have formed in Somalia along regional, ethnic, clan, tribal, and religious lines. Self-
sustaining quasi-state formations and warlords have arisen in the wake of state failure and
institutional collapse, taking the place of the state as a guarantor ofphysical security and
material well-being.”7 I n May 1991 in northwestern Somalia, secessionist clans declared
“Somaliland” an independent republic, while Puntland in northeastern Somalia has
existed as a semi-autonomous self-governing state since 1998. Both have maintained a
stable existence, moving towards democratic representative gove ent An insurgency
group, the Islamic Courts Union, temporarily took military control of the capital,
Mogadishu, in 2006 and was expelled by the Ethiopian military in alliance with the
Transitional Federal Government and United States in January 2007. Other insurgency
groups such as Hizbul Shabaab and the Popular Resistance Movement are Islamist
insurgency groups in Somalia. An estimated 3,000 members are conducting an
underground insurgency, with armed cells across Mogadishu conducting attacks against
the intenm government.”8
Somaliland and Puntland account for the formal sector statistics of the Somali
state, where the average per-capita income is $600. In the central and southern portions
~ CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].
117 Jutta Bakonyi and Kirsti Stuvoy, “Violence & Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia & Angola”
RevieH ofAfrican Political Economy vol. 32, No. 104/5 (Jun/Sep 2005) : 372-375.
‘~ Ibid.
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of the state, there is an absence of statistical economic data without formal state
institutions. Without the element of effective national governance, Somalia’s informal
economy continues to function based on livestock, remittance money transfer companies,
and telecommunications. Agriculture constitutes the primary sector, with livestock
averaging 40% of GDP and an excess of 50% of export earnings from trade with
Somalia’s closest regional neighbors. In the absence of a state-based judicial system, to
resolve disputes most regions of the state utilize local forms of coaflict resolution




Functional Cost: The Cost of Functionality
The development of a metafunctional analysis within this study ultimately
mdicates that there is a requisite cost, or functional cost,’ to both the presence and
absence of greater state functionality. Significant increases in degrees of functionality
within the modem state must incur a requisite cost to society, as modern states are the
product of human necessity and not naturally occurring phenomena. The natural
environment does not reproduce state organizations of any type and as a result is not
structured to cope with the ability of the modem state to physically alter the environment.
As a result, there must be a cost to be paid in varying degrees for the world being
populated by states within a global production and political system.
Functional costs include environmental destruction and degradation, political
repression, social and economic inequality, human rights constriction, and economic
underdevelopment. The greatest collective cost of increasing degrees of state
functionality has been global environmental destruction by the most functional states.
The industrial production of advanced functional states provides for the techno-industrial
needs of the entire planet but extends the environmental cost to states without the
capacity to do the same degree of environmental harm. The greatest cost of the absence




of increasing state functionality has been declining human security and survival among
less functional states. Their pattern of underdevelopment and limited societal complexity
dramatically decrease the quality of life and life expectancy within them.
In hypofunctional states and above, ongoing environmental problems are
paralleled by political and social costs. Political rights and participation may he severely
curtailed, as evidenced within the hyperfunctional Chinese state, the equifunctional state
of Singapore, and the hypofunctional states of Cuba, Libya, Iran, and Vietnam. Massive
social and econoimc inequalities may be perpetuated or exploited to achieve greater
functionality, as evidenced in the hypofunctional states of India, Indonesia, Brazil, and
South Africa. Likewise, large-scale financial debt is emerging as the major cost being
borne by states transitioning from a pathofunctional stage to the hypofunctional stage
such as Ghana and Cape Verde. In those states, development is being financed by
massive amounts of loans and international aid.
The cost of the absence of greater degrees of state complexity in pathofunctional
states and below is unmanageable degrees of state dysfunction characterized by chronic
human insecurity. Not only are political rights circumscribed along with ongoing
inequitable distributions of income, but survival prospects are extremely limited due to
fiscal irresponsibility, chronic food insecurity, health disparities, and educational
shortfalls. The state itself is a predatory entity subjecting the population to urban and
rural poverty, mass exploitation, a peasant lifestyle, and state-sponsored violence. The
populations of pathofunctional states and below are confined to a territorial space in
which their basic wants and needs cannot be met. Their interests are tertiary to those of
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the governing authorities, elites, and international interests.
The short-term social, political, and humanitarian costs of the absence of greater
state functionality at the pathofunctional level and below are significantly higher than the
short-term environmental costs associated with hypofunctional states and above. By
contrast, the long-term environmental costs of attaining greater state functionality at the
hypofunctional level and above are significantly higher than the long-term social,
political, and humanitarian costs in pathofunctional states and below. The short-term
costs to the less functional states only threaten the ongoing existence of the populations
of those states, whereas the long-term environmental costs posed by the most functional
states ultimately threaten the survival of the earth and the entire human race.
The long-term functional cost of increasing state complexity could be minimized
by simultaneously transforming production and consumption patterns to a sustainable
green environmental model and mass producing the renewable resources necessary to
maintain earth’s ecostasis. Due to the system-wide structure of the environmental ordeal,
these activities must be addressed at the international institutional level to adequately
address the problem. The avenue of market forces and regional institutional participation
has served to reduce political, social, and humanitarian costs but has failed to produce the
level of state action necessary to minimize environmental costs. The likely solution must
involve reorganizing the state system in a manner that diffuses the greatest long-term cost
to an area other than the environment. The long-term costs could possibly be diffused to
the state in terms of some loss of state sovereignty to institutional environmental
authorities within the United Nations system. In this scenario, the system and
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environment would benefit from the increased power of international institutions and
enforcement of international environmental regulations.
Ecostasis and Environmental Preservation
A metafunctional analysis dictates that state development in its current form is
inherently linked to the natural environment and earth’s ability to maintain ecostasis.
There is a consequential existential fallout to human beings when the relationship among
states, the system, and the environment is structured in a manner diffusing the greatest
cost to the environment. The relationship ultimately should be structured in an equilibrial
fashion that grants the greatest possible benefit to the state and system, at the least cost to
the environment. During the 20th century, human beings by their own means caused
greater environmental destruction and degradation to the earth than humans had in their
entire recorded history before that period. The next 100 years will more than double the
damage done to the earth as the rate and pace of population expansion, increasing life
expectancy, and expanding industrialization impose greater environmental costs on the
earth.
The evolution of human life on Planet Earth has changed the dynamic of the
earth’s equilibrial balance. Human beings are the only biological life forms that have
evolved the ability to manipulate earth’s physical resources towards the development of a
system of production not entirely dependent on natural processes. Through
mechanization, industrialization, and information technology, human beings rapidly
change and combine earth’s natural resources into necessary goods and services. The
current mode of production allows for the mass production of these goods and services in
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numbers far beyond the earth’s natural ability to produce for human consumption.
Humans have developed technology to overcome naturally occurring transportation,
environmental, and communication limitations.
Prior to the industrial era, all life on earth was subject to naturally occurring
environmental self-correcting patterns. These patterns minimized biological organisms’
ability to negatively impact earth’s ability to maintain internal equilibrium. As a result,
animal populations didn’t expand beyond earth’s natural ability to provide for their
survival needs. Human beings have evolved beyond earth’s ability to self-correct the
costs of human production and consumption patterns. As a result, humans have begun a
process of changing the structure of the ecosystem in a manner that detracts from earth’s
ability to maintain ecostasis. The current pattern of human survival is founded on the
mass consumption of renewable and nonrenewable resources fundamental to ecosystem
regeneration. No significant long-term plans have been initiated to replace or restore
those resources. Teamed with increasing water, air, and land pollution, the current
pattern of human resource use does not permit the earth to effectively recreate the
conditions necessary to maintain life in the long term.
This problem of long-term damage to the environment is arguably linked to states
and state development. The modern state has been the tool or mechanism by which
human beings have organized and maintained their present form ofproduction and
consumption. The world now exists in a global system of states and international
institutions that pollute and utilize resources at a simultaneously national and global
level. Functional states allow human beings to populate and congregate in numbers that
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place unusually high demands on earth’s natural resources. This level of strain on the
earth’s natural resources has resulted in greater human security, but at an inevitably high
environmental cost.
Even so, the pursuit of greater human security continues to drive states to choose
greater state functionality over long-term environmental security. Corrective measures
are immediately necessary in the modern production and consumption pattern to
guarantee the ongoing survival of humanity. The processes of civigenesis and ecostasis
must become mutually reinforcing to allow for the persistence of both in the future.
Human ingenuity must become a tool to ensure ongoing ecostasis as opposed to a means
of destroying it.
An Ecosocial Contract?
Afier 350 years of the modern state system and 300 years of the development and
global expansion of industrialization, ecostasis should be raised to a level of importance
paralleling the aversion of war and maintenance of peace through security alliances and a
liberal economic system. Presently, the threat to human life posed by environmental
destruction and degradation in the coming 100 years is greater than the likelihood of a
third global war between the system’s leading states. The long-term damage to the planet
from the current pattern of production and consumption will only be exceeded by the
event of regional nuclear fallout in any given period.
Due to the long-term environmental threat posed by the present mode of state
development, IR discourse must address the possibility of developing a social contract
among individuals, states, the international system, and the environment. An ecosocial
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contract akin to the social contracts of modem democracy has now become necessary to
avert the largest functional cost modern states incur to achieve greater human security.
Economic incentives, market forces, and institutional consensus have been insufficient to
bring about the requisite production and lifestyle changes on a scale necessary to avert
long-term disaster.
International-level contracts paralleling those of democratic systems of
government and capitalist trade currently exist in the system founded on reciprocity,
rationality, and security. These contracts are observable in state sovereignty regimes
(juridical recognition), trade and exchange (neoliberal economics, reciprocity),
international institutionalism (international public goods, mediation), and security
(collective security, security alliances, nonaggression pacts). Within the global economy,
states and their business entities agree to participate in the international trade system
founded on the global currency system coordinated by the International Monetary Fund.
International trade honoring trade agreements and contracts is a regular feature of the
contemporary international system, with relatively few breaks in contractual
arrangements. Most states generally adhere to regional and international nonaggression
agreements respecting the sovereignty of neighboring states. Collective security regimes
have proliferated regional organizations in the post-World War II era and have been
essential to the foundations of the United Nations system.
In consideration of the existing contractual elements present in the international
system, a number of philosophical questions must be addressed in order to build a theory
of ecosocial relations. First, is an ecosocial contract possible within an anarchical
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international environment? Can such an undertaking be accomplished in the absence of
a global government? Second, who are the parties to the contract? Will the contract be
between states and citizens, multiple states, states and the system, citizens and the
environment, states and the environment, the system and the environment, or all of the
above? Third, if the environment is a party to the agreement, who is its representative, as
it cannot speak for itself? Is the environment a victimized, damaged party that cannot
represent itself and that is in need of counsel appointed on its behalf for its protection and
repair of damages? Fourth, if international institutional consensus has failed to result in
adequate action to protect and preserve the environment, can the central institutions of the
international system be relied upon to coordinate the development and execution of such
a contract? Fifth, does an ecosocial contract need to be based on a collective security
regime, strategic alliances, or a nonaggression pact? Is it necessary to elevate
environmental preservation to the level of security in international affairs? Sixth, under
an ecosocial contract, to whom are individuals, states, and businesses responsible: state
government, other states, or international institutions? Seventh, what would be the
consequence for breaking the terms of the contract? Are sanctions on regimes sufficient
to deter and punish environmental breaches, or does the threat of military force need to be
a critical aspect of environmental enforcement? Would the International Court of Justice
provide an applicable model of accountability for the breaking of international laws and
contracts, or do the World Trade Organization and United Nations Security Council
provide a better alternative to resolving environmental disputes? In each of these
scenarios, what would constitute international environmental justice, and how should it
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be conceptualized?
As the number of advanced functional states increases and the damage to the
environment accelerates towards an irreversible stage, these questions must be addressed
in order to resolve the long-term destruction of the global ecosystem. This study does not
attempt to answer these questions but suggests ideas that should inform environmental
questions as primary in JR discourse. Before the earth passes a stage of irreparable
damage, a mechanism must be found by which to elevate environmental questions to the
level of the most pressing security and economic issues taking precedence in international
institutions. It is perceivable that in addressing environmental questions, solutions to
numerous other intractable problems and issues will also be found.
Functional Governance
The ultimate shortcoming of metafunctionalism is its failure to generally explain
the development and occurrence of functional governance. Functional governance
describes the leadership and government practices facilitating long-term increases in state
functionality to the hypofunctional level and above.2 Metafunctionalism categorizes the
different levels of state functionality without a complete explanation of how the
governance aspect of functional transitions comes into being. The elements of functional
governance historically displayed across the international system to date have been fiscal
responsibility, strategic vision, long-term planning, and the desire to increase human
security and quality of life within the state. Functional governance may be observed
from transitioning to hyperfunctional states and across governments from democracy to
2 This term was developed and introduced by the researcher.
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authoritarianism. There is no ideal type of government more conducive or fitted to the
practice of functional governance than any other at this point in history. Functional
governance has historically been achieved utilizing monarchies, democracy, socialism,
communism, authoritarianism, and military government. An adherence to the principles
and replication of the characteristics of functional governance in any form of government
are sufficient to bring it into existence and practice.
Functional governance is a necessary prerequisite to the state transitioning
upwards from a pathofunctional or lower stage of development to a more advanced level
of functionality. Without the element of functional governance, the state will
immediately stagnate or regress regardless of the functional category it falls within.
Metafunctionalism fails to generally explain how functional governance forms within
society and government due to the limitations of its philosophical assumptions. The
factors revolving around functional governance in the modern era appear to be
dynamically rooted and linked to the values, history, culture, and geography of the
population under consideration. By contrast, metafunctionalism is philosophically rooted
in functionalism and evolution. Functional governance is merely regarded as a necessary
adaptation for survival in which individuals perceive their survival prospects to be greater
within the general benefit of a group than individually. They make short-term sacrifices
of individual sovereignty and material gain for the long-term survival of the population.
Functional governance evolves as a tool by which to achieve order among group
members and direct their collective survival pattern.
However, the complexity of societal institutions and tendencies towards
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competition, cooperation, and specialization cannot fully account for the development of
functional governance. Metafunctionalism’s linear explanation does not address the
value, culture, history, and geographical factors identified as central to state development
within comparative politics. The Confucian ethic, Protestant ethic, Islamism, feudalism,
nationalism, tribalism, colonialism, and dialectical materialism have all been cited as key
factors in state and societal development. Neither evolution nor functionalism has
refuted the validity of these factors and provides no alternative explanation for their role
or existence. As a result, metafunctionalism is unable to make prescriptions for the state
as to how to achieve functional governance. When one is analyzing the African state,
this is a significant shortcoming because leadership and quality of governance have been
primary obstacles to state development. For African states to progress, a prescription for
the development of functional governance must be presented by which to overcome the
region’s functional deficit.
Metafunctional Recommendations for African States
Based on the long- and short-term costs associated with the present
developmental pattern of advanced functional states, African states should seek to
fiinctionalize through a different pattern than those pursued in North America and
Europe. Japan, East Asia, and China have all followed a similar pattern of development
as North America and Europe, incurring the same environmental costs. The goal of
African states should be to functionalize in a manner that bears a different or less
destructive functional cost to the state, system, and environment.
Cost-efficient environmental technology was not widely available at the close of
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WWII as a tool for state development. Presently, incremental environmental measures
have been placed on the international institutional agenda, and green technology is being
produced at an increasingly cost-effective rate. African states have the opportunity to
build from scratch modern, environmentally efficient states utilizing green technology
from advanced functional states.
As an overwhelmingly underdeveloped pathofunctional region, sub-Saharan
Africa it is not confined by the same transitional environmental constraints on
development as established hypofunctional, equifimctional, and hyperfunctional states.
African traditional society is arguably closer to the modern concept of a green society
than is industrial society. Traditional society does not entail a lifestyle or population
numbers imposing massive strains on natural resources or the environment. Traditional
society incurs relatively insignificant environmental costs when measured against
industrial societies. It is plausible to assume that African states could leapfrog the
industrial stage of development to a lower cost green environmental stage.
African states have the opportunity to chart a different and more cost-efficient
path to greater state functionality through the building of green societies. Green societies
are Africa’s most feasible alternative to industrialization and should become the basis for
the region’s long-term sustainable development. The building of modem green societies
in Africa should be modeled on a low-cost, moderate consumption pattern paralleling
rural and village life. The strongest positive elements of the existing lifestyle should be
merged with green technology to create a new pattern of living. African society has
survived for centuries on a low-density, small-housing, low-consumption lifestyle within
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a largely informal economy. These characteristics easily blend with modem conceptions
of a green lifestyle and technology. The product of such a merger will be a unique
modernity based on the modernization of the village concept that has existed for
centuries. The pursuit of this model of development should be the basis for
functionalizing the African state beyond a pathofunctional stage to the hypofunctional
level and above.
There is no model of government or ideal state type upon which to build a modern
green society. The only prerequisite is responsible moral government dedicated to
environmental sustainable development. The same government and leadership factors
constraining the development prospects for an industrial state in Africa would constrain
any efforts at developing a green society. Once the African region begins to address its




At the opening of this study, it was hypothesized that a metatheoretical approach
was necessary to describe the changes that have occurred in African state behavior and
relations over the past twenty years. A metatheoretical framework was thought necessary
to include system and state variables as dual primary determinants of state behavior. At
its close, this study concludes that the metatheoretical approach grants an inherently more
descriptive means of analyzing state behavior and relations than the previous general-
theory approach. By incorporating aspects of the major conventional theories of IR and
comparative politics, a metatheory grants a broader base of possible description than any
of the theories upon which it is built. As a result, its description and analysis carry a
higher degree of detail that grant greater accuracy in identifying the basis for state
behavior. Only international class theory begins to approach the level of broad
description and detail provided by the metatheoretical approach due to its large number
of variants.
The metatheoretical approach is today of inherently greater utility than previous
approaches due to the evolution of the importance of liberal economic power and the
environment in the post Cold War period. Its greatest inherent value is derived from its
consolidation of mainstream approaches, centralizing information in a manner reducing
the possibility of extreme dogmatic positions towards any one theory. The
metatheoretical approach necessitates a balanced and holistic approach to the study of
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African politics and IR. Within the greater descriptive detail of this type of framework,
the African state may be described and categorized more accurately than it has been by
attempts to theorize it in the past.
In building a metatheory of state behavior and relations, this study regards the
relative degree of state functionality as a characteristically inclusive measure of the
determinants in the state’s behavior and relations. The relative degree of state
functionality is in turn a product of the collective forces of evolution at the societal level.
Metafunctionalism is therefore founded on the wedding of a modified functionalism to
the collective processes of evolution, linking realism, liberalism, neomarxism, and
structural functionalism in a theoretical combine.
Metafunctionalism dictates that the purpose of the state is to ensure the greater
survival of its population by enhancing the state’s level of functionality. The state
increases the level of human security within it by enhancing the degree of complexity of
its institutions, infrastructure, territory, and institutional relationships. Metafimctionalism
prescribes that state behavior should be dictated by the pursuit of greater functionality
and human security over all other goals. War, international cooperation, human rights,
regional integration, regulation, and trade should only be pursued if they enhance the
degree of state functionality.
Evaluation
Evaluation of any new social theory at the state and system level immediately
faces the challenge of time and consensus. Verification and predictive capacity regarding
state and system behavior have the challenge of case studies to be completed and elapsed
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time for future events to occur. Judgments based on time-sensitive criteria would require
making a prediction about a given circumstance and waiting for an undefined period to
evaluate those claims. That undefined period is beyond the parameters and scope of this
study. The challenge of time as related to awareness of new theory is ever present among
the academic community within which consensus must be built for or against the theory.
Based on these limitations imposed by time, predictive capacity will not be a measure by
which theory is judged. An explanation or application of statistical data will also not be
considered in the evaluation due to this study not being based on quantitative analysis.
However, some criteria must be presented by which to evaluate the metatheory in
its completed stage. Metafunctionalism in this instance will be evaluated on its structure
and application, as well as the plausibility of claims regarding the topic area. The theory
will be practically judged on how closely it parallels existing formal and informal system
and state structures, describes system and state characteristics, explains system and unit
behavior, creates a logical chronology of international events and processes, and justifies
its philosophical background. Metafunctionalism will also be judged by the degree of
effectiveness through which it combines theory and negates possible inter-theory
contradictions.
System and State Characteristic Parallels to Empirical Reality
Metafunctionalism was designed to parallel the official and unofficial system-unit
structures of the international system. These parallels are generally acknowledged
throughout IR literature and are at the same time obvious in a structured observation of
the international environment. Metafunctionalism begins with recognition of the global
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ecological system and its primary importance in IR. Only within the past fifteen years
has the global ecological system gained significant recognition within IR discourse.
Attention to its importance has been acknowledged within metafunctionalism paralleling
its new recognition within IR. Thereafter, metafunctionalism assumes the existence of a
political and economic international system composed of state base units along with a
host of nonstate actors. Paralleling liberalism, state base units are considered to be
generally rational actors based on the pursuit of their national interests. Just as in the
marketplace, self-interest takes precedence in the international system as states pursue
greater economic and physical security. The United Nations, Bretton Woods institutions,
and World Trade Organization are acknowledged within metafunctionalism as the formal
institutional organization of the international system.
Metafunctionalism’s deviation from conventional theory lies in the structure of
the state base units and assumptions regarding the basis for their behavior. It is generally
acknowledged within IR literature that states as like units house significant differences in
structure, behavior, rationality, and decision making. Distinctions are regularly made in
realism, liberalism, and international class theory between categories of states as
powerful, weak, first world, third world, most developed, least developed, core,
semiperipheral, and peripheral. Likewise, within this study, states are understood to
share general characteristics and are distinguished by the degree of characteristics
displayed. States are in turn categorized by similarities in the degrees of character traits
displayed. This method of classification and categorization is consistent with the method
utilized in realism, liberalism, and international class theory.
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Metafunctionalism acknowledges nation-states as the most dominant actors in the
system but recognizes a second form of state existing beside them. At least a quarter of
all existing states do not characteristically fit into the category of nation-state according
to Westphalian definitions. Based on their shared characteristics, this form of state has
been designated as the artificial multinational state. This difference in state form has
been generally acknowledged in both IR and African politics, but without a general
designation or state classification. In analyses of the African state, there is great
impracticality in continuing the assumption of general Westphalian sovereignty when the
reality of the region invalidates such a claim.
Metafunctionalism also significantly deviates from common assumptions
regarding the purpose of the state, regarding it as a tool of evolution humans have
developed to enhance their survival prospects. Such a claim is highly plausible,
considering the parallels between historic increases in life expectancy, population
expansion, economic expansion, and expansion of states during the 20th century. In the
20th century, humans achieved the highest life expectancy and population expansion in
the world’s history. During the same period, the number of states in the international
system more than quadrupled as the world experienced the greatest economic expansion
in history. These parallels indicate social evolution where socioeconomic changes have
dramatically improved human security and survival prospects.
Metafunctionalism also significantly deviates from conventional theory in its
basis for system change and transition. Stemming from its evolution-based philosophical
roots, metafunctionalism does not accept the general view that events of international
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order occur at random according to a theory of chaos. Rather, system order and change
are the products of a chronological pattern of events linked to the tangible and intangible
characteristics of the system. The principles of biological life and universal organization
suggest that both complex and simple systems come into being as products ofpurposeful
chronological events and processes. This principle holds true in the social world, where
the evolution of the international system has an ultimately mappable pattern. This
method of mapping system change parallels the process of genome mapping developed
within genetics. In this study, the system’s mappable characteristics have been identified
and presented in a logical chronology of events along with broad predictions of future
changes. This approach significantly deviates from mainstream IR theory and will
require a significant period of time to gain consensus on its validity.
Metafunctionalism further deviates from conventional theory in its identification
of the anarchical structure of international order as a hierarchically experienced
phenomenon. The weakest states in the system are more highly subject to regimes of
global governance and regulation than the most powerful states. Based on the
characteristics and position of the state within the international system, the degree of
anarchy it experiences varies. General observations of the structure of the United Nations
system, Bretton Woods fmancial institutions, and global economy justify the assertion
that weak states are more highly subject to the rules and regulations of international order
than powerful and influential states. The permanent seats of the UN Security Council,
distribution of votes and exchange capacity in the IMF, breakdown of trade talks within
the WTO, and nuclear nonproliferation regimes all illustrate the international hierarchy
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existing among the system’s states.
Weak states must act within the confines and parameters of a system they did not
establish and do not maintain. In order to participate, they must follow the rules or seek
to establish their own system. The cost and consequences for not following established
rules and norms are significantly higher for weaker states than for the most powerful
states. In the post-World War II international system, there have been no significant
disciplinary measures against great powers or superpowers for not following the rules,
whereas weaker states such as Iraq, Panama, Syria, Iran, and Libya have all been
significantly punished for seeking to assert their autonomy.
The global diffusion of international manufacturing and industry worldwide
versus single- or dual-commodity exports and oil extraction further indicates the
economic stratification of the global economy. Perhaps the strongest evidence for the
existence of hierarchical anarchy is international aid dependency. Weak and poorer
states require the aid of more developed states and institutions for their daily survival but
are subject to the dictates of donors to receive it.
Logical Chronology of International Events and Processes
In creating a logical chronology of events, metafunctionalism’s basis for system
and state advancement throughout history afready paralleled the most important
principles of process and change generally accepted within conventional IR theory. Its
assertion that state behavior and system process are driven by evolutionary factors of
competition, cooperation, and specialization is already existent within realism’s power
and security competitions, liberalism’s economic and institutional cooperation, and
279
international class theory’s production stratification principles. For over 100 years, these
theories have asserted that each of these principles govern international order.
Metafunctionalism’s concept of civigenesis merely suggests that these principles are
occurring simultaneously yet chronologically towards ensuring human survival
Where metafunctionalism is unique is in its suggestion that each major
advancement in the international environment is by necessity based on the principle of
functional causality. The process by which competition is eventually superseded by
cooperation, and cooperation is eventually enhanced through specialization, is based on
the utility of each in increasing human security. Once the governing principle fails to
ant efficient results a transition is made to a more efficient mode of operation. The
formulation of system and state chronology based on the principle of functional causality
is directly patterned after methods in evolutionary biology. The principle of functional
causality has been accepted as feasible within the hard sciences and carries the same
validity within the social sciences.
Quality of Theoretical Structure and Combine
At the opening of this study, dual nonhierarchical determinants were stated as
essential to describing state behavior and relations in the post-Cold War era. African
state behavior could no longer be categorized based on a single determinant such as
power, interdependence, or class, because each of these factors had evolved as core
aspects of the post-Cold War international system. The question remained as to how to
simultaneously utilize each within a metatheory without intertheory contradictions. This
goal was achieved within metafunctionalism through the structuring of its categorization
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and descriptive system to reflect both system and state variables. From the multiple
theories housed in the metatheory, a broad base of system and state determinants could be
built by which to describe the state. These include power, institutionalism,
interdependence, hierarchy, stratification, structural and functional dependence and
independence, woridview/perception, and leadership type/style. Based on the
combinations of characteristic variations displayed across the system, a number of
categories could be formulated by which to describe general patterns of state behavior
and structure. By design, every category of state within metafunctionalism immediately
describes both system and state determinants. In building this unique system of
categorization the objective of theoretical consolidation was achieved within this study.
However, it is important to note that there were distinct challenges in attempting
to create a region-specific categorization. Ultimately, this study concluded that a valid
theory of state behavior and relations could not be based on the African state and region
in isolation. An isolated regional approach could not be successfully pursued because of
the necessity for relative characteristic comparisons within a system-unit descriptive
system. A theory of state behavior and relations within an international system required a
general description of unit characteristics that could be categorized by the degree of those
characteristics displayed among like units. IR and comparative politics theories required
a system-wide comparative element to distinguish between the degrees of general
characteristics shared by African states and the degrees of those same characteristics
displayed across the system. Without this relative comparative element,
metafunctionalism could not be a valid theory of either discipline. As a region-specific
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theory, it would fundamentally assume that all the characteristics it identifies are unique
to sub-Saharan Africa. Similar characteristics displayed by other states in the system
invalidate that assumption and the region-specific approach.
As a result, metafunctionalism had to be structured as a system-wide general
theory in similarity to realism, liberalism, and international class theory. However, it is
significantly differentiated from those theories by its multideterminantlmultitheory
metatheoretical approach. Metafunctionalism is categorized as both a comparative and
JR theory based on its strong comparative elements and focus on system structure and
relations.
Challenges of Philosophical Preference
The most difficult justification for the validity of metafunctionalism is its
philosophical preference for evolution as the basis for a metatheory of state behavior and
relations. The choice of evolution over other philosophical positions is ultimately the
normative preference of the researcher. Enhancing human survival prospects through
competition, cooperation, and specialization presented the most feasible means to address
behavioral and structural questions within this research model. Evolution was the only
theory available having a broad enough fundamental assumption upon which multiple
theories could be linked without contradiction. As ported from the hard sciences,
evolution housed the primary assumption of the survival of life through biological
adaptation and change. That core assumption closely paralleled political science’s core
concerns regarding quality of life without being beholden to any one JR theory.
Even so, the normative preference for evolution is practically justified by
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scientific parallels to historical state and system development. The foundational
principles of the collective processes of evolution mimic the historical patterns of state
and system development. State power competitions within realism, economic and
institutional cooperation within liberalism, and stratification within international class
theory are reflected in the competition-cooperation-specialization principles of evolution.
These principles merely had to be matched between the hard and social sciences,
mapping their logical pattern and creating a chronology of their occurrence in IR.
A second normative position fundamental to metafunctionalism also requires
justification as a nontraditional preference in IR. An ecosocial view of the system and
state was adopted in lieu of the traditional nonenvironmental views of realism, liberalism,
and international class theory. An ecosocial view of the system and state was necessary
to present the ecosystem as integral to IR discourse. Metafunctionalism had to reflect the
growing importance of environmental preservation that has evolved in the past twenty
years. Without an ecosocial view, the state cannot truly be viewed in a holistic fashion.
The principles of ecostasis and functional cost are dynamically linked to the environment
and would have little operational value without the state being perceived in
environmental terms.
The Problem of Repetitiveness
This study is inherently repetitive due to the interlinked nature of the determinants
in the state’s behavior. This study holds realist, liberal, international class, structure and
function, leadership style, and woridview characteristics as inherently linked in varying
degrees. As a result, discussing the determinants of each characteristic necessarily
involves a discussion of other related determinant characteristics. This occurs in the
discussion of each of the characteristics and becomes increasingly repetitive in any
regional study. The problem of repetition does not detract from the validity of the
findings but requires multiple rehearsals of similar information.
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APPENDIX
STRUCTURAL POLARITY AND SYSTEM CHANGE
Metafunctionalism: Structural Polarity and the Diffusion of Consolidated State
Power
Based on the specific characteristics of structure and unit relations, international
systems will likely be either polar static and agonistic, polar static and reciprocally
altruistic, polar dynamic and reciprocally altruistic, or polar dynamic and agonistic. Each
combination results in its own processes, functions, and outcomes, accompanied by a
specific diffusion of consolidated power within the system. Select combinations of
structural and relational characteristics engender greater degrees of compatibility leading
to systemic stability, while other combinations of characteristics are highly incompatible,
producing increasing levels of dysfunctionality and instability.’
Historically, since the mid l7~~ century most functional mternational systems for a
majority of their lifespan have been either polar static and agonistic, creating stability
through limited competition, or polar dynamic and reciprocally altruistic, creating
stability through increased cooperation and expansion. Most dysfunctional systems have
historically been polar dynamic and agonistic, resulting in greater conflict between a
larger bloc of vertically mobile competing states, or polar static and reciprocally
altruistic, resulting in conflict due to restricted vertical mobility and reward for increasing
This particular explanation of the diffusion of consolidated power and structural polarity was




However, the most important outcome of the state’s characteristics is the resulting
diffusion of consolidated power. Consolidated power refers to the most constant active
elements of aggregate power upon which system structures and processes may be built
and maintained. These elements include a constant economic and fmancial revenue
stream, territorial availability, an active modem communications network, modem naval
and air forces, and multiregional or global diplomatic offices. Consolidated state power
diffuses around the core processes through which the system functions and as a result
place key states at the center of systemic organization. The different combinations of
structural and relational characteristics upon which the system is constructed result in
varying patterns in the diffusion of consolidated power throughout the system. Structural
polarity, or the point of greatest diffusion of consolidated power within the system,
becomes the basis around which system organization revolves.
Historically, polar static agonistic systems have limited the accumulation of vast
consolidated power to between 4 and 10 states, resulting in a multipolar diffusion of
structural polarity. The processes of the system are managed by this limited number of
states, decreasing the probability of major conflict that exponentially increases as the
number of powerful states increases. Likewise, polar static altruistic systems have also
historically resulted in a multipolar diffusion of consolidated power by limiting the
accumulation of vast aggregate state power to between 4 and 10 states. Systemic
processes and mechanisms facilitating both broad and specific state cooperation are
managed by this limited number of states. The limited number facilitates cooperation,
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which is most easily established and feasibly managed among smaller rather than larger
groups. Increasing numbers of vertically mobile states decrease the prospects for early
cooperation by presenting too many interests to be taken into consideration in the
decision-making process
Historically, polar dynamic agonistic systems have placed no structural limits on
the accumulation of vast aggregate state power States in the system are generally
vertically mobile with the ability to rise within the mternational status quo. This form of
system develops in an environment where the general interests of the states of the system
converge around two opposing positions. The dominant relational paradigm of the
system is competition, which is defmed by these two divergent positions or ideologies.
The states on either side cooperate with each other in order to effectively compete and
balance the opposing side. The cooperation on each side of the system is managed by the
state that has accumulated enough aggregate power to facilitate the processes and
mechanisms of cooperation on its side. Those two states then further manage the
competition of convergent interests and ideology for their respective sides between
themselves. As a result, the polar dynamic agonistic system produces a bipolar diffusion
of systemic polarity that diffuses the greatest accumulation of consolidated power to two
states. The bipolarity within the system hinges the processes of competition, conflict
management, and limited cooperation on the aggregate capabilities of 2 states as opposed
to4to 10.
Historically, polar dynamic altruistic systems have produced a unipolar diffusion
of systemic polarity. This type of system has historically emerged proceeding the
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collapse of a bipolar ordering of the international system in which one of the two primary
centers of the diffusion of consolidated power collapses or ceases to exist. The largest
diffusion of consolidated power continues to accumulate to the only remaining state with
enough aggregate power to facilitate and manage the processes and functions of the entire
system. With only a single state capable of maintaining and managing the system,
general state interests converge around the hegemonic state in the interest of maintaining
systemic order and stability. Without the element of bipolar competing interests, the
general behavioral tendency of the states of the system transitions from competition and
limited cooperation to general cooperation facilitated by a single hegemonic state. With
few exceptions, the structure of the system generally continues to place no formal
limitations on the accumulation of vast aggregate power. States continue to be generally
vertically mobile with the ability to rise within the international status quo. The
organization of the system in terms of its processes, functions, and outcomes is
dynamically linked to the aggregate capabilities of a single state.
A second possible outcome of a polar dynamic altruistic system is a symbiopolar
diffusion of systemic polarity. In a symbiopolar diffusion of power, the organization of
the system’s processes and functions is facilitated by the interdependence and
intercooperation of the two states with the largest accumulation of aggregate power. The
structure and stability of the system is dynamically linked to the aggregate capabilities of
two states as opposed to one, or more than three. A symbiopolar diffusion of
consolidated state power occurs where the two states having amassed the greatest
accumulation of aggregate power do not have enough consolidated power to manage or
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maintain the system individually. In a system predicated on cooperative relations, each is
individually incapable of sufficiently facilitating the mechanisms by which to foster and
maintain system-wide cooperation.
However, even though insufficient individually, together in concert, these two
states have sufficient consolidated power to maintain and manage a functional system
structure. Through establishing a symbiotic relationship, they are able to facilitate a
greater degree of system-wide cooperation, balance, and deterrence than either state
could achieve by itself. Their cooperation produces economic and political incentives for
system-wide cooperation and dissuades them from engaging in conflict based on the
overwhelming size of their combined security deterrents. Management of the system
occurs within the context of negotiations between two interdependent parties, creating
great degrees of stability based on a confluence of intermingled interests.
A symbiopolar ordering of the international system is without historical precedent
at the international level but has been observed at the regional level. Symbiopolarity is
significantly distinguished from bipolarity by its predominantly cooperative relations
within a reciprocally altruistic system. In contrast, bipolarity is historically predicated on
competition and limited cooperation within a predominantly agonistic system of
relations 2
2 The term and concept of “symbiopolarity” was originally developed by the researcher in this study.
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